Retirement Income, Defaults and Fiduciary Duty

 I will confess that I am (still) of a mixed mind on imbedding retirement income solutions in 401(k) plans — and a new whitepaper on the implications of the new Investment Selection rule has done little to assuage those concerns.

The Morningstar paper — aptly titled “Guaranteed Income in DC Plans: Evaluating Target-Date Funds with Built-In Annuities” — covers a lot of ground. That said, more than half the paper is background[i] — chronicling both the trend lines to date, as well as offering a readable description of the two primary types of retirement income options that have found their way into the target-date fund framework (and yes, they’re quite different!). Those trendlines have captured the attention (and doubtless recirculation) of the paper, particularly among proponents.

But the “meat” of the paper considers the implicatio
ns of applying the Labor Department’s “new” Investment Selection Rule (though its official label at present remains “Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives”), and its list of six factors fiduciaries are charged with applying in their consideration(s) of all participant-directed choices[ii] on their retirement plan menu — at least if they expect to benefit from the presumption of prudence the Labor Department proposes to invoke in what it at least calls a “safe” harbor.

Factors Focus

And while those six factors — fees, complexity, performance, benchmarking, liquidity, and valuation — are to be broadly applied under the proposal, much (most? All?) of the coverage and discussion to date has been about the application of the Labor Department’s proposal to private markets, cryptocurrency, and the like. That said, this paper thoughtfully reminds us that retirement income option(s) require careful consideration as well.

Not to blend the first two, but fees on these retirement income offerings are definitely “complicated.” They’re higher than the other components of the target-date fund — the question is, what is the commensurate value? Their addition to the target-date fund definitely also adds mechanical complexity, certainly at the participant level (presumably the default facilitates adoption, but at some point, the participant has to “deal” with the reality).

As for performance — well, as the paper acknowledges, “Evaluating these products’ performance requires accepting upfront that forecasting is hard.” Ditto benchmarking, for much the same consideration. “Participants receiving guaranteed income through a GLWB or income annuity are benefiting from something traditional performance comparisons do not capture,” according to the authors. “This is where the Department of Labor’s emphasis on meaningful benchmarks becomes especially challenging for these products.” 

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And then there’s liquidity and valuation — which are one thing at a plan level, and potentially something quite different at the participant level. Oh, and the authors add a seventh factor; financial strength and the insurer’s credit rating — which while the SECURE Act may well provide helpful guidance there, those factors certainly bear additional, thoughtful consideration — and I would argue particularly so in a default fund scenario.

Complicate ‘Ed’

The paper itself is undeniably positive[iii] in its assessment of the need for, and the opportunities with, these solutions. It not only reviews the growing number of target-date structures incorporating guaranteed income components, it also outlines the potential behavioral and longevity-risk benefits of annuities.

But in my reading, the analysis is far more “nuanced.” Indeed, much of the paper reads like a litany of unresolved complications:

• Different annuity structures behave very differently.
• Fees and guarantees can be difficult to evaluate.
• Liquidity tradeoffs remain significant.
• Portability remains a significant concern — people change jobs, plan sponsors change recordkeepers, recordkeepers get acquired, insurers merge, and rollovers are complicated enough already.
• Participant understanding is limited — to say the least. Much less the understanding of the plan fiduciaries (and advisors) considering these options.

Little wonder that current adoption remains fairly muted despite years of industry attention and encouragement.

Proponents would, and have of course, argued that defaulting participants into these structures merely applies the same behavioral-finance principles that helped positively drive participation and savings rates higher.

If these structures were a straightforward solution, adoption likely would have moved beyond niche implementation by now. Instead, the industry continues searching for a retirement-income framework that participants will understand, fiduciaries will accept, and recordkeeping systems can realistically support — or at least one that can be slipped into a target-date offering that has already passed those tests.

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And while it remains just a proposal at this point, the Morningstar analysis suggests that applying the Labor Department's proposed framework to retirement-income solutions may rightly prove to be more challenging than applying it to traditional investment options.

The challenge is that retirement-income products are not merely investments with different return characteristics; they are insurance structures layered into investment vehicles. That distinction may ultimately require a different fiduciary lens altogether.

And whether the required analysis produces better fiduciary decisions — or simply more complexity — remains to be seen.

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

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[i] In fairness, a full quarter of the 13-page paper is devoted to disclosures/disclaimers.

[ii] Lifetime income options were one of the categories of investment alternatives named in President Trump’s August 2025 Executive Order (even if most wouldn’t be inclined to include them in that category).

[iii] In one executive summary bullet, it’s noted that assets in target-date strategies that include an annuity component for lifetime income grew to $44 billion at the end of March 2026, up from $25 billion a year earlier. However, in a separate bullet it’s acknowledged that “so far, growth has been driven by two series: BlackRock LifePath Paycheck (USD 26 billion in assets at the end of March) and custom target-date AB Lifetime Income (USD 14 billion).” So, $40 billion of the $44 billion in just those two.

A PEP-spective on Fiduciary Reviews

  Some months back, the Labor Department published an intriguing three-part “proposed rule” that, to my eye, offered helpful fiduciary tips that go well beyond pooled employer plans (PEPs).

The title alone — “Pooled Employer Plans: Big Plans for Small Businesses” — told you all you needed to know about the motives behind the publication. And, true to form, both the data provided on the current state of pooled employer plan adoption and the focus of the request for information (RFI) included were very much in the spirit of removing barriers to PEP adoption, if not outright promotion of the same.

But what I viewed as the third part of the publication (though it’s labeled V. Fiduciary Tips for Small Employers Selecting a PEP) was, to my eye, the most intriguing aspect, in no small part because it served as a valuable reminder that there ARE fiduciary considerations in making that choice — something that purveyors of that option have been known to gloss over.

As I was recently scanning these — it occurred to me that these admonitions could — and should — be broadly applied to pretty much any new plan option — and not just for small employers.

To that end, consider the following as a fill-in-the-blank template, replacing the word PEP with, say — alternative investments, cryptocurrency, retirement income, or a managed account. Consider:

The Considerations

1. Consider what ________ [i] has to offer you and your employees.

The PEP-focused explanation emphasizes an opportunity to leverage economies of scale, as well as to free up time for plan fiduciaries to run their business “…while simultaneously providing your employees with an opportunity to save and achieve retirement security.”  While that buries the lead a bit, it’s a reminder that your actions need to be prudent and in the best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries” — but mostly a reminder to consider the benefits and costs of the service(s) under consideration.

• Make sure you understand the type of ____________ under consideration.

The PEP-focused explanation notes that, while this option has certain things in common, they aren’t all the same, and don’t operate in the same way — that plan fiduciaries should consider the needs and best fit, and the importance of considering several before making a choice. The same thing is true with pretty much every option that might be under consideration, as the labels retirement income, alternative investments, and managed accounts are widely applied to very different products and operational considerations.

• Make sure you consider the experience and qualifications of the _______.

While the pooled plan provider (PPP) is mentioned here, every service offering is delivered by a provider of some type, and as this tip reminds, “understanding the experience and qualifications” of this entity “…is one of the most important — if not the single most important — aspects….” That means you need to ask and understand “questions relating to the quality of their services, customer satisfaction, prior litigation or government enforcement matters…” as well as “the number of employers and participants in the plan and the amount of its assets….” Basically, you want to make sure that the entity is capable — and has a track record — to fulfill the promises that have been made, and the needs of your plan.

• Make sure you ask questions about ________ fees.

This one really doesn’t need any more explanation, other than a reminder not only to find out what the fees are and who pays them, but also who is getting paid, notably any third parties — or third parties that might be providing compensation to the provider you’ve hired.

• Make sure you understand the investment options.

Of course, for some of the possibilities noted above, this (alternative investments, crypto) is the investment option under consideration and definitely should be understood. Ditto retirement income, which comes in many shapes and sizes (and was recently included in the executive order regarding alternative investments).

• Ask questions about your exposure to fiduciary liability for investments.
• Ask questions about your exposure to fiduciary liability should you join _____.
• Don't forget to monitor ________ on an ongoing basis.

One of the interesting call outs in the PEP document was that “under federal law, employers joining a PEP are legally responsible as fiduciaries for the proper selection of investment options for their employees unless the pooled plan provider hires an investment professional to act as a fiduciary with respect to investment selection.”  Interesting in that, again, some of the purveyors of those options have tended to gloss over/downplay this aspect.

That said it’s good to remember that, barring some kind of special provision, you are personally liable for the prudent selection and ongoing monitoring of all plan investments and services. All of which are embodied in the three tips listed above.

• Make sure you fully inquire about the implications of exiting _____.

I’ve heard it said that it’s a lot easier to get INTO a PEP than to get out of it (though that may just be a nasty rumor, and is doubtless a function of the PEP you have gotten into) — but the same could apply to any number of the other services outlined above, notably retirement income and alternative investments.

The tip here notes that it’s good to ask about any timing or penalty-imposed restrictions from a PEP, but similar impediments might, of course, be found with retirement income or different types of alternative investments. The bottom line here is that while you may not need to exercise an “exit” strategy, you need to know what the implications for the plan and participants would be if it came to that.

In Sum

So there in a nutshell you have it. For any/every product service being considered, make sure you know what benefits/costs it brings to the plan/participants, the capabilities/sustainability of the entity providing it, the fees (and who’s getting them), the process/costs for exiting — and that you have an ongoing personal liability/responsibility for monitoring the services, once engaged.

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] Just fill in the blank with the applicable service/product under consideration: managed account, retirement income, alternative investments, crypto, etc.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

  Plan fiduciaries might well have gotten a case of severe whiplash last week.

I’m referring of course to the dual announcements from the Labor Department (a) rescinding its previous position on cryptocurrency in retirement plans and (b) indicating  that it in some fashion plans to review/change the current so-called ESG rule through a formal regulatory notice-and-comment period — presumably rather than defend the current version which had been challenged in court. That, and any day now it’s expected that the Administration will (similarly) soften, if not shift, its previous take on private equity investments in defined contribution plans.

Doubtless many are cheering these new developments; others, of course, will see this as either a danger, or a diminution of fiduciary responsibility. And some, surely, will like one, but not the other. 

Regardless, if you’re a plan fiduciary trying to figure out what is right and prudent to consider as plan investments — well, by any rational measure these shifts are abrupt, if not contradictory in effect if not purpose.   

Now, admittedly the world has changed since the Labor Department first staked out positions on these matters — markets have matured, definitions (notably ESG) have “evolved,” and while time inevitably allows us to review past experiences in a different light — we all know what has actually happened is that the Trump Administration looks at the world of retirement plans (and markets generally) differently than the Biden or Obama and even the Bush Administration(s). And even if the standards of conduct established by ERISA haven’t changed, the application of those standards apparently has. Yes, over the course of time and experience, as you would hope/expect, but more accurately over the course of change in administrations.

Worse, we live in a time when the plaintiffs’ bar — without a hint of irony — manage to find fault both with failing to add a stable value option, and the decision to add one rather than a money market alternative, to challenge as imprudent target-date funds that don’t mirror the (different) glidepaths of the rest of the “pack,” or to claim that following the legal terms of the plan document in forfeiture dispositions runs afoul of one’s fiduciary obligations. 

Add to that the growing industry chorus that a less-than-active consideration of mechanisms like in-plan retirement income constitutes a failure to consider “best interests” — and it’s no wonder that prudent plan fiduciaries feel themselves stranded in the middle of a “damned whether you do – or not” minefield.

The reality is that plan fiduciaries have always had to thread a needle of sorts; trying to act solely in the best interests of participants on matters in which they often lack the requisite expertise to make that evaluation — and in matters for which they bear personal responsibility. It’s why many do — and all arguably should — tap into the insights and experience of those who have that expertise. 

But in this “rock and a hard place” environment, you can’t fault plan fiduciaries for choosing to avoid or defer making big changes in plan design when the rules — and rule makers — change so abruptly.

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

Are There Boogeymen in the New Fiduciary Proposal?

Like many of you, I have spent a fair amount of time over the past couple of weeks reading and analyzing the impact and import of the new fiduciary rule proposal—not to mention the legal pundits who seek to tell us what they think it means, or might mean, regardless of what the proposal actually says.

At a high level, it seems to me (and several well-regarded ERISA attorneys) that retirement plan advisors who are today operating under the auspices of PTE 2020-02 should have little to worry about under the new proposal. Indeed, the biggest controversies around the proposed rule seem to be extending the reach of PTE 2020-02 to organizations and entities that hadn’t previously had to adhere to those requirements. 

But if you’re already doing so—and surely if you’re a retirement plan advisor you are—there’s little of concern in the proposal. In fact, you might well draw comfort from the possibility that entities and advisors that have competed with you for rollover business would have to adhere to the same rules and disclosures that are now part of your business, painful though it may have been to adopt them at the time. Of no small consequence is that recommendations to plan sponsors regarding which investments to include in 401(k) and other employer-sponsored plans—advice that is not subject to the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest and right now is not required to be in the customer’s best interest—would be.

Make no mistake, this is a new and considerably revised proposal. One that appears to not only have acknowledged the things that led a federal district court to vacate the 2016 rule—but to actively address and remedy those missteps. 

That said, rumors abound, and some law firms (certainly those that represent the interests of those who would be newly subject to new regulations) have, to my read anyway, been inclined to see plenty of clouds in the silver linings—and to characterize the new proposal as basically being a resurrection of the old one (to that end, the Halloween unveiling made for plenty of “zombie” references)—in the process imagining things that aren’t actually “there.” 

Perhaps the most pernicious is one that they admit isn’t there—but argue it might be; the so-called “private right of action”—which means simply that individuals would be able to sue on their own for a breach of the law. The concerns harken back to comments made during the controversy concerning the 2016 rule that the fiduciary rule was not only opening a new door for litigation, but that the Labor Department was perhaps even counting on it.     

Now, on this, and other points in the new proposal, the DOL acknowledges both the issues raised in the vacating of the rule by the Fifth Circuit, and the deliberate steps they’ve taken to avoid those issues in the new proposal. “The 2016 Rulemaking was significantly different than the current rulemaking,” the DOL explains in the preamble to the proposed rule, “in that it imposed a fiduciary obligation on virtually all investment recommendations specifically directed to retirement investors, imposed demanding contract and warranty requirements in the IRA market, which gave investors a direct cause of action against firms and advisers for breach of the Impartial Conduct Standards, and represented a significant break from the then-existing regulatory baseline.”

To be sure, there is already a cause of action for fiduciary breaches under ERISA for recommendations to plans and participants—and there’s no question that while under a recent decision in a Florida district court, rollover recommendations are not considered fiduciary recommendations under current law—but will be under the proposed rule.

That said, in considering this latest proposal, one notable DC law firm says, for example that the proposal includes “strong enforcement mechanisms, including provisions that give the DOL oversight and authority over firms’ individual retirement account (IRA) business and (although DOL claims otherwise[i]) a potential private right of action.” That’s right—even though the Labor Department specifically says otherwise, this law firm has chosen to read between the lines and see the potential for something the DOL explicitly denies. 

In fact, the Labor Department clearly states in a footnote in the preamble of the proposed rule that (the underline is mine, for emphasis) “Unlike the PTEs that were a part of the 2016 Rulemaking, these PTEs do not, and the amendments would not, include required contracts or warranties that the Fifth Circuit objected to.”  

The footnote goes on to explain that “these prohibited transaction exemptions also do not exempt a party from status as a fiduciary, and therefore, the proposals do not affect the scope of the regulatory definition of an investment advice fiduciary. Rather, the exemption proposals involve an exercise of the statutory authority afforded to the Department by Congress to grant administrative relief from the strict prohibited transaction provisions in Title I and Title II of ERISA for beneficial transactions involving plans and IRAs.”

Now, the standard of care for “conflicted” recommendations to plans, participants and IRAs is the Best Interest Standard—a combination of the prudent man rule and duty of loyalty. If the “conflicted” recommendation isn’t in the best interest of a retirement investor, the protection of the prohibited transaction exemption (PTE) is lost and the advisor isn’t permitted to be legally compensated. That said, the best interest standard in the PTE isn’t actionable.

Another critical “boogeyman” that proposal critics claim to have seen there is an undermining of the ability to enforce arbitration clauses as a precursor to litigation. I say “conjured” because—unlike a controversial provision in the 2016 rule that barred the use of the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BIC) if advisory contracts included an arbitration requirement—there is no mention or reference to that in the current proposal.        

There’s plenty still to analyze and evaluate in this new proposal—and arguably not as much time to do so as we might prefer. Here’s hoping most of that time and energy is spent on the things that are actually in the proposal instead of imaginary “monsters” that aren’t. 

 - Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] Their exact words.