Saturday, February 25, 2023

Second Thoughts About the ‘Third Rail?’

In recent days—notably at the State of the Union address—Social Security is back in the headlines.

Granted, its invocation seems largely intended as a political dividing rod, but it seems today that the vast majority (and despite the veiled insinuations, perhaps the entirety) of Congress and the President are committed to that system’s preservation, or at least rebutting its diminution. It appears that touching Social Security remains the “third rail” of American politics. That said, it’s going to take more than bold podium pontifications to fulfill that commitment.

It’s been called a Ponzi scheme by its critics—and, while not technically correct, there is a familiar element at work—the notion that money being deposited to the system now is basically going to be paid out to other beneficiaries. Indeed, in most Ponzi structures the scheme “runner” generally pays off longer-term participants with money invested by newer investors. Sooner or later, there are not enough new investors to fulfill those expectations and the whole thing blows up—though, depending on the sales skills of the Ponzi purveyor (and the expectations of the investors), it can run for years. Certainly one of the funding issues with Social Security is a result of having fewer new contributors relative to the payout to older participants,[i] if not by number, then by contribution amount(s).    

However, technically speaking, Social Security is not an investment program. Despite those individual withholding statements provided occasionally by the Social Security Administration, nobody has a Social Security “account” into which all those years of FICA withholdings (not to mention the employer contributions) are deposited. People who see those Social Security checks in retirement as a return of the money they put in (with interest) are misguided (at best), though politicians have long found it in their interest for workers to see a link between the two.

Whatever that system’s historic success, and the dependence of the nation’s retirees on its benefits, most surveys find a deep skepticism among the populace as to its long-term financial viability. However, that’s not a new sentiment. Along the way adjustments have been made over time to address those potential shortfalls—the retirement age has been lifted, the taxes withheld from current pay to fund that system have been increased, the benefits eventually paid from that system have been subjected to taxation (effectively reducing benefits)—and these days, most honest politicians will admit that those same kinds of changes will be required again to avert a future crisis.

Whatever you want to call it, to my eyes, Social Security is basically a societal retirement income insurance policy. Those FICA withholdings are premiums and, depending on our life circumstances, we may or may not collect on it. One thing is for sure, however: Whether it’s for life insurance, car insurance, or Social Security, when we make those payments, we expect that we will receive the benefit(s) for which we contracted. Older workers are, naturally, counting on receiving those benefits—because they have been told they can expect them by a reliable source, because they have spent a lifetime dutifully making those payments, and because they have seen their elders do the same.

Not only that, just try finding a retirement income needs projection that doesn’t have as a foundational baseline Social Security benefits. Or consider that an emerging strategy to compensate for retirement savings shortfalls is to use those savings to postpone Social Security claiming in order to maximize those benefits.[ii] Indeed, considering how many Americans rely on Social Security as their sole—or at least a primary—source of retirement income, you’d think addressing the looming shortfall would be a matter of high priority for policy makers. But for the most part—and the current enflamed rhetoric notwithstanding—it unfortunately still seems to be a problem that everyone agrees—someone else needs to fix.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD 

[i] In 2022, there were an estimated 2.8 covered workers per each Social Security beneficiary. By 2035, the Trustees estimate there will be 2.3 covered workers for each beneficiary.

[ii] Some of the pushback on that argument is a concern that those future benefits will be trimmed—directly or through expanded “means” testing.

Saturday, February 18, 2023

'Hidden' Figures

This week was Valentine's Day—and, as usual, there’s been the typical seasonal promotions for flowers, candy, and even pajamas. 

I’ve been pretty good over the years remembering those type events—anniversaries (wedding AND dating), birthdays and, yes—Valentine’s Day. But sometimes the time gap between my remembering the date and actually getting around to doing something to commemorate it has been problematic. With Valentine’s Day that can be particularly painful, if only because so many others are scrambling to do the same thing—and at a time when delivery services (and costs), not to mention growing season(s) can be in short supply, relative to the need.

Several years back, I was running late in my preparations—and spotted an email touting a dozen roses for $24.99 (they’re a LOT more expensive now). Of course, for that price (even then), you could only get them in red (though it was Valentine’s Day, after all), and you actually got a glass vase included in that price (with options to “upgrade,” of course). 

So, I’m feeling pretty good about my bargain-hunting, but then the “other” charges emerged; “standard” delivery was another $12.99, and—at least at that (late) date, it cost (another) $9.99 to guarantee Valentine’s Day delivery, another $14.99 if you want it there in the morning, and there’s a “care & handling charge” of $2.99, regardless of delivery date or time. In fact, by the time you add in taxes those $24.99 roses will run you… well, quite a bit more than $24.99.

Not that you’ll see that all presented in one place—well, until the very last screen, anyway.

Surprise ‘Zing’ 

I wonder sometimes if that isn’t how those who request a hardship withdrawal feel—though, disclosures notwithstanding, it’s not like they can see what it’s actually going to cost at the point they make the request.

Oh, they know the amount they need, and presumably request. But then there’s the 20% withholding that comes off the top, but then, come tax time, they’ll find out if that 20% withholding was “enough.” At the same time, they’ll likely discover the 10% penalty (for those who aren’t yet 59½). Less obvious is the retirement savings “ground” they’ve lost to the customary six-month suspension of contributions (and match). And that’s not considering the 401(k) loan they likely had to take first because, after all, we have to make really, really sure that you absolutely have no other way to get to that money. Those “surprises” are likely to be lessened with the emergency savings and withdrawal provisions of the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022, of course.[i] 

And then there are the surprises that come WITH retirement. That’s when you “discover” the DISadvantage of pre-tax savings, as Uncle Sam (and his state and city “cousins”) line up for their postponed “cut.” It’s also when Social Security (and Medicare) look to that as fresh income against which benefits (and the cost of benefits) is now means-tested (a.k.a. reduced/taxed).   

Now, if all that seems like a particularly depressing theme for Valentine’s Day, fear not. The impact of the “hidden” costs of retirement—like the hidden costs of that floral arrangement can be muted, if not mitigated, by not waiting until the very last minute to make preparations …

- Nevin E. Adams, JD 


[i] We’ll save for another day the potential impacts on future retirement savings.

Saturday, February 11, 2023

Could Super Bowl LVII Flummox Your 401(k)?

Will your 401(k) be chipped by the Chiefs—or soar with the Eagles?

That’s what adherents of the so-called Super Bowl Indicator[1] would likely conclude, after all. It’s a “theory” that when a team from the old National Football League wins the Super Bowl, the S&P 500 will rise, and when a team from the old American Football League prevails, stock prices will fall.

It’s a “theory” that has been found to be correct nearly 80% of the time—for 41 of the 56 Super Bowls, in fact. Not that it hasn’t had its shortcomings.

One need to look back no further than last year’s victory by the Los Angeles Rams that should have been a portent of good times, only to see the S&P 500 slump more than 19% for its biggest loss since 2008.  And while the previous year’s victory by the NFC’s Tampa Bay Buccaneers bolstered the premise behind the “theory,” the year before that the win by the AFC’s (and original AFL) Kansas City Chiefs over the then-NFC Champion San Francisco 49ers undermined its track record (or did your 401(k) miss that 18.4% rise in the S&P 500?). Or how about the year before that when the AFC’s New England Patriots (who once upon a time were the AFL’s Boston Patriots) bested the NFC champion Los Angeles Rams—but the S&P 500 was up more than 30% that year (2019).

Or, looking the other way, the year before that a win by the NFC champion Philadelphia Eagles (back for this year’s contest) against the AFC Champion Patriots turned out to be a loser, marketwise, with the S&P 500 down more than 6% (though for most of the year it was quite a different story). Ditto the year before, when the epic comeback by those same AFC Champion Patriots against the then-NFC champion Atlanta Falcons failed to forestall a 2017 market surge.

Now, one might think that the real “spoiler” to this market “theory” is the New England Patriots—but the year before that, the AFC’s (and original AFL) Broncos’ 24-10 victory over the Carolina Panthers, who represented the NFC, also proved to be an “exception.”

Market Makings

You might well wonder why, in view of that consistent string of “exceptions” that we’re still talking about this “theory”—but, as it turns out, that’s an unusual (albeit consistent) break in the streak that was sustained in 2015 following Super Bowl XLIX, when the AFC’s New England Patriots (yes, they show up a lot) bested the Seattle Seahawks 28-24 to earn their fourth Super Bowl title.

It also “worked” in 2014, when the Seahawks bumped off the legacy AFL Denver Broncos, and in 2013, when a dramatic fourth-quarter comeback rescued a victory by the Baltimore Ravens—who, though representing the AFC, are technically a legacy NFL team via their Cleveland Browns roots (this is where things start to get confusing, as the Ravens, who were the Browns moved to Baltimore in 1995 (though the NFL still views them as an expansion team) filling the hole left by the then-Baltimore Colts’ 1984 “dead of night” move to Indianapolis.

Admittedly, the fact that the markets fared well in 2013 was hardly a true test of the Super Bowl Theory since, as it turned out, both teams in Super Bowl XLVII—the Ravens and the San Francisco 49ers—were, technically, NFL legacy teams.

However, consider that in 2012 a team from the old NFL (the New York Giants) took on—and took down—one from the old AFL (the New England Patriots—yes, those New England Patriots… again). And, in fact, 2012 was a pretty good year for stocks.

Steel ‘Curtains’?

On the other hand, the year before that, the Pittsburgh Steelers (representing the American Football Conference) took on the National Football Conference’s Green Bay Packers—two teams that had some of the oldest, deepest and, yes, most “storied” NFL roots, with the Steelers formed in 1933 (as the Pittsburgh Pirates) and the Packers founded in 1919. According to the Super Bowl Theory, 2011 should have been a good year for stocks (because, regardless of who won, a legacy NFL team would prevail).

But as some may recall, while the Dow gained ground for the year, the S&P 500 was, well, flat (dare we say “deflated”?).

And then there was the string of Super Bowls where the contests were all between legacy NFL teams (thus, no matter who won, the markets should have risen):

  • 2006, when the Steelers bested the Seattle Seahawks;
  • 2007, when the Indianapolis Colts (those old Baltimore Colts) beat the Chicago Bears 29-17;
  • 2009, when the Pittsburgh Steelers took on the Arizona Cardinals (who had once been the NFL’s St. Louis Cardinals); and
  • 2010, when the New Orleans Saints bested the Indianapolis Colts, who, as we’ve already remarked, had roots dating back to the NFL legacy Baltimore Colts.

Sure enough, the markets were higher in each of those years.

As for 2008? Well, that was the year that the NFC’s New York Giants upended the hopes of the AFL-legacy Patriots (yes, those Patriots) for a perfect season, but it didn’t do any favors for the stock market. In fact, that was the last time that the Super Bowl Theory didn’t “work” (well, until the year before last—oh, and the year before that—and the year before…).

Patriot Gains

Times were better for Patriots fans in 2005, when they bested the NFC’s Philadelphia Eagles 24-21 (yep, those Eagles). Indeed, according to the Super Bowl Theory, the markets should have been down that year—but the S&P 500 rose 2.55%.

Of course, Super Bowl Theory proponents would tell you that the 2002 win by the New England Patriots accurately foretold the continuation of the bear market into a third year (at the time, the first accurate result in five years). But the Patriots’ 2004 Super Bowl win against the Carolina Panthers (the one that probably nobody except Patriots fans and disappointed Panthers advocates remember because it was overshadowed by the infamous “wardrobe malfunction”) failed to anticipate a fall rally that helped push the S&P 500 to a near 9% gain that year, sacking the indicator for another loss (couldn’t resist).

Bronco ‘Busters’

Consider also that, despite victories by the AFL-legacy Denver Broncos in 1998 and 1999, the S&P 500 continued its winning ways, while victories by the NFL-legacy St. Louis (by way of Los Angeles) Rams (that have since returned to the City of Angels) and the Baltimore Ravens (those former “Browns”) did nothing to dispel the bear markets of 2000 and 2001, respectively.

In fact, the Super Bowl Theory “worked” 28 times between 1967 and 1997, then went 0-4 between 1998 and 2001, only to get back on track from 2002 on (though “purists” still dispute how to interpret Tampa Bay’s 2003 victory, since the Buccaneers spent their first NFL season in the AFC before moving to the NFC).

Indeed, the Buccaneers’ move to the NFC was part of a swap with the Seattle Seahawks, who did, in fact, enter the NFL as an NFC team in 1976 but shuttled quickly over to the AFC (where they remained through 2001) before returning to the NFC.[2] And, not having entered the league until 1976, regardless of when they began, can the Seahawks truly be considered a “legacy” NFL squad?

Bear in mind as well, that in 2006, when the Seahawks made their first Super Bowl appearance—and lost—the S&P 500 gained nearly 16%.

As noted above, the Eagles have played in three Super Bowls—but only won once—defeating Tom Brady and the New England Patriots 41-33 in Super Bowl LII in 2017 (they previously lost to the Oakland Raiders in Super Bowl XV and to the Patriots in Super Bowl XXXIX). But those outcomes haven’t really lined up with what the Super Bowl Theory suggests. 

As for the Chiefs, they’ve been there before—four times—but with long stretches in between and mixed results. They were in the very first (though back then it was called the AFL-NFL World Championship Game), losing to the Green Bay Packers, but made it back to Super Bowl IV, where they beat the Minnesota Vikings (the first of the four Super Bowls that team would lose). And then, it was a long 50-year stretch between then and 2020 when they bested the 49ers 31-20—only to come back the next year (2021)—and lose to Tom Brady and the Tampa Bay Buccaneers in Super Bowl LV. Again, a mixed contribution to the SB Theory.

The Eagles are the designated “home” team—and given that the game is taking place in an NFC Stadium, so this doesn’t come as a surprise. That said, they’re going to be wearing their home green jerseys—and the Chiefs will be wearing white—and the team wearing white jerseys in the Super Bowl has won 15 of the last 18 Super Bowls (though the last time Kansas City won they were wearing red).

One more thing to watch for those of you into such things; the winner of the coin toss has lost the Super Bowl eight straight years. In fact, the last team to win the coin toss and win the game—was the Seahawks against the Broncos in Super Bowl XLVIII. Yeah, it’s been a while.

Finally—if you’re feeling like the Super Bowl is later and later, you’re not imagining things. In fact, this year’s contest is the SECOND latest ever. The latest? Last year’s contest between the Rams and the Bengals.

All in all, and particularly in view of the exciting playoff games that have led up to it, it looks like it should be a good game.

And that—whether you are a proponent of the Super Bowl Theory or not—would be one in which regardless of which team wins, we all do!

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

[1] An alternate theory linking the Super Bowl to stock market performance in reverse fashion postulates that Wall Street’s results can be used to predict the outcome of the game. According to this theory, if the Dow rises from the end of November until Super Bowl game day, the team whose full name appears later in the alphabet will win. Some people have too much time on their hands….

[2] Note: Seattle is the only team to have played in both the AFC and NFC Championship Games, having relocated from the AFC to the NFC during league realignment prior to the 2002 season. The Seahawks are the only NFL team to switch conferences twice in the post-merger era. The franchise began play in 1976 in the NFC West division but switched conferences with the Buccaneers after one season and joined the AFC West.

Saturday, February 04, 2023

A Change of "Hearths"

There are few things more disruptive to the peace or clarity of a 401(k) plan than a switch in recordkeepers.

Let’s face it—change—even change for the better—is frequently disruptive to the human psyche. Most of us tend to drift into comfortable “ruts” of pattern, or perhaps habit—places where we know what to expect and, roughly anyway, when to expect it. And, at least in my experience, the more frazzled your existence, the more one pines for these oases of quiet and relative clarity.

That’s true, of course, even when the change is instigated by a regular, thoughtful, focused evaluation of the alternatives; and certainly when that change is the product of a desperate quest driven by a truly awful service relationship. But it is perhaps particularly disruptive when the change is thrust on the plan by forces outside of its control or instigation—and for the thousands of plans that have recently or are in the process of a change in recordkeepers due to industry consolidation.

Some changes are less impactful than others on the plan’s daily administration, of course. Changes that trigger a mass departure of key staff can be upsetting, and those that necessitate moving to a new processing platform even more so. Change that requires communication to participants is anathema to most plan sponsors. On the other hand, recordkeeper changes that result in additional resources, better capabilities, a clearer focus, and a stronger commitment to “the business” are not as rare as one might fear.

But—whether for good or ill—a change in recordkeepers—regardless of the motivating forces behind the move—is one of those “choices” that plan fiduciaries are expected under ERISA to evaluate as a prudent expert. And so, regardless of whether the change appears to be good, bad, or inconsequential on its face, plan fiduciaries can be expected to know:

How much your plan pays in fees. And to whom. And for what.

The essence of a recordkeeper/service evaluation is the determination that the services provided—and the fees paid for those services—are reasonable. It starts, of course, with knowing how much is being paid for those services. But you can’t know if those fees are reasonable without knowing the services they support. But this analysis also involves a determination that the services provided are appropriate.  That starts with enumerating the services you received prior to the move—and checking those against the one(s) your new arrangement provides.  

What revenue-sharing is (and where it goes).

At a high level, revenue-sharing is just the redistribution of fees paid to one provider to another. It can be a relatively straightforward matter of compensating a sub-contractor, though in retirement plans it’s generally 12(b)1 marketing/distribution fees collected by a mutual fund company and “shared” with the recordkeeper that is actually doing the “distribution” of the funds. There is a general trend away from such practices—but if they are in place, you need to know how much, to whom, and how they’re paid.

How your investment menu might change.

Changes in recordkeepers don’t always involve shifts in the investment menu offered to participants, though they can and often do. And even if they haven’t—and if you have reviewed them recently—the change in recordkeepers can be a good opportunity to reconsider/affirm your investment options to make sure not only that they are prudent, but that they (still) meet the needs of your workforce, and the objectives of your benefit program.

And you might also want to:

Document your review/decision(s)

Whatever process you are using to evaluate your plan (this doesn’t require a recordkeeper change), the goals and objectives in doing so should be written down, as should the conclusions drawn from the exercise. You might get there with a simple committee review, or perhaps something more formal—like a request for proposal (particularly if you have the time to do so ahead of the move). Indeed, odds are a formal benchmarking process or RFP will produce documentation of those conclusions/considerations as a natural outcome. But if it doesn’t, you should make the effort to make sure it does.

A change in recordkeepers is a good opportunity to reconsider your plan’s design and operations—and one that, as a prudent plan fiduciary—you’re expected to.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD