5 Dangerous Fiduciary Assumptions

There’s an old saying that when you assume… well, here are some assumptions that can create real headaches for retirement plan fiduciaries.

Assuming that the worst-case deadline for depositing participant contributions IS the deadline for depositing participant contributions.

The legal requirements for depositing contributions to the plan are perhaps the most widely misunderstood elements of plan administration. A delay in contribution deposits is also one of the most common signs that an employer is in financial trouble—and that the Labor Department is likely to investigate.

Note that the law requires that participant contributions be deposited in the plan as soon as it is reasonably possible to segregate them from the company’s assets, but no later than the 15th business day of the month following the payday. If employers can reasonably make the deposits sooner, they need to do so. Many have read the worst-case situation (the 15th business day of the month following) to be the legal requirement. It is not.

Assuming that not being required to have an investment policy statement means you don’t need to have an investment policy.

While plan advisers and consultants routinely counsel on the need for, and importance of, an investment policy statement (IPS), the reality is that the law does not require one, and thus, many plan sponsors—sometimes at the direction of legal counsel—choose not to put one in place.

Of course, while the law does not, in fact, specifically require a written IPS—think of it as investment guidelines for the plan—ERISA nonetheless basically anticipates that plan fiduciaries will conduct themselves as though they had one in place. And, generally speaking, plan sponsors (and the advisors they work with) will find it easier to conduct the plan’s investment business in accordance with a set of established, prudent standards—if those standards are already in writing, not crafted at a point in time when you are desperately trying to make sense of the markets.

In sum, you want an IPS in place before you need an IPS in place.

Assuming that ERISA’s required fiduciary bond covers your liability as an ERISA plan fiduciary. 

These are two very different things with similar names. Suffice it to say that the Fidelity Bond required by ERISA protects the plan and its participants from potential malfeasance on the part of those who handle plan assets. The plan is the named insured in the fidelity bond. 

On the other hand, Fiduciary Liability Insurance typically protects the plan’s fiduciaries from claims of a breach of fiduciary responsibilities—an important protection since ERISA plan fiduciaries have personal liability, not only for their actions, but for the actions of their co-fiduciaries. The cost of the insurance can be paid by the employer or by the plan fiduciary—but not from plan assets.

Assuming that hiring a fiduciary keeps you from being a fiduciary.

ERISA has a couple of very specific exceptions through which you can limit—but not eliminate—fiduciary obligations. The first has to do with the specific decisions made by a qualified investment manager—and, even then, a plan sponsor/fiduciary remains responsible for the prudent selection and monitoring of that investment manager’s activities on behalf of the plan.

The second exception has to do with specific investment decisions made by properly informed and empowered individual participants in accordance with ERISA Section 404(c). Here also, even if the plan meets the 404(c) criteria (and it is by no means certain it will), the plan fiduciary remains responsible for the prudent selection and monitoring of the options on the investment menu (and, as the Tibble case reminds us, that obligation is ongoing).

Outside of these two exceptions, the plan sponsor/fiduciary is essentially responsible for the quality of the investments of the plan—including those that participants make. Oh, and hiring a 3(16) fiduciary? Still on the hook as a fiduciary for selecting that provider.

Assuming you have to figure it all out on your own.

ERISA imposes a duty of prudence on plan fiduciaries that is often referred to as one of the highest duties known to law—and for good reason. Those fiduciaries must act “with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”

The “familiar with such matters” is the sticking point for those who might otherwise be inclined to simply adopt a “do unto others as you would have others do unto you” approach. Similarly, those who might be naturally predisposed toward a kind of Hippocratic, “first, do no harm” stance are afforded no such discretion under ERISA’s strictures. That said, the Department of Labor has stated that “[l]acking that expertise, a fiduciary will want to hire someone with that professional knowledge to carry out the investment and other functions.”

Simply stated, if you lack the skill, prudence and diligence of an expert in such matters, you are not only entitled to get help—you are expected to do so.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

A Guide Path for Your Glide Path(s)

A recent report—and a new wave of litigation—reminds us that all target-date funds are not designed the same. 

We all know that target-date funds are different, even if their names sometimes suggest otherwise.  Different management teams both set and monitor asset allocations—allocations that can vary widely with regard to the type and quantity of underlying assets. Fees can certainly be different, and some favor a reliance on passive investing versus an active engagement. But the difference that can often account for many of the other differences is the glide path, and more specifically the glide path’s “goal”—and here I am referring to the difference between funds that opt for a “to” retirement versus a “through” retirement focus. 

Now, admittedly it’s a “target date” fund, not necessarily a retirement date fund—and indeed if those were once upon a time considered one and the same, that’s apparently no longer the case. Indeed, and as a recent stream of litigation reminds us, the largest target-date fund providers these days are nearly all in what we call “through” retirement date funds, meaning that their glidepath is designed to carry you past the traditional retirement date “through” to the end of your life.

That’s not an illogical approach—after all, once you get to 65, your odds of making it to 85 (or beyond) are surprisingly good, and two decades is a lifetime[i] (and then some) when it comes to investment time horizons. Indeed, and without question, target-date funds have been a godsend for millions and millions of individuals who are time-pressed and lacking in investment expertise. Let’s face it, even those who have a fair degree of investment acumen find it challenging to keep up with the demands of personal portfolio management alongside the demands of a daily schedule. 

That said, a recent Morningstar whitepaper cautioned (in its title, helpfully) “Plan Sponsors May Not Always Consider Participants’ Behavior or Needs When Selecting Target-Date Glide Paths.” That paper cautioned that “through” glidepaths generally include around 13 percentage points more in equity at age 65 than their peers invested in “to” glide paths, as the average “through” series holds 46% in stocks versus just 33% for the average “to” series. That makes them riskier (or at least more volatile), and potentially riskier than those defaulted into those options may know—or desire.

Therein lies the rub—the Morningstar paper also reminds us that nearly a decade ago the Labor Department provided some "Tips for ERISA Fiduciaries" regarding target-date funds. Tips that included the importance of “Establish[ing] a process for comparing and selecting TDFs,” under which the Labor Department suggested that plan fiduciaries “… should consider how well the TDF’s characteristics align with eligible employees’ ages and likely retirement dates. It also may be helpful for plan fiduciaries to discuss with their prospective TDF providers the possible significance of other characteristics of the participant population, such as participation in a traditional defined benefit pension plan offered by the employer, salary levels, turnover rates, contribution rates and withdrawal patterns.”

Considering the variety of workforce demographics, and the relatively small number of target-date providers garnering the majority of money flowing into TDFs, it seems unlikely that many plan sponsors have yet really focused on the Labor Department’s tips, specifically with regard to questions of demographic alignment with the TDF glidepaths. For those who haven’t, it’s certainly worth a (re)consideration. 

And while you’re at it, it might be a good idea to make sure that it’s aligned with the communication and education to the participants who’ve been placed upon them.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i] More cynically perhaps, one can understand and appreciate the interests of those designing the glidepaths in assuming that those invested there would choose to continue to retain that investment expertise, rather than cycle it down and reinvest in a completely different asset class.

‘Damned’ (Even) If You Do

 The flurry of lawsuits unleashed on holders of the BlackRock LifePath target-date funds is not without precedent—but it’s surely a head scratcher.

I’m referring, of course, to the recent swarm of lawsuits challenging nearly a dozen of the nation’s largest 401(k) plans and their decision(s) to select, and hold, on their investment menu the BlackRock LifePath target-date fund suite. It’s a decision that the Shah Miller law firm (on behalf of multiple ex-participant plaintiffs) says was the result of fiduciaries who “chased low fees” over performance.[i]

Of course, it’s not unusual for these types of lawsuits cite obscure articles as authority, rely on Form 5500 data that often doesn’t tell the whole story, state as fact things that are really only theories (or opinions), lean on averages, or base comparative conclusions on surveys distorted by sampling size or content. 

But in a characterization straight out of George Orwell’s 1984, this one draws straight from a point of analysis that, to my eyes, anyway, seems to say one thing while the plaintiffs’ attorneys claim to see something completely the opposite. “War is peace,” if you will.

Setting aside for a minute the reality that performance isn’t necessarily indicative of an imprudent process[ii]—and that it’s been far more common over the past two decades for fiduciaries to be challenged on the allegedly “excessive” fees than performance (though the latter is often tagged on to the fee claim), the plaintiffs here have challenged the selection of a fund suite that Morningstar has identified as among the “best” in that category—run by an “innovative team with topnotch resources.”

Nor is the Morningstar evaluation irrelevant here—indeed, the plaintiffs lean heavily on it to draw their conclusions of poor performance, though they do so primarily by challenging the benchmark, insisting that the suite be benchmarked against other target-date suites—despite their striking difference in focus and glidepath. See, the BlackRock series operates with a “to” retirement date focus, rather than the “through” retirement focus that most others in this space have now embraced (and all of the ones the plaintiffs point to). That means, of course, that the asset allocation, certainly in the components nearing retirement age, are more conservative than those that are managing for 20-30 years beyond that. And—in bull markets, anyway—more conservative often means lower performance. On the other hand—and certainly if your goal is to wind down your investment risk as you approach retirement… and here one can’t help but remember 2008… (not to mention 2022…) 

Not that the BlackRock glidepaths are overly conservative—in fact, the Morningstar commentary (and the lawsuits that cite it) acknowledge that for newer target date funds—those for younger investors—BlackRock’s have tended to be more equity-laden, at least compared with those the plaintiffs would have serve as its benchmark. This lawsuits seem to mistake this difference for some kind of “equity discrepancy,” rather than a deliberate, thoughtful glidepath, one oriented to do what all target-date funds once claimed to—to move to more conservative asset allocations as one neared the target date (and, arguably still do, though the “throughs” have a different endpoint in mind). 

There is, of course, a certain tendency among plan fiduciaries to seek the comfort of the pack in making plan design and investment decisions—which is understandable when one considers the personal liability that comes with that assignment. But these suits seem to create a not-so-subtle inference that any glidepath that varies from the through retirement “pack” is going to be viewed as imprudent—not based on a bad or unreasoned theory, but rather based on a specific time window when certain strategies simply don’t match those of different philosophies. 

So, how is this particular approach constructed? The analysts at Morningstar see it this way: “This index-based series benefits from BlackRock’s robust approach to asset allocation and a research-intensive culture. They keep costs low by investing exclusively in passive index funds, though this gives management fewer tools to outperform over shorter periods compared with more active strategies that can tactically tilt the portfolio or select talented active managers. Yet, the team continues to innovate, with current research looking at ways to get targeted fixed-income exposures across the glide path.”

The report goes on to note that, “Continuing to revisit prior assumptions and make proactive changes that are backed by rigorous research gives us confidence that the team will continue to evolve the series over the long term to investors’ benefit.”

Little wonder then that the BlackRock suite winds up with a “gold” Morningstar Analyst rating. 

What’s harder to figure out is why the plaintiffs’ bar decided to take to task the large plans and plan fiduciaries that opted for this suite and approach. 

Well, perhaps except for the obvious.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i] There were other allegations that varied with the plan targeted, but the LifePath funds and performance was the dominant claim.

[ii] At this juncture we have no way to know what processes, if any, the charged plan fiduciaries have in place to provide the prudent process and review required of plan fiduciaries—not that the plaintiffs have kept that from inferring its absence. 

Could ESG Options Undermine Participant Outcomes?

Despite surveys to the contrary, a new study finds that overall interest in ESG strategies by participants is “relatively weak” and “driven by naïve diversification.”

The difference may, of course, be attributed to the difference between what individuals say—and what they actually do. Unlike surveys that purport to capture participant (and plan sponsor) sentiments, the research by David Blanchett of PGIM and Zhikun Liu of the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) looks at the actual allocation decisions of 9,324[i] newly enrolled DC participants who are self-directing their accounts in a DC plan that offers at least one ESG fund. 

‘Weak Preferences’

They do so in a paper titled “ESG Fund Allocations Among New, Do-It-Yourself Defined Contribution Plan Participants,” they claim to find that overall interest in ESG strategies among these participants is “relatively weak,” with only 8.9% of participants having any allocation to an ESG fund and average allocations to ESG strategies of just 18.7% among those holding any ESG funds.[ii] Indeed, while they note “some clear demographic preferences for ESG funds (e.g., among younger participants with higher incomes),” they find that ESG allocations appear to be “primarily a function of weak preferences, driven by naïve diversification.”

Now, that hardly sounds like the heightened interest and engagement with those options that some participant surveys have captured (well, aside from that by younger participants with higher deferral rates and higher incomes). However, the research claims that the two factors which appeared to drive the largest allocations to ESG funds were not related to participant demographics, but rather the number of funds in the participant portfolio and the percentage of participants in the respective DC plan allocating to an ESG fund. 

If that seems a confusing descriptor, they found a “notable increase” in the probability of owning an ESG fund as the number of portfolio holdings increases—basically, the more funds the individual holds, the more likely he or she is to have an ESG offering among them. This tendency they characterized as attributable to “naïve diversification”—again, basically, if you’re simply picking a larger number of funds overall, then they concluded that the decision to allocate to the ESG fund is “likely based on a weak preference, not necessarily conviction in ESG.” Said another way, if you’re picking a lot of different funds, the more you pick, the better the odds that an ESG fund will (randomly) be among them.

On the other hand, those looking for a more optimistic future for ESG might take heart from their conclusion that “the fact ESG allocations increase as more participants in a plan allocate to ESG funds suggests plan interest effects could be an especially strong driver of future growth in ESG funds (despite relatively low usage today).” In fact, they noted a “notable plan interest effect, whereby ESG allocations are significantly higher in plans where general ESG usage is higher.”

Plan Sponsor Cautions

That said, the current decision-making by those participants appears to be “sub-optimal” (worse than you might expect) from a return standpoint—with the researchers here basically finding that participants who self-direct their portfolios have significantly lower expected returns than those using professionally managed investment options, such as target-date funds—something that proponents of professionally managed asset allocation solutions shouldn’t find surprising. To put it another way, those more likely to pick ESG funds are more likely to be the “do it yourself” (DIY) types—and those don’t do as well as those professionally managed solutions. This, as the researchers point out, can be an “important consideration for plan sponsors when adding ESG funds to the core menu to the extent they entice participants to self-direct their accounts.” So, adding an ESG fund might encourage more DIY investing by those interested in ESG—and that interest pulls them away from the professionally managed, higher-returning alternatives.   

In fact, an additional analysis suggests that those DIY participants have expected returns that are approximately 100 basis points lower than investors using professionally managed portfolios, such as target-date funds and managed accounts. And this, the researchers comment, suggests that adding ESG funds to core menus may create additional implicit return “costs” for participants—by adding those options that encourage participants to make choices other than professionally managed multi-asset options (e.g., target-date funds).[iii]

Overall, the researchers comment that their analysis paints a “mixed picture about the actual participant interest, and drivers of demand, for ESG funds in DC plans and suggests that plan sponsors should take a thoughtful approach when considering adding ESG funds to an existing core menu.”

Or—it seems fair to say—when adding (or subtracting) any funds at all.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i] Of the 9,324 participants included in the dataset, only 833 had some allocation to an ESG fund, which is 8.9% of the total.

[ii] Among participants with an allocation to an ESG fund, the average allocation was 18.7%, with a standard deviation of 19.0%. The total average balance allocation to ESG funds is 1.7% (including all participants). There are only 56 participants (0.6% of the total) with ESG allocations greater than 50% of their balance and only 19 participants (0.2% of the total) with 100% of their balance in ESG funds. “In other words, even among participants who select the ESG funds, they almost always play a relatively supporting role as part of the overall portfolio.”

[iii] Some of the issues here are no doubt a consequence of current menu constructions. In the sampling studied, no plan offered more than five ESG funds, and the vast majority (approximately 76%) offered only one ESG fund. “This suggests it would be relatively difficult to build a diversified portfolio using only the ESG funds in DC plans currently,” the authors note. Moreover—and adding to the reality that it is “relatively difficult to build a truly diversified portfolio using only ESG funds”—they explain that roughly half of all ESG funds available are large blend funds. Only 13 of the funds (8.7% of the identifiable category total) are fixed income funds, and only 12 (8.1% of the identifiable total) are balanced funds. “The difficulty associated with building a diversified portfolio with only ESG funds has important implications on overall portfolio efficiency. If allocating to ESG funds requires participants to opt out of using a professionally managed portfolio option (e.g., target-date funds or retirement managed accounts), it may negatively impact future expected returns”—a cost the authors say they plan to quantify in a future work.