Showing posts with label retirement investments. Show all posts
Showing posts with label retirement investments. Show all posts

Saturday, June 07, 2025

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

  Plan fiduciaries might well have gotten a case of severe whiplash last week.

I’m referring of course to the dual announcements from the Labor Department (a) rescinding its previous position on cryptocurrency in retirement plans and (b) indicating  that it in some fashion plans to review/change the current so-called ESG rule through a formal regulatory notice-and-comment period — presumably rather than defend the current version which had been challenged in court. That, and any day now it’s expected that the Administration will (similarly) soften, if not shift, its previous take on private equity investments in defined contribution plans.

Doubtless many are cheering these new developments; others, of course, will see this as either a danger, or a diminution of fiduciary responsibility. And some, surely, will like one, but not the other. 


Regardless, if you’re a plan fiduciary trying to figure out what is right and prudent to consider as plan investments — well, by any rational measure these shifts are abrupt, if not contradictory in effect if not purpose.   

Now, admittedly the world has changed since the Labor Department first staked out positions on these matters — markets have matured, definitions (notably ESG) have “evolved,” and while time inevitably allows us to review past experiences in a different light — we all know what has actually happened is that the Trump Administration looks at the world of retirement plans (and markets generally) differently than the Biden or Obama and even the Bush Administration(s). And even if the standards of conduct established by ERISA haven’t changed, the application of those standards apparently has. Yes, over the course of time and experience, as you would hope/expect, but more accurately over the course of change in administrations.

Worse, we live in a time when the plaintiffs’ bar — without a hint of irony — manage to find fault both with failing to add a stable value option, and the decision to add one rather than a money market alternative, to challenge as imprudent target-date funds that don’t mirror the (different) glidepaths of the rest of the “pack,” or to claim that following the legal terms of the plan document in forfeiture dispositions runs afoul of one’s fiduciary obligations. 

Add to that the growing industry chorus that a less-than-active consideration of mechanisms like in-plan retirement income constitutes a failure to consider “best interests” — and it’s no wonder that prudent plan fiduciaries feel themselves stranded in the middle of a “damned whether you do – or not” minefield.

The reality is that plan fiduciaries have always had to thread a needle of sorts; trying to act solely in the best interests of participants on matters in which they often lack the requisite expertise to make that evaluation — and in matters for which they bear personal responsibility. It’s why many do — and all arguably should — tap into the insights and experience of those who have that expertise. 

But in this “rock and a hard place” environment, you can’t fault plan fiduciaries for choosing to avoid or defer making big changes in plan design when the rules — and rule makers — change so abruptly.

  • Nevin E. Adams, JD

Saturday, October 26, 2024

Top 10 Pet Peeves About the Retirement Industry — Part II

Last week, I shared five of my Top 10 Pet Peeves about the Retirement Industry. Here’s the rest of the list.

Making “apples to oranges” comparisons of world pension systems.

Let’s face it — nobody wants to be “average.” And yet, there are now a handful of retirement industry consultants that, each year, publish a ranking of how the world’s retirement systems rate — and year after year the United States generally comes in about the middle of the pack.

Considering just how diverse these systems and the populations they serve are — one might well wonder at the need to rank them. But rank them they do, employing a relatively complex rating system to do so. The most recent was by Mercer — who, once again — held the U.S. in relatively poor esteem compared with the Netherlands, Iceland, Denmark and Israel. The Nordic countries are a perennial favorite here — though they all happen to be (much) smaller in population, and more culturally and racially monolithic than the U.S.


They all also have different approaches to taxes, and social infrastructure. Said another way, these rankings never consider the cost — both monetarily — to society and the mandatory worker contributions they require — and in terms of pre-retirement access to those funds. No, they myopically focus on the level of benefits provided and the security of those promises — not irrelevant considerations, of course — but one that glosses over some of the choices that might have to be made — or eliminated — in order to achieve them.

Not that Americans might not be willing to make them — if they were told what they were. But labelling the American system (slightly above) “average” isn’t telling the whole story.

Ignoring the existence and impact of Social Security.

Once upon a time, we talked about retirement as having three legs: Social Security, workplace savings/pensions, and personal savings. But to a number of vocal pundits, the full burden has been put … on the 401(k). A system that, as I noted previously, everybody decries as never being intended to be a retirement plan.

Well, before there was a 401(k) — and even before the advent of ERISA — there was Social Security, a program designed to provide retirement income to working Americans. It remains absolutely integral to even the most rudimentary retirement planning calculation, and with good reason. But it too was “never intended” to provide a full replacement of pre-retirement income in retirement, though it does for many lower-income Americans. 

That said, despite a looming financing shortfall — and a fairly widespread notion that those benefits aren't "enough" for a full retirement income replacement, you don't see headlines in the New York Times — or folks going on book tours — proclaiming that program was a "mistake" the way some do about the 401(k). The reality is that Social Security — like the 401(k) — has undergone significant changes in scope, funding, and mission since its 1935 inception. While deliberate, it might fairly be termed “mission creep.”

The (other) reality is that the 401(k) actually does a pretty good job of what workplace savings was always designed to do — supplement the foundation that Social Security provides — and yes, even for lower-income individuals. It has been — and continues to be — an essential element of retirement security for middle-income workers, for whom Social Security benefits alone likely fall short of their pre-retirement income levels and needs. It, like Social Security, is an essential element of the three-legged stool. But we need to quit carrying on like the 401(k) should be expected to be THE retirement income source (and that it’s a failure if it doesn’t).   

Using compounding “Magic” to make mountains our of molehills.

Albert Einstein is said to have called compounding the eighth wonder of the world. While that certainly applies to finances and savings growth, it can also be used to exaggerate financial issues. 

For example, a couple of years back a firm (that was in the business of capturing IRA rollovers) put out a jaw-dropping statistic that claimed there were $1.35 trillion in “forgotten” 401(k) accounts?  That’s TRILLION, with a “T”. 

That jaw-dropping number was the headline from a report titled, “The true cost of forgotten 401(k) accounts,” authored by “the Capitalize research team” — and yes, if accurate, that would mean that about a fifth of all 401(k) assets have been “forgotten.” Sound suspicious? Here’s another data point: The report goes on to estimate that these 24.3 million accounts that have been “forgotten” have an average balance of… $55,400 per account

Now, numbers like that are generally reserved for emails regarding a Nigerian prince. Fortunately, these authors showed their “math” — and — suffice it to say they pulled a couple of actual data points, extrapolated a much larger reality from those data points, and did a couple of rounds of multiplication to expand the population impacted, and the compounded the financial impact. And if that weren’t enough, they further extrapolated that impact to be an ongoing annual expansion of the problem. 

More recently, there was a report from Vanguard that claimed that job-changing could cost your retirement $300,000. That was a jaw-dropping number on its own (p.s., if a projection is jaw-dropping, beware) — particularly when you get into the report and find that it’s based on a projection based a median participant making $60,000 per year. 

Most of the coverage focused on the impact resulting from participants who had been auto-enrolled, and then auto-escalated to a point, changed jobs, and then (re)started participation at a new plan, (re)auto-enrolled at a lower deferral rate than where they left off at their old plan. The problem there, of course, isn’t the job change itself, it’s the individual not taking the time/energy to adjust the rate of savings with the new plan. By the way, job changers with VOLUNTARY enrollment saw NO decrease in savings rates. 

But as you look deeper into the report, the researchers also focus on folks getting a raise with the job change (10%, on average, they assume), but not commensurately increasing their deferrals — so, on a relative basis, the report calls this a reduction in savings (this is the way government does tax math, by the way). Moreover, there were job changers that saw even higher raises with the job change — and, according to the math here, “suffered” a commensurately larger decrease in savings — at least relative to the rates at which they were saving previously.

Ultimately, of course, this makes it sound like people are LOSING retirement savings, when in fact it’s really more about leaving money on the table (and they admit that there are a multitude of reasons why folks might legitimately be saving differently along with a job change).

Still, the headlines have been trumpeting this as a scary development — one that some are (already) saying means that the 401(k) design is flawed, and not equipped to deal with today’s job changers. 

Except, of course, that the median job tenure of the American workforce is pretty much unchanged since WWII.   

The bottom line? If the headline is jaw-dropping, go look at the methodology and fine print. 

Claiming that 401(k)s are only for the “rich.”

Well, first off, you need to get those folks to tell you who they consider rich. There’s certainly an argument to be made that those making higher incomes might well get a “bigger” benefit from the pre-tax preferences — but studies have shown that constraints like non-discrimination tests and 402(g) limits bound those in such that the benefits higher income workers receive are in rough proportion to their income(s). 

Indeed, if those “upside-down incentives” were the only forces at work, one might reasonably expect to find that the higher the individual’s salary, the higher the overall account balance would be, as a multiple of salary. However, a couple of years back — drawing on the actual administrative data from the then-massive EBRI/ICI 401(k) database, and specifically focusing on workers in their 60s (broken down by tenure and salary), then-EBRI Research Director Jack VanDerhei found that those ratios hold relatively steady. In fact, those ratios are relatively flat for salaries between $30,000 and $100,000, before dropping substantially for those with salaries in excess of $100,000 (see here).

The reality is that the 401(k) has been remarkably equitable in encouraging participation, even among workers of very modest incomes. For them — and for the middle class, generally — the 401(k) has been the only way they (can) save.

Referring to recordkeeping as a “commodity.”

For years, recordkeeping services — complex and difficult as they can be to provide accurately and consistently (not to mention profitably) — have been characterized (some might say disparaged) as a “commodity,” while fee compression (and the aforementioned complexities) continue to fuel consolidation in that industry. 

Honestly, as a former recordkeeper (though it’s been awhile), I’ve never understood how anyone who had any real appreciation for a business as varied, complex, and demanding as that of keeping up – and keeping up accurately – with individual participant accounts over the course of a working career – would be willing to refer to those services as “interchangeable.” Or why any firm that provides those complex services in these challenging times would be willing to let others do so. Certainly, any participant, plan sponsor, or advisor who has seen the integrity of that data put at risk by clumsy and inattentive hands can attest to the impact that a failure to do so. Indeed, I’m shocked by the leaders in our industry who label it as such — leaders that I think might well feel differently if they had spent even a small amount of time in those shoes.

Without question, recordkeeping is not only a challenging business, it is expensive to stay current with technology, to keep processes and programs current not only with changes both in the laws and regulations, but the nuances of individual plan designs. And as if that weren’t enough, cybersecurity has recently emerged as a significant threat – little wonder in view of the enormous amount of sensitive financial data to which these “commodity” producers are entrusted.

Where recordkeeping does seem to have been “transformed” into a commodity business is in the pricing of those services. Like the gasoline drawn from a pump, economists would tell you that, since commodity products are “interchangeable,” they compete (only) on price – and to do so (profitably) requires that that you have to achieve economies of scale – and the continued downward pressure on fees for those services continues to force firms to exit or flee to the embrace of larger players.

Further fueling those trends, the plaintiffs’ bar has latched onto the “commodity” concept, having (apparently) determined that it is “appropriate” to be compensated for these services by a flat per-participant charge (it started at $35/participant, but has since moved lower). 

Regardless, my personal experience is that those who find themselves working with a service provider or TPA that views those critical services as a “commodity” will, in short order, be looking for a new one.

One More

Well, that’s my list, and while I worked hard to limit it to 10, I have one more to share; what really ticks me off is those who give a microphone (and/credibility) and SHARE those comments (however well-intentioned) to those who say any of the above. And that goes DOUBLE for those in this industry who should know better!

Got one (or more) you’d like to add? Do so in the comments!

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Saturday, February 02, 2019

A Pigskin Prediction for Your Portfolios?

Will your portfolio rise with the Rams – or get pummeled by the Patriots?

That’s what adherents of the so-called Super Bowl Theory would likely conclude. The Super Bowl Theory holds that when a team from the old National Football League wins the Super Bowl, the S&P 500 will rise, and when a team from the old American Football League prevails, stock prices will fall.

It’s a “theory” that has been found to be correct nearly 80% of the time – for 40 of the 52 Super Bowls, in fact.

Not that it hasn’t had its shortcomings. One need look back no further than last year’s win by the NFC champion Philadelphia Eagles against the AFC Champion Patriots (who once were the AFL’s Boston Patriots) to find an instance where it turned out to be a loser, market-wise, with the S&P 500 down more than 6% (though for most of the year it was quite a different story). Ditto the year before when the epic comeback by those same AFC Champion Patriots against the NFC champion Atlanta Falcons didn’t forestall a 2017 market surge.

Nor is it always the Patriots who play Super Bowl Theory spoilers – the year before that, the AFC’s (and original AFL) Broncos’ 24-10 victory over the Carolina Panthers, who represented the NFC, also proved to be an “exception.”

Market Makings

That was an unusual break in the streak that was sustained in 2015 following Super Bowl XLIX, when the New England Patriots (yes, those same Patriots) bested the Seattle Seahawks 28-24 to earn their fourth Super Bowl title. It also “worked” in 2014, when the Seahawks bumped off the legacy AFL Denver Broncos, and in 2013, when a dramatic fourth-quarter comeback rescued a victory by the Baltimore Ravens – who, though representing the AFC, are technically a legacy NFL team via their Cleveland Browns roots.

Admittedly, the fact that the markets fared well in 2013 was hardly a true test of the Super Bowl Theory since, as it turned out, both teams in Super Bowl XLVII – the Ravens and the San Francisco 49ers – were NFL legacy teams.


Who’s your pick to win Super Bowl 53? Cast your vote here!


However, consider that in 2012 a team from the old NFL (the New York Giants) took on – and took down – one from the old AFL (the New England Patriots – yes, those New England Patriots). And, in fact, 2012 was a pretty good year for stocks.

Steel ‘Curtains’?

On the other hand, the year before that, the Pittsburgh Steelers (representing the American Football Conference) took on the National Football Conference’s Green Bay Packers – two teams that had some of the oldest, deepest and, yes, most “storied” NFL roots, with the Steelers formed in 1933 (as the Pittsburgh Pirates) and the Packers founded in 1919. According to the Super Bowl Theory, 2011 should have been a good year for stocks (because, regardless of who won, a legacy NFL team would prevail).

But as you may recall, while the Dow gained ground for the year, the S&P 500 was, well, flat.

And then there was the string of Super Bowls where the contests were all between legacy NFL teams (thus, no matter who won, the markets should have risen):
  • 2006, when the Steelers bested the Seattle Seahawks;
  • 2007, when the Indianapolis Colts beat the Chicago Bears 29-17;
  • 2009, when the Pittsburgh Steelers took on the Arizona Cardinals (who had once been the NFL’s St. Louis Cardinals); and
  • 2010, when the New Orleans Saints bested the Indianapolis Colts, who had roots back to the NFL legacy Baltimore Colts.
Sure enough, the markets were higher in each of those years.

As for 2008? Well, that was the year that the NFC’s New York Giants upended the hopes of the AFL-legacy Patriots (yes, those Patriots) for a perfect season, but it didn’t do any favors for the stock market. In fact, that was the last time that the Super Bowl Theory didn’t “work” (well, until this past year – oh, and the year before that – and the year before…).

Patriot Gains

Times were better for Patriots fans in 2005, when they bested the NFC’s Philadelphia Eagles 24-21. Indeed, according to the Super Bowl Theory, the markets should have been down that year – but the S&P 500 rose 2.55%.

Of course, Super Bowl Theory proponents would tell you that the 2002 win by (those same) New England Patriots accurately foretold the continuation of the bear market into a third year (at the time, the first accurate result in five years). But the Patriots’ 2004 Super Bowl win against the Carolina Panthers (the one that probably nobody except Patriots fans remember because it was overshadowed by Janet Jackson’s infamous “wardrobe malfunction”) failed to anticipate a fall rally that helped push the S&P 500 to a near 9% gain that year, sacking the indicator for another loss (couldn’t resist).

Bronco ‘Busters’

Consider also that, despite victories by the AFL-legacy Denver Broncos in 1998 and 1999, the S&P 500 continued its winning ways, while victories by the NFL-legacy St. Louis (by way of Los Angeles) Rams (that have now returned to the City of Angels) and the Baltimore Ravens did nothing to dispel the bear markets of 2000 and 2001, respectively.

In fact, the Super Bowl Theory “worked” 28 times between 1967 and 1997, then went 0-4 between 1998 and 2001, only to get back on track from 2002 on (though “purists” still dispute how to interpret Tampa Bay’s 2003 victory, since the Buccaneers spent their first NFL season in the AFC before moving to the NFC).

Indeed, the Buccaneers’ move to the NFC was part of a swap with the Seattle Seahawks, who did, in fact, enter the NFL as an NFC team in 1976 but shuttled quickly over to the AFC (where they remained through 2001) before returning to the NFC (see below). And, not having entered the league until 1976, regardless of when they began, can the Seahawks truly be considered a “legacy” NFL squad? Bear in mind as well, that in 2006, when the Seahawks made their first Super Bowl appearance – and lost – the S&P 500 gained nearly 16%.

As for Sunday’s contest, the Patriots have been here before (to put it mildly), the Rams (just) twice – but not since 2002 (when they lost to the Patriots, 20-17 in the first Super Bowl to be played in February, following the one-week delay in the NFL season after the 9/11 attacks).

Indeed that victory is seen by many as marking the beginning of the current Patriot “dynasty” (and one that, no doubt, the Rams would like to “avenge”).

Jersey ‘Sure’?

On a separate note, despite (technically) being the home team, the Rams have decided to wear their blue/yellow throwback jerseys – meaning that the Patriots will (again) be wearing white jerseys. The Patriots are doubtless pleased with the Rams’ decision because, dating back to 2005 with the Patriots in Super Bowl XXXIX, the team wearing white jerseys has won 12 times. That’s 12 wins in 14 years with the only teams to win while wearing colored uniforms in that span being the Packers in Super Bowl XLV… oh, and the Eagles last year against… well, you know.

All in all, it looks like it should be a good game.

And that – whether you are a proponent of the Super Bowl Theory or not – would be one in which regardless of which team wins, we all do!

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Note: Seattle is the only team to have played in both the AFC and NFC Championship Games, having relocated from the AFC to the NFC during league realignment prior to the 2002 season. The Seahawks are the only NFL team to switch conferences twice in the post-merger era. The franchise began play in 1976 in the NFC West division but switched conferences with the Buccaneers after one season and joined the AFC West.