“Miss” Perceptions?

Next week we will launch our eighth annual search for the nation’s best retirement plan advisers.

Each year, we receive a number of inquiries from advisers about the awards, many that fall into a category I tend to think of as “exploratory”—feelers as to what we are looking for.

Well, at its core, what we hope to acknowledge—and, thus, what we are looking for—hasn’t changed at all from when we first launched the award in 2005: advisers who make a difference by enhancing the nation’s retirement security, through their support of plan sponsor and plan participant information, support, and education. And, since its inception, we’ve focused on advisers who do so through quantifiable measures: increased participation, higher deferral rates, better plan and participant asset allocation, and delivering expanded service and/or better expense management.

Now, we’ve always tried to be very transparent about the award, and the process that underlies the selection. That said, I know that some have questions—and perhaps misperceptions—about the award and how it is administered. So, based on conversations I have had with some of you over time, not to mention the general inquiries that emerge around an award that garners this much attention, here are five things you should know about PLANSPONSOR’s Retirement Plan Adviser of the Year award:

(1) It’s NOT a personality contest. Sure, advisers who are nominated by 30 of their closest friends and wholesalers stand out (though only after you’ve passed the quantitative round). But even then you get no extra points for having support in the “community.”

(2) You will have to provide actual data about the impact your firm is making on things that really matter. We look at participation rates, deferral increases, participant asset allocations, and even fee negotiations. And we will talk to your plan sponsor clients (and expect them to confirm your data). If you don’t have, or aren’t monitoring, those kinds of data, you probably aren’t ready for this award.

(3) Award semi-finalists and finalists are chosen based on a blind review of qualification data. Our process selects semi-finalists and finalists based solely on data and screened reference checks. Only after the finalists have been selected are their names known to the judges.

(4) Our judges sign nondisclosure agreements. Yes, we have judges for this award—judges who not only know the space, but know how to evaluate the data. Two of the five judges for each award are advisers; prior winners of the award, in fact. We have always thought their perspective was important as a “real world” check on the award criteria. That said, we understand that some advisers might be reluctant about sharing data about their practice1 with potential competitors—and our judges agree, in writing, to respect the confidentiality of that information.

(5) Those who don’t participate don’t win. It may be an honor “just to be nominated,” but those who don’t respond completely and accurately to the aforementioned requests for information don’t make it past the nomination round.

May the best adviser(s) win—and, based on our prior winners,they generally do.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

Editor’s Note: Those who have additional questions should feel free to e-mail me at nevin.adams@assetinternational.com, or Alison Cooke-Mintzer at acooke@assetinternational.com

More background information on the award is available HERE
Additional information is available here


1 We’re not talking about client lists here; average rates of deferral and savings across your client base, your average client size, that kind of thing.

Double Dipping?

Last week, Fidelity published some data from their quarterly analysis of participant activity.

For the very most part, the data (see Fidelity Finds Q2 Uptick in 401(k) Withdrawals) revealed what we have come to expect from such reviews: Participants continue to stay the course, deferral rates are largely unchanged (average was 8%), and more increased their rate of deferral (5.3%) than decreased it (2.9%) in the most recent quarter. Additionally, the balance recovery continues apace, with the average account balance up 15% (though for this good news, you have to reach for a year-over-year comparison, because Q2 figures to be a pretty rough one for participant accounts—down 7.6% in Fidelity’s database).

However, this report drew more than the customary amount of coverage for its finding that rates of hardship withdrawals and loans were higher—and by some measures, significantly higher—than they were a year ago.1

My initial reaction was that this latter finding was something of an outlier; after all, in recent weeks we have seen other, similar reports from other providers that indicate that withdrawal volumes were down, certainly compared with the dark early days of 2009. But then, this was more recent data, and with the report of weekly jobless claims back up to half a million, well, let’s just say that it didn’t require much imagination to see a link between more people out of work and an uptick in “premature” distributions.

But later, as I considered the data, the findings didn’t seem so out of line. While the Fidelity survey found that 11% of participants took out a loan this quarter (9% did a quarter earlier), neither the average initial loan amount ($8,650) nor the loan term (3.5 years) seemed out of line. The report did, however, contain at least two alarming statistics. First, 22% of participants recordkept by Fidelity now have an outstanding loan, and while that isn’t much beyond the one in five that did a year ago, it nonetheless represented a decade-long record for Fidelity’s database. Indeed, this was the item that most media outlets qravitated toward (based on the calls I got).

In fact, IMHO, a more troubling trend lies in the fact that nearly half (45%) of participants who took hardship withdrawals one year prior also took a hardship withdrawal in the 12-month period ending in the second quarter of this year.

While participant loans are (too) frequently touted as borrowing from yourself, they put the participant in the position of having to replace—on an after-tax basis—the contributions you’ve withdrawn and a rate of “return” in the form of interest on the loan. Still, at least you’re on a schedule to replace the money you’ve withdrawn.

Now, properly administered, it’s not easy to obtain a hardship withdrawal. You actually have to be experiencing a financial hardship, for one thing, and you often not only have to prove that, but also that you have exhausted other sources. Worse, that hardship withdrawal is reduced not only by the need to pay taxes on the pre-tax monies you’ve now tapped, you have to fork over another 10% as a penalty to Uncle Sam (unless, of course, you’re older than 59 ½). What that means, of course, is that what you think you are seeing isn’t exactly what you are going to “get.”2 In fact, it could easily be just half what the requesting participant might be expecting.

The reality is that people are surely hurting, and if the money they have set aside in their 401(k) helps them through this period, puts food on the table, or keeps the family in their home, that’s, IMHO, a good thing. After all, there’s not much point in taking out a loan when you don’t have a source of income to repay it.

But what concerns me about the trends in the Fidelity report, aside from the implications that so many are struggling financially, is that, in my experience, hardship withdrawals, unlike loans, are not only gone for a while, they are savings that are often “gone” forever.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

1Loans initiated over the past 12 months grew to 11% of total active participants from about 9% one year prior. The portion of participants with loans outstanding also increased two full percentage points in the second quarter to 22%. The average initial loan amount as of the end of the second quarter was $8,650, with an average loan duration of three and half years, according to Fidelity.

According to Fidelity’s data, 62,000 of the participants recordkept by the firm initiated a hardship withdrawal in the second quarter, compared with 45,000 participants who did so the quarter before. As of the end of Q2, 2.2% of Fidelity’s active participants took a hardship withdrawal, compared with 2.0% a year earlier.

2 Those taxes aren’t always obvious at the point of distribution, unfortunately, but due at the individual’s next tax filing.

'Mandatory' Sentences

We have long lamented the reality that only about half of this nation’s workers have access to some kind of workplace-based retirement vehicle, and with good reason.

Well, we now have bills introduced in the Congress, both House and Senate, that will, eventually, require that every American business that hires 10 or more workers offer them the ability to save for retirement (see Auto-IRA Bill Introduced With Employer Mandates, Auto IRA Bill Introduced in the House).

Now, my first reaction was “it’s about time.” After all, we can talk about inadequate savings rates, inefficient asset-allocation decisions, and egregious revenue-sharing arrangements—but workers with access to the opportunity to save are surely better-served than those without. And any number of studies have shown that those without access to those programs save less—when they save at all—than those who have the opportunity to participate.

But honestly, the more I read through the bill1 summary (and that’s MUCH easier than the legislative language), the more I was struck by the potential complications. Workers, of course, can opt out—but under the legislation, employers are stuck with having to set the programs up.

Not that those workers will necessarily be saving much, nor is it likely to be “enough.” The default deferral rate will be 3%, with no escalation (though the worker can bump up the rate), nor is an employer match permitted. Workers have the choice of saving on a pre- or post-tax (Roth) basis, though the default is post-tax.

A default investment structure is outlined—basically, a principal preservation fund for balances under $5,000, with a lifecycle fund for larger balances—but the employer will still have to choose a provider, and could still wind up with fiduciary liability for that choice, unless the employer picks a provider on the approved list (from an online database that the government will establish). The bill summary suggests that an employer will fill in some basic information about its workforce, be provided with a list of suitable providers, click on one, and be connected2.

Moreover, there are eligibility standards to be monitored (those employed for at least three months and who have attained age 18 as of the beginning of the year), payroll deposit deadlines to be met (and an excise tax if they are not), a requirement to provide employees with some kind of standardized form explaining the program and investment decisions (though this could be part of the W-4), and a $100 excise tax per employee who is not properly covered by the program.

Oh—and to offset the costs of implementing and running this program, the employer will get a tax credit of…$250.

Will it Matter?

So, will this legislation live up to its promise? Will it provide 42 million more Americans with an “easy, effective way to take responsibility for their fiscal futures and plan for a secure retirement”? The truth is, I’m not sure.

We can only hope that regulators are as attentive to the fees assessed on these accounts, and on the investment structures created—accounts that are sure to be miniscule on an individual basis, but which will almost certainly in their entirety be an enormous pile of temptation.3 As for its impact on participant savings—well, it is perhaps a step in the right direction, certainly in terms of getting those who have jobs to begin putting some of that income aside for retirement. Surely the additional incremental cost and burden to the employer won’t by itself be enough to dissuade a hiring decision—though in tandem with other mandates and the promise of higher taxes, to boot, it might well.

There is, of course, always the possibility that a realization that a retirement plan mandate is coming will spur those who have been holding off on setting up a 401(k) to do so now—though, IMHO, it’s every bit as likely, and perhaps more likely, that they will simply set aside those plans and wait for the “government’s” version (which, even with all its requirements and costs, is surely less onerous).

To their credit, those pushing the bills are trying to plug a retirement savings hole that has too long been ignored. There is every indication that they have been thoughtful in their analysis, and have sought to minimize both the cost and the effort imposed on businesses.

That said, there is a cost—in time, effort, and focus—attendant with setting these programs in place (and it feels like more than $250 worth to me). While, in better times, this might be a laudable initiative4, it strikes me as oddly inappropriate at a time when concerns about additional government mandates appear to be restraining hiring and business growth.

Timing, it is said, is everything. Unfortunately, I think this mandatory IRA bill may well be a good idea at a bad time—and that, IMHO, could make it a bad idea.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) For simplicity, this column focuses on the bill introduced in the Senate, which was the first to be introduced, though the two appear similar, if not identical.

(2) From the Bingaman bill summary: “The website will be designed to assist employers in choosing a provider. The employer will enter a small amount of information about itself and its employees in a starting screen. Then, employers will be directed to a page listing providers willing to serve as trustee for employees’ Automatic IRA accounts. Once the employer makes a choice, it will be directly connected to the provider.”

(3) The Bingaman bill summary explains the phased implementation approach not as an accommodation to employers, but so that retirement service providers can “prepare for a significant expansion in the number of IRA accounts (through product innovation and marketing) and regulators to address enforcement and other regulatory issues.”

(4) The bill wouldn’t kick in for everyone right away: In the first year after enactment, the provision will apply only to firms with 100 or more employees (counting employees who earned more than $5,000 in the prior year); in the second year, 50 or more; in the third, 25 or more; and in the fourth, 10 or more. So, perhaps by the time it is effective, the “timing” will be better. However, employers may well focus on the future implications when they make current hiring decisions.

IMHO: "Wrong" Headed?—Part 2

Last week’s column presented half of a list that I titled “10 things you’re probably STILL doing wrong as a plan fiduciary.” As I mentioned then, this is a compilation based on my experience, the experiences of a group of experts who conducted a panel by the same title at the PLANSPONSOR National Conference in June, and a list of “Common Plan Mistakes” from none other than the Internal Revenue Service itself.

Here’s the rest of the list:

6. Not providing required notices to participants (e.g., safe harbor notices or QDIA notices).

The law provides plan fiduciaries with certain protections conditioned on the timely provision of notices deemed sufficient to alert participants to their rights and the obligations of the plan fiduciaries. This holds true with so-called “safe harbor” plan designs as well as the selection of qualified default investment alternatives (QDIAs), or the implementation of automatic enrollment, where the participant could opt out of deferrals, select a different deferral amount, or select another investment option.

While the implications of failing to provide a timely notice vary depending on the purpose of the notice, generally speaking, a failure to provide the notice invalidates the protections afforded the fiduciary.

7. Failing to obtain spousal consent.

The IRS notes that a common plan mistake submitted for correction under the Voluntary Correction Program (VCP) is the distribution to a participant of a benefit in a form other than the required QJSA (e.g., a single lump sum) without securing proper consent from the spouse. This often happens when the sponsor’s human resources accounting system incorrectly classifies a participant as not married (or when the participant was not married at one point and subsequently got married—or remarried). The failure to provide proper spousal consent is an operational qualification mistake that would cause the plan to lose its tax-qualified status.

8. Paying expenses from the plan that are not eligible to be paid from plan assets.

Plan sponsors are frequently interested in what expenses can be paid from plan assets. The first step in that determination involves making sure that the plan document allows the payment of any expenses from plan assets.

Assuming that the plan allows it, the Department of Labor has divided plan expenses into two types: so-called “settlor expenses,” which must be borne by the employer; and administrative expenses, which—if they are reasonable—may be paid from plan assets. In general, settlor expenses include the cost of any services provided to establish, terminate, or design the plan. These are the types of services that generally are seen as benefiting the employer, rather than the plan beneficiaries.

Administrative expenses include fees and costs associated with things like amending the plan to keep it in compliance with tax laws, conducting nondiscrimination testing, performing participant recordkeeping services, or providing plan information to participants.

9. Not knowing (or making an effort to ascertain) if your plan fees are reasonable.

As a plan fiduciary, you have several key responsibilities, one of which is to make sure that the fees paid by, and the services rendered to, the plan be reasonable. Fulfilling that responsibility would seem to require that you know the services that are being rendered, and that you know the fees paid for those services.

Determining that the combination is reasonable may seem as much art as science, but if you do not have the answers to those two key variables, it is hard to imagine how you can satisfy your obligation as a fiduciary.

10. Not seeking the help of experts when you lack the expertise to make fiduciary decisions impacting the plan.

ERISA imposes a duty of prudence on plan fiduciaries that is often referred to as one of the highest duties known to law—and for good reason. Those fiduciaries must act “with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” The “familiar with such matters” is the sticking point for those who might otherwise be inclined to simply adopt a “do unto others as you would have others do unto you” approach. Similarly, those who might be naturally predisposed toward a kind of Hippocratic “first, do no harm” stance are afforded no such discretion under ERISA’s strictures.

Simply stated, if you lack the, skill, prudence, and diligence of an expert in such matters—you are expected to get help.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

Last year’s list of “10 Things You’re (Probably) Doing Wrong” is HERE

The list of Common Plan Mistakes from the IRS is available HERE

As for correcting those mistakes, see the IRS’ 401(k) Fix-It Guide

You can find more information on fulfilling your fiduciary responsibilities at the Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) Web site

'Wrong' Headed?

In this as, perhaps, many professional endeavors, it seems that the more you know, the more you know you don’t know. Moreover, the standards imposed on plan fiduciaries by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) are not only demanding, they may be the highest found in law—and with personal liability imposed, to boot.

About a year ago, I compiled a list of “10 things you're (probably) doing wrong as a plan fiduciary.” By all accounts, it was well-read, much forwarded, and useful in terms of helping plan sponsors and retirement plan advisers highlight areas of possible improvement with your plan sponsor clients.

The list that follows – think of it as “10 things you’re probably STILL doing wrong as a plan fiduciary” - is a compilation based on my experience, the experiences of a group of experts who conducted a panel by the same title at the PLANSPONSOR National Conference in June, and a list of “Common Plan Mistakes” from none other than the Internal Revenue Service itself. Once again, I hope you find this list informative—and that you draw insight and comfort from its contents.

1. Not following the terms of your plan document regarding the administration of loan provisions (maximum amounts, repayment schedules, etc.) or hardship withdrawals.

Plan documents routinely provide that hardship distributions can only be obtained for certain very specific reasons, and that participants first avail themselves of all other sources of financing before applying for hardship distributions (these conditions often are incorporated directly from the requirements of the law). Similarly, loans are permissible from these programs only when they comply with certain standards regarding the amount, purpose, and repayment terms.

Failure to ensure that these legal requirements are met can, of course, most obviously result in a distribution not authorized under the terms of the plan document—and, since these types of distributions are frequently quickly spent by participants (and thus not readily recoverable), it can be complicated and time-consuming to set the situation right.

2. Failure to follow plan document eligibility and vesting provisions

An employee’s rights to retirement benefits are determined by the correct application of service and/or age requirements of the plan regarding eligibility for participation, and also may be influenced by the proper application of the plan’s vesting schedule.

To properly comply with those requirements, you need to maintain accurate service records for all employees. If these records are incorrect, the benefits provided may be incorrect—either in excess of what is permissible or less than what was due to the participant. Note that the failure to properly follow the plan’s provisions can cause the plan to lose its qualified status.

The plan document serves as the foundation for plan operations; it is, quite simply, the operating manual for your program. Sometimes, particularly if you are relying on a document that has been prepared by a third-party service provider, certain “gaps” can emerge between what the document allows and how the plan is actually administered. As a result, it is a good idea to conduct a document/process “audit” every couple of years—don’t assume that “the way we’ve always done things” is supported by the legal document governing your plan.

3. Improperly managing forfeiture accounts

Many defined contribution plans require participants to complete a period of service before becoming fully vested in matching or non-elective employer contributions, and when a participant leaves the play before they are fully vested, their unvested account balance may be forfeited. Some plan administrators place these forfeited amounts into a plan suspense account, allowing them to accumulate over several years. However, the Internal Revenue Code does not allow this practice. Forfeitures must be used or allocated in the plan year incurred.

Revenue Ruling 80-155 states that a defined contribution plan will not be qualified unless all funds are allocated to participants’ accounts in accordance with a definite formula defined in the plan, and the IRS notes that this would preclude a plan from carrying over plan forfeitures to subsequent plan years, as doing so would defy the rule requiring all monies in a defined contribution plan to be allocated annually to plan participants. The plan document’s terms should have provisions detailing how and when a plan will exhaust plan forfeitures.

4. Not starting required minimum distributions (RMD) on time

A minimum payment must be made to the participant by the required beginning date (RBD) and for each following year. Normally, the RBD for a participant who is not a 5% owner is April 1 following the end of the calendar year in which the latter of two events occurs: either the participant reaches age 70½ or the participant retires (for 5% owners, the RBD is April 1 following the end of the calendar year in which they attain age 70½ regardless of their retirement date).

Plan sponsors often discover that required minimum payments either have not been paid timely or at all, especially when a non-5% owner continues working after reaching age 70½. Failure to follow the minimum payment rules as written in the plan document can lead to the loss of the plan’s tax-qualified status. If participants or beneficiaries do not receive their minimum distribution on time, they (not the plan) are subject to a 50% additional tax on the underpayment.

5. Not depositing contributions on a timely basis

The legal requirements for depositing contributions to the plan are perhaps the most widely misunderstood elements of plan administration. A delay in contribution deposits is also one of the most common flags that an employer is in financial trouble—and that the Labor Department is likely to investigate.

Note that the law requires that participant contributions be deposited in the plan as soon as it is reasonably possible to segregate them from the company’s assets, but no later than the 15th business day of the month following the payday. If employers can reasonably make the deposits sooner, they need to do so. Many have read the worst-case situation (the 15th business day of the month following) to be the legal requirement. It is not.

Editor’s Note: the other five things will appear in next week’s column.