Between a Rock and a Hard Place

  Plan fiduciaries might well have gotten a case of severe whiplash last week.

I’m referring of course to the dual announcements from the Labor Department (a) rescinding its previous position on cryptocurrency in retirement plans and (b) indicating  that it in some fashion plans to review/change the current so-called ESG rule through a formal regulatory notice-and-comment period — presumably rather than defend the current version which had been challenged in court. That, and any day now it’s expected that the Administration will (similarly) soften, if not shift, its previous take on private equity investments in defined contribution plans.

Doubtless many are cheering these new developments; others, of course, will see this as either a danger, or a diminution of fiduciary responsibility. And some, surely, will like one, but not the other. 

Regardless, if you’re a plan fiduciary trying to figure out what is right and prudent to consider as plan investments — well, by any rational measure these shifts are abrupt, if not contradictory in effect if not purpose.   

Now, admittedly the world has changed since the Labor Department first staked out positions on these matters — markets have matured, definitions (notably ESG) have “evolved,” and while time inevitably allows us to review past experiences in a different light — we all know what has actually happened is that the Trump Administration looks at the world of retirement plans (and markets generally) differently than the Biden or Obama and even the Bush Administration(s). And even if the standards of conduct established by ERISA haven’t changed, the application of those standards apparently has. Yes, over the course of time and experience, as you would hope/expect, but more accurately over the course of change in administrations.

Worse, we live in a time when the plaintiffs’ bar — without a hint of irony — manage to find fault both with failing to add a stable value option, and the decision to add one rather than a money market alternative, to challenge as imprudent target-date funds that don’t mirror the (different) glidepaths of the rest of the “pack,” or to claim that following the legal terms of the plan document in forfeiture dispositions runs afoul of one’s fiduciary obligations. 

Add to that the growing industry chorus that a less-than-active consideration of mechanisms like in-plan retirement income constitutes a failure to consider “best interests” — and it’s no wonder that prudent plan fiduciaries feel themselves stranded in the middle of a “damned whether you do – or not” minefield.

The reality is that plan fiduciaries have always had to thread a needle of sorts; trying to act solely in the best interests of participants on matters in which they often lack the requisite expertise to make that evaluation — and in matters for which they bear personal responsibility. It’s why many do — and all arguably should — tap into the insights and experience of those who have that expertise. 

But in this “rock and a hard place” environment, you can’t fault plan fiduciaries for choosing to avoid or defer making big changes in plan design when the rules — and rule makers — change so abruptly.

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

What’s Top of Mind for Retirement Plan Advisors?

One of my favorite parts of the NAPA 401(k) Summit is a comprehensive annual survey we do of advisors in attendance at the Summit I call the Summit Insider.

It’s a unique opportunity to get the perspective of hundreds of retirement plan-focused advisors in a unique window of time. A chance, if you will, to see what’s on the collective minds of a very special group of individuals.

Like the networking experience of the Summit itself, it’s a chance to see what is actually on the minds and driving forces for the nation’s leading advisors. Sometimes it’s a validation—sometimes a repudiation—but it’s always insightful, all the more so in view of this year’s (record-breaking) response to the Summit Insider questionnaire.

Over the past couple of weeks, I’ve shared some insights in the NAPA-Net daily—but if you’re looking for a quick sense of the advisor perspective(s) on business practices, industry trends, team building, or future focus—well, here you go:

• There have been BIG shifts in sentiment regarding cryptocurrency (from positive to negative game changers) and state-run IRAs (ditto). 
• Managed accounts continue to be viewed negatively—a sharp and sustained turnabout from three years ago (when they were actually seen as a positive game changer).
• ESG remains the most over-hyped trend—but advisors are split as to whether it is a negative or positive game changer.
• Indeed, when it comes to over-hyped trends, ESG has demonstrated remarkable “staying” power, having topped that most over-hyped list for (now) four years running—and this year drew nearly THREE times as much support for that categorization (last year it was only twice as supported) as the #2—which was, again, cryptocurrency. MEPs/PEPs crept up to the #3 slot, while actually declining in overall ranking from its placement the past two years. 
• Cost loomed large as the biggest hurdle for managed accounts, though not far ahead of “participants lack understanding of how they work.” Most see the future of these as being offered by the advisor’s firm.
• Plan sponsor interest in retirement income options really hasn’t changed, hovering somewhere between “minimal” and “occasional.” Something else that hasn’t changed; portability remains the dominant advisor concern with these solutions. 
• Roughly two-thirds are now incorporating HSAs (health savings accounts) into financial wellness curriculums—though a third of those do so only if they consulted on the specific solution. 
• Nearly a quarter (24%) say their team’s work/life balance is “better than ever.”
• “Attracting and retaining talent” alongside “scaling your practice” remained the big issues for advisor practices over the next 12 months. Perhaps somewhat ironically, succession and advisor consolidation were in the “not important” category.
• Among support from DC wholesalers, “plan tools and resources” slightly edged out “competitive info” as valued services.

Thanks once again to all who took the time to share those (your?) perspectives and insights on the pages that follow. Thanks for being part of the 2023 NAPA 401(k) Summit—and thanks particularly to the sponsors of this year’s NAPA Summit Insider!

And please—like, share and comment! Check out the rest of the 2023 NAPA Summit Insider at https://bit.ly/23Summitinsider1

See you (all) in Nashville April 7-9 for the 2024 NAPA 401(k) Summit!

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

7 Things to Know About the New ESG Regulation

A little more than a week ago, the U.S. Department of Labor unveiled its much-anticipated final ESG rule.  There’s a lot to unpack in that regulation (and the rest of the 236-pages that help explain its process and rationale), but here’s a few things that seem particularly important to note at the outset.

There are some (important) things that did NOT change.

First, and to my mind, foremost, the Labor Department noted that “The duties of prudence and loyalty require ERISA plan fiduciaries to focus on relevant risk-return factors and not subordinate the interests of participants and beneficiaries (such as by sacrificing investment returns or taking on additional investment risk) to objectives unrelated to the provision of benefits under the plan.

But it also included an important clarification:

“…the final rule amends the current regulation to make it clear that a fiduciary’s determination with respect to an investment or investment course of action must be based on factors that the fiduciary reasonably determines are relevant to a risk and return analysis and that such factors may (emphasis mine) include the economic effects of climate change and other environmental, social, or governance factors on the particular investment or investment course of action.”

It does away with “pecuniary” as a standard (or at least as a word claiming to be the standard).

The Trump Administration’s version defined pecuniary (a term “introduced” to the ERISA lexicon by the United States Supreme Court in the Fifth Third v. Dudenhoefer decision[i]) as “a factor that a fiduciary prudently determines is expected to have a material effect on the risk and/or return of an investment based on appropriate investment horizons consistent with the plan’s investment objectives and the funding policy established pursuant to section 402(b)(1) of ERISA.” 

However, that word choice was determined by the Labor Department to be causing “confusion” and to have a “chilling effect” — “deterring fiduciaries from taking steps that other marketplace investors would take in enhancing investment value and performance, or improving investment portfolio resilience against the potential financial risks and impacts associated with climate change and other ESG factors.”

However, and despite what some saw as an implication in the proposed regulation, the final regulation does NOT mandate consideration of ESG factors.

Quite the contrary—quoting from the Labor Department:

“The final rule makes unambiguous that it is not establishing a mandate that ESG factors are relevant under every circumstance, nor is it creating an incentive for a fiduciary to put a thumb on the scale in favor of ESG factors.” 

“Outside the ERISA context, investors may choose to invest in funds that promote collateral objectives, and even choose to sacrifice return or increase risk to achieve those objectives. Such conduct, however, would be impermissible for ERISA plan fiduciaries, who cannot sacrifice return or increase risk for the purpose of promoting collateral goals unrelated to the economic interests of plan participants in their benefits.”

It treats QDIAs just like any other investment option in the plan.

The Trump Administration in its preliminary regulation had barred funds with an ESG focus from qualifying as a qualified default investment alternative (QDIA), and then—following criticism on that front—in its final regulation modified the provision in the proposal on QDIAs to prohibit plans from adding or retaining any investment fund, product, or model portfolio as a QDIA or as a component of such a default investment alternative, if its objectives, goals or principal investment strategies include the use of non-pecuniary factors.

The new regulation removes that distinction, noting that “QDIAs would continue to be subject to the same legal standards under the final rule as all other investments, including the prohibition against subordinating the interests of participants and beneficiaries in their retirement income to other objectives. QDIAs also would continue to be subject to the separate protections of the QDIA regulation.”

That said, the Labor Department says it expects to see an increase in the number of QDIAs that are ESG funds—though, considering the number currently in the market (and there are some), that hardly seems a controversial call.

Eliminated additional disclosure/labeling requirements associated with alternative investments with collateral benefits.

The Trump era regulation imposed a requirement that competing investments be indistinguishable based solely on pecuniary factors before you could turn to collateral factors to break a tie—oh, and even then, you would have had to comply with a special documentation requirement on the use of such factors.

The final rule, on the other hand, replaces that with a standard that instead requires the fiduciary to conclude prudently that competing investments, or competing investment courses of action, equally serve the financial interests of the plan over the appropriate time horizon—and, having determined that they equally serve those goals, is not prohibited from selecting the investment, or investment course of action (like an ESG focus), based on collateral benefits other than investment returns. 

And they no longer have to document that evaluation (which, interestingly enough, turns out to be one of the cost benefits[ii] associated with the new rule). 

Participant preferences can (still) play a role in menu design.

Now, in my experience, plan sponsors (and advisors) have long considered participant preferences in menu design. Not to the subordination of prudent fiduciary standards, of course—though there have been concerns that some might not see it that way. 

Well, the new regulation contains a new and interesting provision that “clarifies” that fiduciaries “do not violate their duty of loyalty solely because they take participants’ preferences into account when constructing a menu of prudent investment options for participant-directed individual account plans. If accommodating participants’ preferences will lead to greater participation and higher deferral rates, as suggested by commenters, then it could lead to greater retirement security."

Now, notice that while such considerations don’t necessarily violate the duty of loyalty—but there is no setting aside of the standards of prudence in evaluating and monitoring those investments noted above.  More specifically, those decisions need to be evaluated “taking into consideration the risk of loss and the opportunity for gain” compared to the opportunity for gain “with reasonably available alternatives with similar risks.”   

As noted above, there’s a lot to unpack here—and we’ll continue to do so right up to the Jan. 30, 2023 effective date—and beyond.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

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[i] In that case, the nation’s highest court concluded that the responsibilities of an ESOP fiduciary must be directed toward the duty to provide benefits and defray expenses—and that any non-pecuniary interests, such as Congress' strong encouragement of employee stock ownership, did not warrant an alteration of the fiduciary standard.  

[ii] Noting that in view of the “large scale of investments held by covered plans, approximately $12.0 trillion, changes in investment decisions and/or plan performance may result in changes in returns in excess of $100 million in a given year,” the Labor Department estimates that 20% of defined contribution and defined benefit plans (149,300 plans with some 28.5 million participants) will be affected by the regulation “because their fiduciaries consider or will begin considering climate change or other ESG factors when selecting investments.” In the Labor Department’s estimation, for each plan, a “legal professional will need to review paragraphs (b)-(c) of the final rule, evaluate how these provisions might affect their investment practices and assess whether the plan will need to make changes to investment practices. The Department estimates that this review will take a legal professional approximately four hours to complete, resulting in an aggregate cost burden of approximately $91.5 million or a per-plan cost burden of approximately $613.[ii]”

That said, the Labor Department noted that plan fiduciaries “generally already undertake deliberative evaluations as part of their investment selection decision-making process and this final rule does not add burden to those deliberations; but rather, the final rule clarifies that the scope of those deliberations may include climate change and other ESG factors within the confines of paragraphs (b)(4) and (c)(1) of the final rule. The Department does not intend to increase fiduciaries’ burden of care attendant to such consideration; therefore, no incremental costs are estimated for these requirements.”

Things to Ponder

In the course of my day, I talk to (and email with) people, read a lot, and every so often jot down a random thought or insight that gives me pause and makes me think. See what you think.

It’s not what you’re doing wrong; it’s what you’re not doing that’s wrong.

The best way to stay out of court is to avoid situations where participants lose money.

The key to successful retirement savings is not how you invest, but how much you save.

Does anybody still expect their taxes to be lower in retirement?

If you don’t know how much you’re paying, you can’t know if it’s reasonable.

Everybody wants a pension, but nobody seems to want an annuity.

Everybody’s “committed to the business”…until they aren’t.

Retirement income is a challenge to solve, not a product to build.

“Stay the course” is only good advice if you were on a good course to begin with.

Does anybody but lawyers actually read those legal “disclosures?” (that’s a rhetorical question.)

When selecting plan investments, keep in mind the 80-10-10 rule: 80% of participants are not investment savvy, 10% are, and the other 10% think they are. But aren’t.

There’s no such thing as a passive ESG fund.

“Don’t put all your eggs in one basket” applies to all life decisions.

What’s the “target date” for a “through” retirement date target fund?

92% of participants defaulted in at a 6% rate do nothing. 4% actually increase that deferral rate.

Plan sponsors may not be responsible for the outcomes of their retirement plan designs, but someone should be.

Sometimes just saying you’re thinking about doing an RFP can get results.

Hiring a co-fiduciary doesn’t make you an ex-fiduciary.

“Because it’s the one my recordkeeper offers” is not a good reason to select a target-date fund.

Given an opportunity to save via a workplace retirement plan, most people do. Without access to a workplace retirement plan, most people don’t.

Disclosure isn’t the same thing as clarity. Sometimes it’s the opposite.

Nobody knows how much “reasonable” is.

You want to have an investment policy in place before you need to have an investment policy in place.

The same provider can charge different fees to plans that aren’t all that different.

The biggest mistake a plan fiduciary can make is not seeking the help of experts.

Thanks to all who have inspired these—by thoughts, words and (mis)deeds—past, present and future.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Could ESG Options Undermine Participant Outcomes?

Despite surveys to the contrary, a new study finds that overall interest in ESG strategies by participants is “relatively weak” and “driven by naïve diversification.”

The difference may, of course, be attributed to the difference between what individuals say—and what they actually do. Unlike surveys that purport to capture participant (and plan sponsor) sentiments, the research by David Blanchett of PGIM and Zhikun Liu of the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) looks at the actual allocation decisions of 9,324[i] newly enrolled DC participants who are self-directing their accounts in a DC plan that offers at least one ESG fund. 

‘Weak Preferences’

They do so in a paper titled “ESG Fund Allocations Among New, Do-It-Yourself Defined Contribution Plan Participants,” they claim to find that overall interest in ESG strategies among these participants is “relatively weak,” with only 8.9% of participants having any allocation to an ESG fund and average allocations to ESG strategies of just 18.7% among those holding any ESG funds.[ii] Indeed, while they note “some clear demographic preferences for ESG funds (e.g., among younger participants with higher incomes),” they find that ESG allocations appear to be “primarily a function of weak preferences, driven by naïve diversification.”

Now, that hardly sounds like the heightened interest and engagement with those options that some participant surveys have captured (well, aside from that by younger participants with higher deferral rates and higher incomes). However, the research claims that the two factors which appeared to drive the largest allocations to ESG funds were not related to participant demographics, but rather the number of funds in the participant portfolio and the percentage of participants in the respective DC plan allocating to an ESG fund. 

If that seems a confusing descriptor, they found a “notable increase” in the probability of owning an ESG fund as the number of portfolio holdings increases—basically, the more funds the individual holds, the more likely he or she is to have an ESG offering among them. This tendency they characterized as attributable to “naïve diversification”—again, basically, if you’re simply picking a larger number of funds overall, then they concluded that the decision to allocate to the ESG fund is “likely based on a weak preference, not necessarily conviction in ESG.” Said another way, if you’re picking a lot of different funds, the more you pick, the better the odds that an ESG fund will (randomly) be among them.

On the other hand, those looking for a more optimistic future for ESG might take heart from their conclusion that “the fact ESG allocations increase as more participants in a plan allocate to ESG funds suggests plan interest effects could be an especially strong driver of future growth in ESG funds (despite relatively low usage today).” In fact, they noted a “notable plan interest effect, whereby ESG allocations are significantly higher in plans where general ESG usage is higher.”

Plan Sponsor Cautions

That said, the current decision-making by those participants appears to be “sub-optimal” (worse than you might expect) from a return standpoint—with the researchers here basically finding that participants who self-direct their portfolios have significantly lower expected returns than those using professionally managed investment options, such as target-date funds—something that proponents of professionally managed asset allocation solutions shouldn’t find surprising. To put it another way, those more likely to pick ESG funds are more likely to be the “do it yourself” (DIY) types—and those don’t do as well as those professionally managed solutions. This, as the researchers point out, can be an “important consideration for plan sponsors when adding ESG funds to the core menu to the extent they entice participants to self-direct their accounts.” So, adding an ESG fund might encourage more DIY investing by those interested in ESG—and that interest pulls them away from the professionally managed, higher-returning alternatives.   

In fact, an additional analysis suggests that those DIY participants have expected returns that are approximately 100 basis points lower than investors using professionally managed portfolios, such as target-date funds and managed accounts. And this, the researchers comment, suggests that adding ESG funds to core menus may create additional implicit return “costs” for participants—by adding those options that encourage participants to make choices other than professionally managed multi-asset options (e.g., target-date funds).[iii]

Overall, the researchers comment that their analysis paints a “mixed picture about the actual participant interest, and drivers of demand, for ESG funds in DC plans and suggests that plan sponsors should take a thoughtful approach when considering adding ESG funds to an existing core menu.”

Or—it seems fair to say—when adding (or subtracting) any funds at all.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] Of the 9,324 participants included in the dataset, only 833 had some allocation to an ESG fund, which is 8.9% of the total.

[ii] Among participants with an allocation to an ESG fund, the average allocation was 18.7%, with a standard deviation of 19.0%. The total average balance allocation to ESG funds is 1.7% (including all participants). There are only 56 participants (0.6% of the total) with ESG allocations greater than 50% of their balance and only 19 participants (0.2% of the total) with 100% of their balance in ESG funds. “In other words, even among participants who select the ESG funds, they almost always play a relatively supporting role as part of the overall portfolio.”

[iii] Some of the issues here are no doubt a consequence of current menu constructions. In the sampling studied, no plan offered more than five ESG funds, and the vast majority (approximately 76%) offered only one ESG fund. “This suggests it would be relatively difficult to build a diversified portfolio using only the ESG funds in DC plans currently,” the authors note. Moreover—and adding to the reality that it is “relatively difficult to build a truly diversified portfolio using only ESG funds”—they explain that roughly half of all ESG funds available are large blend funds. Only 13 of the funds (8.7% of the identifiable category total) are fixed income funds, and only 12 (8.1% of the identifiable total) are balanced funds. “The difficulty associated with building a diversified portfolio with only ESG funds has important implications on overall portfolio efficiency. If allocating to ESG funds requires participants to opt out of using a professionally managed portfolio option (e.g., target-date funds or retirement managed accounts), it may negatively impact future expected returns”—a cost the authors say they plan to quantify in a future work.

A Thumb on the Scale(s)?

Years back I remember being part of a Q&A with a group of plan sponsors—the focus was the challenge of not only getting, but keeping their plans in compliance, while also looking for creative ways to engage and encourage participants. Then at one point, a tired looking gentleman, expressing frustration with the pressures of audits and litigation, said: “I wish the DOL would just tell us what to do.” 

I cautioned him at the time that he ought to be careful what he wished for—that he might just get it.

Sure enough, in mid-March the Labor Department issued a “compliance assistance release” which was unique both in format and, arguably, focus. It reminded plan fiduciaries of the significance of their review and assessment of prudence of plan investments—and then said in no uncertain terms that it had concerns about the ability of cryptocurrency to meet those high standards. Indeed, the release plainly stated that those who did include such options could “expect to be questioned about how they can square their actions with their duties of prudence and loyalty…”—not just as standalone options on the menu, but even through a brokerage account. And so, while not an outright prohibition, it seems fair to say that it’s likely to have what lawyers call a “chilling effect” on cryptocurrency as a 401(k) investment option.

In late December the Labor Department issued a statement on the use of private equity in participant-directed plans—stating that, except in a minority of situations, plan-level fiduciaries of small, individual account plans are not likely suited to evaluate the use of PE investments in designated investment alternatives (DIAs) in individual account plans. It represented a step back from a June 2020 information letter that affirmed that PE investments “as a component of a professionally managed multi-asset class vehicle structured as a target date, target risk or balanced fund” can be offered as an investment option for participants in defined contribution plans under ERISA. It seems likely that some private equity firms (or those promoting such investments) had taken the initial guidance as something of a green light to promote those options beyond the limitations of the original letter—leading the Labor Department to clarify its position—and, arguably, to shut down active consideration of those options, at least by “small, individual account plans.” 

And then, of course, there’s the focus on ESG options, which the Trump administration clearly tried to undermine with its proposed and then (slightly muted) final regulation—and which the Biden administration first announced that it would not enforce, and has since then, with its own proposed regulation, sought to swing the pendulum in favor of those options—arguably to the point of not only encouraging, but requiring, consideration of those factors.

The reality is, of course, that times change. And even if the long-standing precepts of prudence and fiduciary responsibility haven’t changed, the environment in which those determinations are made has. Cryptocurrency wasn’t a “thing” until fairly recently (and it didn’t take long to find its way into 401(k) platforms), and those who may have misapplied (accidentally or “on purpose”) the Labor Department’s statement on private equity needed to be reminded. ESG is certainly a relatively recent—though not brand new—focus—but plan fiduciaries can perhaps be forgiven for feeling a bit “whipsawed” by the shifting sentiments between administrations.

Generally well-intentioned, the perspective of even the most seasoned and expert regulatory professional sometimes fails to appreciate the impact in the “real” world. That’s the value in the access—and influence—that NAPA, armed with the input, insight and perspective of NAPA members, provides to these processes. Insight and influence that allows you to “put a thumb on the scale” in providing a practical and pragmatic perspective on the rules and regulations that guide our industry— now, and in the days ahead. 

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

p.s.: Speaking of which, this would be a great time to get involved via the NAPA DC Fly-In Forum. Check it out—and apply today—at https://napadcflyin.org.

Is the Retirement System ‘Fragile’?

It’s not all about “the Benjamins,” but a recent analysis of the nation’s private retirement system certainly puts a lot of emphasis on the accumulation of aggregate assets in retirement plans.

The Morningstar report—“Retirement Plan Landscape Report, An In-Depth Look at the Trends and Forces Reshaping U.S. Retirement Plans”—is extraordinarily diverse and comprehensive[i] in its assessment—though while the report’s authors seemed to be striving for a balanced assessment, the overall sense was one of a leaky boat.

No Surprises 

There were some findings that seemed to surprise the authors that didn’t strike me as all that remarkable. Apparently (I hope you’re sitting down for this one) larger plans pay lower fees (expressed as basis points) than smaller plans. They are also more likely to invest in collective investment trusts (which tend to have lower fees, though that isn’t necessarily the case).

What I did find surprising was Morningstar’s assessment that those smaller plans pay, on average, “just” 88 basis points (compared to the 41 basis points estimated for larger plans)—indeed, I found both numbers pretty reassuring. On the other hand, “averages” can often obscure reality, and the authors also found that smaller plans also feature a much wider range of fees between plans—with roughly a third of those plans costing participants more than 100 basis points in total.

And make no mistake: Those higher fees are—literally—a “toll” on retirement. The Morningstar report says that two workers who save the same amount and invested the same way might well result in an individual who worked for a smaller employer (and who participated in a smaller plan) having 10% less in retirement savings. That’s a hefty price to pay—but then this is hardly the only area in life where larger purchasers are able to obtain a volume discount.

ESG ‘Risk’

There was also little surprise in the finding that “Plan sponsors appear to have shied away from considering environmental, social and governance (ESG) information and analysis, in part because of regulatory uncertainty.” Oddly, Morningstar’s analysis—here they leverage their own ratings system to ascertain funds that might be considered to be exposed to ESG “risk”[ii]—produces a number that, while well short of what Morningstar would apparently deem prudent,[iii] still notes that “as many as 48% of retirement plans with at least 100 participants already offer investment strategies that use ESG analysis to evaluate investments”—though that belies the results of most industry surveys (including PSCA’s 64th Annual Survey of 401(k) and Profit Sharing Plans). On the other hand, the report acknowledges that this includes funds with a “broad definition” of ESG—funds that presumably take those type factors into account without touting that as an explicit emphasis (and perhaps without the awareness and focus of plan fiduciaries). Regardless, and undoubtedly for the reasons cited by the report, there’s little question that plan sponsors outside of the public and non-profit sectors have indeed shied away from ESG. At least for the moment.

Assets Oriented

There was, however, some interesting new ground in the apparent “churn” in the system. The report states that more than 380,000 plans closed during the period from 2011 to 2020—a result it attributes largely to employers going out of business. While that is certain a point of vulnerability for those previously covered by those plans (not to mention the presumed loss of employment), the solution for that lies beyond the retirement system per se.

As we have noted consistently, the report expresses concerns about coverage and the access to workplace savings, but ultimately differentiates its focus from traditional retirement system analysis by focusing on the size and flow of the system, as measured by assets. Indeed, and as noted above, the report seems particularly obsessed on the subject of assets—not on an individual level, or on obtaining a measure of retirement income adequacy, but on the premise that more assets mean the ability for plans in the system to negotiate for lower fees (and, on a related note, to opt for investment types, notably CITs, that have lower expenses). But while the emphasis was intriguingly unique, it’s also the basis upon which these authors affix the “fragile” label to the system, as if “the system”—as measured by assets—must constantly grow in order to be considered healthy. 

Now, there were some jaw-dropping numbers behind this premise—the report claims that there have been outflows of more than $400 billion a year since 2015, at least as reported by plans in their annual filings. However, at a time when 10,000 Boomers are said to be heading off into retirement every day, one might well expect a lot of them to be taking their retirement savings with them. 

‘Out’ Flows?

The concerns expressed in Morningstar’s analysis seems to assume that much of the outflow is pre-retirement “leakage”—though they seem equally concerned about rollovers. Why? Well, once again they write that, “More assets in the defined-contribution system would help more sponsors gain the leverage to demand lower fees from asset managers and drive down costs for end investors.” While true enough, it seems an odd anchoring. 

Indeed, in commenting on their assumptions, the authors comment that while they believe their estimates are “conservative,” and that “any errors understate the massive detectable flow of money out of DC plans,” they also admit that it is “…clear from Internal Revenue Service data that most flows out of plans are for rollovers rather than cash-outs…,” though they concede you can’t draw a distinction there between cash-outs and rollovers with the Form 5500 data.

Indeed, while 30,000-foot assessments of the retirement savings landscape are not unique, in looking nearly exclusively at the total pool of assets in that system and its implications, Morningstar’s report makes no attempt to correlate those assets to the needs of the individuals covered by the system. 

‘Pool’ Rules?

That asset-focused prism leaves it to claim that the entire system “relies on a few thousand employers to cover most people saving for retirement,” as though that’s a unique vulnerability. But the defined contribution retirement system is not one gigantic pool that must satisfy all obligations. Sure, it would be great if more employers, specifically more small employers, saw fit to offer a plan—but the fact that they don’t doesn’t put “the system” at risk. 

But those who do have these programs, and take advantage of them, face no jeopardy as a result (although they may well wind up being taxed at higher rates in the future). The U.S. DC system doesn’t “rely” on new employers to offer plans to compensate for those that are no longer doing so—though arguably the coverage gap, and the lack of ready access that results, are an issue of general concern.

All in all, the report offers an interesting assessment of “the system”—more thoughtful and comprehensive than most, though the obsession with total assets seems a bit myopic, and as one might expect a lot of assumptions, perhaps of necessity in a report as broad as this.  

In sum, while its conclusions are perhaps a bit “fragile” upon which to build a firm assessment, there’s plenty there to warrant discussion—and action.  But is the system "Fragile" - only for those who aren't part of it.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] While much of the report focuses on DC plans, the Morningstar researchers also intriguingly acknowledge that more than 33 million people are or will receive benefits from defined benefit plans as of 2019, and that DB plans accounted for more than 30% of distributions paid to participants in 2019 and they do not appear to have peaked. It even notes that approximately 8.8 million people who are no longer working are still entitled to future benefits and 11.7 million people who are still working will eventually receive benefits. Looks like those “dead” pension plans still have a lot of life in them! 

[ii] The percent of assets that are in the various categories of ESG risk assigned by the Morningstar® Sustainability Rating™ for funds, sometimes called the globe rating.

[iii] In fact, the report comments, “…sponsors have left the U.S. defined-contribution system in the aggregate tilted toward investments with more ESG risk—which is the degree to which companies fail to manage ESG risks, potentially imperiling their long-term economic value. Plan sponsors may wish to reexamine their investment choices using an ESG lens.” 

An Insiders' Perspectve(s)

There’s nothing like the NAPA 401(k) Summit—particularly being at the NAPA 401(k) Summit after the many months and a worldwide pandemic that kept us all apart. 

Each year for the past four years we’ve taken advantage of that gathering (including in 2020 when we gathered “virtually”) to reach out[i] to the nation’s top retirement plan advisors to glean their perspective on a wide range of issues relating to their practice—and practices. 

This year’s Summit Insider was no exception—as we “consulted” with more than 500 retirement plan advisors and home office staff on a range of issues—the criteria in selecting—and rejecting—key business relationships, the things that are over-hyped—and the things that no one is talking about—but that everyone, at least in the eyes of these “Insiders,” should be. We also got some insights on retirement income, important features in choosing target-date funds, rollovers and outcomes. 

We’ve included a number of verbatim comments on what these “Insiders” wish that plan sponsors knew, or knew better. Sometimes those words are harsh, sometimes reassuring—but we asked advisors for their insights, and they were generous in doing so. I only wish we had room to share them all.

Key Findings

Among the key findings:

• Glidepath philosophy topped the criteria on selecting target-date funds, slightly outpacing 5-year performance.
• More than half of the advisors surveyed focus on measuring outcomes at the plan level during every plan review.
• Nearly two-thirds deliver financial wellness as a component of their current service offerings—another 17% do so through an external partner.
• ESG remains the most “overhyped” trend in the industry, outpacing robo-advice and MEPs/PEPs by a significant margin.
• Portability was deemed the most influential/compelling factor to respondents’ plan sponsor clients in considering a retirement income solution. It was also the most cited factor influencing advisor considerations.
• Client support and market intel were tied as the most-valued support from the DC wholesaler partners.
• Service was—still—the dominant criteria in selecting a TPA partner.  
• Rollovers, the SECURE Act’s expansion of a retirement income safe harbor, including lifetime income disclosures on participant statements, managed accounts, and e-delivery were all rated as “positive game changers.” However, a third rated managed accounts as “much ado about not much.”
• Legislation to allow student loan repayment matching was cited as a positive gain changer by 7 in 10, and legislation to expand emergency savings accounts drew “positive game changer” support of 60%. 
• The Labor Department’s fiduciary (re)proposal? A plurality (43%) said it was “too soon to say.” Which, as we’re still waiting for it, seems reasonable (if not obvious). 
• Recordkeeper consolidation was viewed as a negative game changer by nearly half (46%), though a quarter (23%) saw it as a positive.

As for what they wished plan sponsors knew more about, the list included “their roles and responsibilities,” the role(s) of other parties servicing the plan, fees, plan design, plan operations—oh, and “our roles,” of course. The verbatim quotes here are, as you might imagine, “priceless.”

A special thanks to the hundreds of retirement plan advisors who took the time to provide such thoughtful responses—and to the sponsors of this fourth edition of the Summit Insider. Which NAPA members can find in your mail—or online at https://www.napa-net.org/industry-intel/summit-insider.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Three ‘Scary’ Things That Give Plan Sponsors Chills

Halloween is the time of year when one’s thoughts turn to trick-or-treat, ghosts and goblins, and things that go bump in the night—and, for plan sponsors, and those who support them, a good time to think about the things that give us pause—that cause a chill to run down our spine… 

Things like…

Changing Providers

OK, they may not exactly be “scared” of changing providers, but it’s certainly not a process for the faint of heart—particularly with all of the competing focus priorities confronting plan sponsors on a daily basis. Industry surveys routinely point to a certain amount of regular provider “churn”—indeed, by some counts as many as 10% of the plans change providers in any given year. That said, industry surveys (and excessive fee litigation) are replete with indications that the vast majority of plans not only don’t change recordkeepers, but may not even undertake a formal review of services, fees and capabilities.

Now, any plan sponsor who has ever gone through a recordkeeping conversion knows that, however smooth the transition, and regardless how improved the experience on the new platform, moving is a lot of work. And, as with relocating your home, the longer you have been in a particular location, the harder it seems to be (there are inevitably a lot of “skeletons” in those closets). Knowing that, it’s little wonder that many plan sponsors make those changes only under a duress of sorts, forced by poor service, a lack of capabilities, (relatively) high fees—and sometimes more than one of the above. 

And that, of course, means that the transition, however badly needed or desired, will likely be rougher—and take longer—than anticipated or desired (see also 3 Things Plan Sponsors Should Know About Changing Providers). And who knows how many intentions to pursue a review have simply petered out on the altar of “not enough time” to do so?

ESG

In fairness, it’s probably not Environmental, Social & Governance (ESG) investing per se that seems to “scare” plan sponsors from offering these options, but rather concerns about their level of accountability for choosing to do so. Indeed, there’s plenty of survey data to suggest that workers, particularly younger ones, want these options. That said, workable, consistent definitions of ESG remain fluid, and perhaps as a result, the adoption rate among DC plans has been tepid—and the take-up rate among participants who have the option is even lower. Indeed, fewer than 3% of plan sponsor respondents included that option on their plan investment menu, according to the Plan Sponsor Council of America’s 63^rd Annual Survey of 401(k) and Profit Sharing Plans, and only about 0.1% of plan assets were invested in those options. Those looking for a counterpoint might note that ESG options were more common among the largest plans (those with more than 5,000 participants) and the smallest (fewer than 50 participants), where 4.2% and 4.4%, respectively, offered that option.

The hesitancy likely comes (at least in part) from confusion about how the Labor Department views these options, or more precisely the prudence of including them as a participant investment option. For a long time there had “only” been Interpretive Bulletins (IBs) (in 1994, 2008 and 2016) and, more recently, a 2018 Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) on this subject. And while the 2016 IB was read as encouraging consideration of ESG factors (or at least not discouraging it), the 2018 FAB was widely viewed as pulling back on that stance, in the process establishing what had been called the “all things equal” standard, which meant that so long as two otherwise identical investments met all the requisite prudence standards, a fiduciary could (prudently) pick the one that (also) had ESG attributes. 

And then, roughly a year ago, the Trump administration weighed in with a proposed rule that was harshly critical of ESG (unless a “pecuniary”—that is, financial—rationale was evident)– and ultimately a final one that moved off that stance a bit, but still left room for caution. 

After first announcing that it had no intention of enforcing that rule, the Biden administration’s DOL has recently provided a (new) proposed rule that—arguably—puts these options in a more positive light. Indeed, in its current form it actually seems more supportive than the “all things equal” standard put forth by the Obama administration, though it remains a proposed rule, with comments being taken for consideration in shaping a final version.    

All of which arguably (still) leaves plan sponsors contemplating a shift to ESG with a lingering uncertainty. They may not be “scared,” but one can certainly understand a bit of as-yet-unresolved apprehension.

Lifetime Income Options

Speaking of apprehension, while DC plan fiduciaries aren’t exactly scared of retirement income, DC plans have long eschewed providing those options. That despite the unquestioned reality that participants need help structuring their income in retirement—and little doubt that a lifetime income option could help.

There are in-plan options available in the marketplace now, of course, and thus, logically, there are plan sponsors who have either derived the requisite assurances (or don’t find them necessary) or feel that the benefits and/or participant need for such options makes it worth the additional considerations. On the other hand, those industry surveys notwithstanding, for the most part participants don’t seem to be asking for the option (from anyone other than industry survey takers)—and when they do have access, mostly don’t take advantage. Let’s face it, even when DB pension plan participants have a choice, they opt for the lump sum. 

It’s ironic that programs designed to provide retirement income pay so little attention to the realization of that objective; only about half of DC plans currently provide an option for participants to establish a systematic series of periodic payments, much less an annuity or other in-plan retirement income option, and that’s despite the 2008 Safe Harbor regulation from the Labor Department regarding the selection of annuity providers under DC plans (which was designed to alleviate, though it did not eliminate, those concerns), not to mention a further attempt to close that comfort gap in 2015 (FAB 2015-02).

Proponents are even more hopeful that the SECURE Act’s provisions regarding lifetime income disclosures (though many recordkeepers already provide some version of this), enhanced portability (a serious logistical challenge if you ever want to move from a recordkeeper that provides the service to one that doesn’t, though solutions are emerging that claim to have made progress on this front) and, perhaps most importantly, an expanded fiduciary safe harbor for selection of lifetime income providers, will—finally—put those “fears” to rest. We’ll see.

The Standard

Don’t get me wrong—there are plenty of things for ERISA fiduciaries—who are, after all, personally liable not only for their actions, but those of their co-fiduciaries—to be worried about. The standards with which their conduct must comply are (as one court has put it) “the highest known to law,” and with good reason. Prudence is often associated with caution, and fiduciaries generally find more comfort in the middle of the trend “pack” than on its fringes.

That said, the standard is to act (solely) in the best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries—and even though it may be “scary” from time to time… the alternative is surely worse…

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Limiting Fiduciary Liability (Costs)

A recent survey of insurers highlights the criteria that a number of the nation’s leading fiduciary liability insurers identified as the biggest sources of fiduciary risk—within the control of plan fiduciaries. 

Now, arguably, the report—titled “What Drives Fiduciary Liability?”—might have been more accurately titled “What Drives Fiduciary Liability Insurance Costs?”—or even more precisely “What Drives Fiduciary Liability Insurance Costs That You Can Do Something About?” Indeed, the report’s authors note that it was specifically focused on sources of risk that are within the control of fiduciaries. That’s key, because there are things that attract litigation (such as plan size or even stock price) that aren’t. 

Moreover, the survey respondents (there were 8 of the 12 that Aon said account for 85% of the total gross written premium placed by the firms in 2020) were asked only to evaluate pricing criteria as having a significant, small or nonexistent impact—though one might want to find something between significant and small, at least.

The survey’s authors identified five key takeaways—and while there are more elements discussed in the report, that seems a good place to start:

1. Fees are very important.

Well, to quote Homer Simpson, “doh.” Indeed, the only surprises here are that (only) 88% of the respondents identified periodic fee benchmarking reviews by the investment committee as a “significant” driver of insurance premiums; (just) 75% said it was significant if the plan uses revenue-sharing or Sub-TA type revenues; and (a mere) 63% said that using retail mutual fund share classes would fall in that category. Granted, with only 8 respondents (albeit with big market share), we’re talking small numbers.

Moreover, note that these points aren’t about what the fees are, and certainly not what they are relative to the services provided (the true measure of “reasonable”), but about fee structures and process. It is, in other words, about what might be seen as the “appearance” of impropriety. Indeed, as has been borne out in litigation, there’s no legal issue with any of the foregoing—but all of these practices (or, in the case of the review, non-practices) have been challenged as if they were themselves a violation, or at least an indicator, of a fiduciary breach. 

Suffice it to say that if the plan is currently doing (or not doing, in the case of a review) these things, you should be sure to have prudently considered the reasons—and to have documented that consideration—but can likely expect to pay more in insurance premiums, regardless. 

2. Committee minutes are important, but it matters less who takes them.

Only a third of the survey respondents said that taking formal minutes was a “significant” factor (the rest said the impact was “small”—bearing in mind that the only other option was “nonexistent”), so I have a feeling that the Aon report authors exercised a little editorial “discretion” in positioning that as important. In fact, that seemed very low to me, certainly in view of the impact in persuading a judge (much less a DOL auditor) that you do, in fact, have a prudent process in place. Perhaps it reflects what still seems to be a consistent caution from the legal community: that such things can be a “smoking gun” in litigation. On the other hand, I’ve seen committee minutes be effective shields in having cases dismissed at the pleading stage, so…

The report does indicate that there is no particular advantage in having an advisor or legal counsel act as scribe, though the latter might well limit the “smoking gun” risk.

3. Investment advisors are viewed as a moderate influencer of premiums.

This one was a bit of a head-scratcher as well—perhaps reflecting the varying quality and expertise of the investment advisors whose expertise might be tapped. The Aon report said the responses were split almost evenly among the impact of an advisor being deemed as significant, small or nonexistent, and even when going on to qualify that statement (with the quality of the advisor), only a quarter (that’s two firms) said it would have a significant impact on pricing. (Half described the impact as “small.”) 

There were some qualifiers here—the impact was seen as small by one “unless related party in which case significant impact” (and I’m assuming a negative one), another stated that an “experienced advisor is expected,” and still another cautioned that while this was a factor, “…outside vendors are not foolproof and the insured retains fiduciary liability with respect to them.” 

4. Employer stock in DC plans remains a top concern for insurers.

This one appears to matter—a lot. Then again, it wasn’t unanimous—88% rated it as a significant factor, though that figure dropped to 50% when there is a limit on the size of the investment, which is increasingly common. Indeed, so-called “stock drop” suits seem to (still) crop up every time there is a disappointing earnings announcement or some piece of bad PR that drives down the stock price. 

That said, it’s one thing to bring suit—and yet, it remains a hard suit to win based on recent case history. 

Not mentioned: the inclusion of proprietary funds. It’s seldom a standalone rationale for bringing suit, but—well, it’s increasingly common, at least among organizations that have that capability.

5. Environmental, social and governance (ESG) options in DC plans play a minor role in pricing fiduciary liability insurance.

The inclusion of this particular item was a bit of a head-scratcher, though the results—62% said it had no impact on the premium pricing—were not. In fairness, and as noted by the survey’s authors, the survey was fielded after the Biden administration’s announcement that it was not going to enforce the rule put in place by the Trump administration, but my guess (and theirs) is that it simply reflects the relatively small take-up rate by plans and the tepid adoption by participants. Indeed, one of the survey respondents commented that the impact “depends on the % of plan assets or # of investment options offered. As well as if the plan were to attempt to force a requirement to its participants.” 

Ultimately, and as one of the survey respondents noted, “While we look at a number of items that are in the survey, the problem is that there is pressure to settle, in some cases because the cost to defend would be greater than the settlement value. Defense costs and settlement amounts in the so-called fee cases are incredibly high, even where the client has robust fiduciary processes.”

Still, forewarned is forearmed. Like vaccines, addressing those issues might not completely forestall litigation—but it would surely make for a less painful set of “symptoms.”

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

3 Things That (Seem to) Scare Plan Sponsors

Halloween is the time of year when one’s thoughts turn to trick-or-treat, ghosts and goblins, and things that go bump in the night. And sometimes it’s just a good time to think about the things that give us pause—that cause a chill to run down our spine. 

In that category, here are three things to ponder…

Getting Sued

Plan sponsors will often mention their fear of getting sued (actually, their advisors frequently broach the topic), and little wonder. The headlines are (still) full of multi-million dollar lawsuits against multi-billion dollar plans—the pandemic has, if anything, seemed to accelerate the pace. If relatively few seem to actually get to a judge (and those that do have—to date—largely been decided in the plan fiduciaries’ favor), they nonetheless seem to result in multi-million dollar settlements. Oh, and not only has this been going on for more than a decade, the issues raised are evolving as well.

It's not that the fear is unfounded—plan fiduciaries certainly can be sued, and that includes responsibility for the acts of co-fiduciaries, and liability that is personal, to boot (see 7 Things an ERISA Fiduciary Should Know).

Of course, most plan sponsors won’t ever get sued, much less get into trouble with regulators. And those who do are much more likely to drift into trouble for things like late deposit of contributions, errors in nondiscrimination testing, or not following the terms of the plan.

Still worried about getting sued? As one famous ERISA attorney once told me, you might as well worry about getting hit by a meteor. Unless, of course, you have more than $1 billion in plan assets.

ESG

In fairness, it’s not ESG—environmental, social & governance—investing per se that seems to “scare” plan sponsors from offering these options, but rather concerns as to their level of accountability for choosing to do so. Indeed, there’s plenty of survey data to suggest that workers want these options, particularly younger workers. That said, workable, consistent definitions of ESG remain fluid, and perhaps as a result, the adoption rate among defined contribution plans has been tepid—and the take-up rate among participants even lower. Fewer than 3% of plans offer an ESG option, according to the 62^nd annual Plan Sponsor Council of America survey, and less than 0.2% of plan assets have been invested in those options. 

Many think the hesitancy comes from confusion about how the Labor Department views these options, or more precisely the prudence of including them as a participant investment option. For a long time there had “only” been Interpretive Bulletins (IBs) (in 1994, 2008 and 2016) and, more recently, a 2018 Field Assistance Bulletin (FAB) on this subject. And while the 2016 IB was read as encouraging consideration of ESG factors (or at least discouraging the discouraging), the 2018 FAB was widely viewed as pulling back on that stance, in the process establishing what had been called the “all things equal” standard, which meant that so long as two otherwise identical investments met all the requisite prudence standards, a fiduciary could (prudently) pick the one that (also) had ESG attributes. 

And then in June, noting its concern “that the growing emphasis on ESG investing may be prompting ERISA plan fiduciaries to make investment decisions for purposes distinct from providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan,” the Labor Department proposed a new rule to “clarify” things.

Now the rule itself is pretty standard stuff—but the Labor Department wrapped that in about 60 pages worth of preamble and impact analysis that conveyed what many (including this writer) saw as a clear sense of skepticism about the prudence of those options, or at least a concern that plan fiduciaries might be inclined to lower the prudence bar in order to accommodate the inclusion of these options. And if there was any doubt as to the concerns of the Trump administration, the rule specifically calls out ESG as unsuitable as a focus in qualified default investment alternatives (QDIA) (not that I am aware of any that have yet taken that step, and perhaps the rule was intended to forestall that). All this at a time when the Labor Department has made a series of (allegedly separate and unrelated) inquiries to both plan sponsors and RIAs about their current  processes regarding ESG consideration and review.

As one might expect in view of the billions of dollars (already) committed to ESG—not to mention its increasing prominence in the focus of a growing number of investment managers—that rule drew a ton  (more than 8,000) of comments (most critical), but is now back for review at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a timeframe so short as to suggest to many that it didn’t undergo much change. 

All of which arguably leaves plan sponsors contemplating a shift to ESG with a great deal of uncertainty. They may not be “scared,” but one can certainly understand a bit of apprehension.

Lifetime Income Options

Speaking of apprehension, while defined contribution plan fiduciaries aren’t exactly scared  of retirement income, DC plans have long eschewed providing those options. There’s no question that participants need help structuring their income in retirement—and little doubt that a lifetime income option could help (certainly with some help from a trusted advisor). 

There are in-plan options available in the marketplace now, of course, and thus, logically, there are plan sponsors who have either derived the requisite assurances (or don’t find them necessary). Or who feel that the benefits and/or participant need for such options makes it worth the additional considerations. On the other hand, those industry surveys notwithstanding, participants don’t seem to be asking for the option (from anyone other than industry survey takers)—and when they do have access, mostly don’t take advantage. Let’s face it, even when defined benefit pension  plan participants have a choice, they opt for the lump sum. 

It’s ironic that programs designed to provide retirement income pay so little attention to the realization of that objective; only about half of defined contribution plans currently provide an option for participants to establish a systematic series of periodic payments, much less an annuity or other in-plan retirement income option, and that’s despite the 2008 Safe Harbor regulation from the Labor Department regarding the selection of annuity providers under defined contribution plans (which was designed to alleviate, though it did not eliminate, those concerns), not to mention a further attempt to close that comfort gap in 2015 (FAB 2015-02).

Proponents are hopeful that the SECURE Act’s provisions regarding lifetime income disclosures (though many recordkeepers already provide this), enhanced portability (a serious logistical challenge if you ever want to move from a recordkeeper that provides the service to one that doesn’t) and, perhaps most importantly, an expanded fiduciary safe harbor for selection of lifetime income providers, will—finally—put those “fears” to rest. We’ll see.

Don’t get me wrong—there are plenty of things for ERISA fiduciaries to be worried about. The standards to which their conduct must comply are “the highest known to law,” and with good reason. Prudence is often associated with caution, and fiduciaries generally find more comfort in the middle of the trend “pack” than on its fringes.

That said, the standard is to act (solely) in the best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries—even though it may be “scary” from time to time…

- Nevin E. Adams, JD