Showing posts with label 404c. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 404c. Show all posts

Sunday, August 07, 2011

“Fifth” Avenues

The year we began publishing PLANADVISER was a big year in many ways for me – it marked my twentieth wedding anniversary, it was the year my father passed away, the year my eldest went off to college for the first time, and also the year that “catch-up contributions” became an item of more-than-passing interest to me.

In recent weeks, I’ve had occasion to think back on those past five years, and all that has transpired – the Pension Protection Act, QDIAs. the back-and-forth on fiduciary advisers, the first wave (and subsequent flurry) of revenue-sharing lawsuits, the growing emphasis on transparency and disclosure, the growth – and questions about – target-date funds, the “normalization” of a fiduciary role for retirement plan advisers, and more recently, the back-and-forth on an expanded fiduciary definition. Like many of you, I can still recall the tumultuous news of September 2008 – all hitting during our PLANADVISER National Conference that year.

While it’s fun and interesting to look back at what’s gone on the past several years – to imagine what might have been, and perhaps to rue what has, it’s clear that we’ve all come a long way over the past five years - and little question that we have an interesting road ahead as well.


Here are five things I think we can count on for the next five years:

Participant fee disclosure won’t matter.

Let’s face it; most participants don’t do anything with their retirement accounts. Most never realign balances, most don’t ever change the amount they defer, and – thankfully, most leave those accounts alone at times when we’re all worried that they will not. I’m betting, for all the angst about participant fee disclosures, most won’t read them – and even fewer will do anything in response. With luck, by the time they get those disclosures, they won’t feel the need.

Plan sponsor fee disclosure will matter.

It’s no easy thing for a plan sponsor to up and change providers. All other things being equal, most would rather crawl over hot coals than deal with all the additional work (and decisions) attendant with those changes. That said, once fee disclosures become more public, and, shall we say, “systematic” – well, I expect plan sponsors will have a lot of “help” reviewing the information. While I don’t expect a massive surge in provider changes, I think it’s fair to say that a lot of “haggling” will take place.

Advisers that work with ERISA plans will need to be ERISA fiduciaries.

Arguably it’s already tough to win a piece of ERISA business against an adviser willing to claim fiduciary status. But I think we’ve already passed the tipping point, and if market forces weren’t sufficiently persuasive, the regulators now seem determined to press the issue.

We’ll come to regret our complacency about target-date fund designs.

In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, much was made of the variations in target-date glide paths, the disparity in assumptions that resulted in wildly different results for those just a couple of years away from retirement. Since then, the markets have repaired much of that damage, but little appears to have been done in terms of rethinking the assumptions and structures of those funds. More troubling is how little movement has since been apparent among plans that felt burned, but ostensibly were ignorant (willfully or otherwise) of those differences in 2008.

Retirement income will (still) be the big thing we all say needs to be solved that (still) isn’t.

Mark Twain once famously remarked that “everyone talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.” Well, you can’t say that people haven’t been doing things about retirement income. In fact, there have been some pretty remarkable developments over the past couple of years. The Obama Administration has certainly tried to jumpstart the discussion, if not adoption of such designs. A truly comprehensive safe harbor could be a game-changer here – but I’m guessing that there won’t be a target-date “simple” solution here. Not that there should be …

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Sunday, September 26, 2010

"Status" Quo?

Last week, during our PLANADVISER National Conference, I asked a panel of four plan sponsors if their current adviser was a fiduciary—and if that status mattered to them.

It’s not the first time I’ve asked that question; in fact, I have asked it of these plan sponsor panels at each of our four such conferences to date (although the plan sponsors were, of course, different). I ask it for one simple reason: While I sense a certain unanimity of opinion on the matter in retirement plan adviser circles, plan sponsors frequently have a more nuanced view.

Sure enough, this year a plan sponsor panelist not only said that his adviser wasn’t a fiduciary, but that he wasn’t at all sure why that mattered. In fact, he wondered aloud why an adviser would want to go to jail with him if something went awry.

Now, you could tell that many of the advisers in the room were surprised, perhaps stunned, by that statement. And yet, IMHO, that plan sponsor demonstrated what I felt was a pretty insightful appreciation for the litigation shield—or lack thereof—afforded him in hiring a fiduciary. For my money, far too many plan sponsors think that when they hire a plan adviser who is a fiduciary (or a provider who touts itself as a “co-fiduciary”), they have, in fact, supplanted their own fiduciary obligations to the program. But here was a plan sponsor who understood that if something “went wrong,” even if his adviser were a fiduciary, he was still on the hook.

That said, this plan sponsor’s answer was the kind of response that should surely give pause to an industry that spends so much time and energy “angsting” over the fiduciary issue.

The truth is, hiring a fiduciary is no magic talisman against litigation for the plan sponsor—and those who think (or who are mislead into thinking) so are ill-advised, to put it kindly. So why should fiduciary status matter?

Consider for a minute, when you bought your last car, who was that salesman looking out for—even as he ostensibly went to lobby his manager on your behalf? What about that clerk that was so helpful as you considered that PC or big-screen TV purchase? How about that commission-based realtor? Did they really have your best interests in mind?

Advisers that have adopted fiduciary status routinely talk about how their fee-for-service approach insulates them from bias in making fund recommendations; note that it allows them to bring THEIR very best judgment to the fore. What is, however, IMHO, too often glossed over is that it’s not just their best judgment, even an unbiased judgment, that is the essential benefit to hiring an ERISA fiduciary. Rather, it’s that judgment applied, and applied solely, in the best interests of the plan and its participants.

And that matters most—or, IMHO, should matter most—to those who are themselves charged with making decisions that adhere to those standards

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

Saturday, August 22, 2009

“To Do” List—Part 2


Being a plan fiduciary is a tough job—and one that, it’s probably fair to say—is underappreciated, if not undercompensated. In my experience, most who find themselves in that role (see “IMHO: Duty Call”) do an admirable job of living up to the spirit, if not the letter, of their responsibilities.

Nonetheless, there are plenty of areas in which we could do a better job. In this week’s column, we’ll touch on the rest of my “10 things you’re probably doing wrong” list:


6. Thinking your plan qualifies for 404(c) protection—and misunderstanding what that means.

Any number of studies suggest that many, perhaps most, plan sponsors think their plan meets the standards of ERISA 404(c ), a provision that ostensibly shields them from being sued for participant investment decisions, so long as certain conditions are met.

On the other hand, industry experts are nearly uniform in their assessment that very few, perhaps no, plans meet those standards (though the courts have been somewhat more liberal in their application). So, even if you think your plan does comply—check. And even if your plan does comply, understand that, while 404(c)’s shield may offer some protection against an individual participant suit, it offers no insulation against a participant suit predicated on an inappropriate investment option. Remember, too, that the DoL thinks you’re responsible for every participant investment decision except those behind 404(c)’s “shield.”

7. Depositing contributions on a timely basis.

The legal requirement for when contributions must be deposited to the plan is perhaps one of most widely misunderstood elements of plan administration. Unfortunately, a delay in contribution deposits is also one of the most common flags that an employer is in financial trouble—and that the Labor Department is likely to investigate.

Note that the law requires that participant contributions be deposited in the plan as soon as it is reasonably possible to segregate them from the company’s assets, but no later than the 15th business day of the month following the payday. If employers can reasonably make the deposits sooner, they need to do so. Many have read the worst case situation (the 15th business day of the month following) to be the legal requirement. It is not.

8. (Not) monitoring providers on a regular basis.

In some sense, we all “monitor” the performance of plan providers all the time. Is the Web site available when people try to access it? Do checks and statements arrive on time? Are the balances displayed accurate? The reality is that, for most of us, no news is seen as “good” news. After all, if the answer to any of those questions was “no,” we’d not only know about it, we’d be complaining about it (after fending off our own set of complaining phone calls). Odds are that you have a very full-time job dealing with the things that are “broken”—why go looking for trouble?

However, relationships with providers are like any other relationship—we all slip into “ruts” of complacency—and the best way to keep that new customer “honeymoon” feeling alive is to do something as simple as ask your current provider for a regular service review. At least once a year—no matter how well things are going—you should determine if your plan has access to the new services that have come online since you converted; that you are getting the advantages of the most current thinking about costs and fees; and how your plan’s participation, deferral, and asset diversification stack up. And every three to five years (sooner if there are problems, of course), you should go through a formal request for information (RFI) or request for proposal (RFP) process—on your own, or with the help of an adviser (who doubtless has more experience with such things).

Remember also that the DoL says that, “Among other duties, fiduciaries have a responsibility to ensure that the services provided to their plan are necessary and that the cost of those services is reasonable.”

9. Not following the terms of the plan document.

Plan documents are, after all, legal documents and can skirt the fringes of readability. Retirement plans develop certain patterns or routines—the way things are handled—that may not, over time, remain consistent with the terms of the plan. Particularly if you are using a plan document prepared by a provider (or, worse, an ex-provider) that may well accommodate that provider’s approach, but may not match (or may not have kept up with) how you actually administer the plan. It is a good idea to do a document/process “audit” every couple of years; don’t assume that “the way we’ve always done things” is supported by the legal document governing your plan.

10. Not realizing who is a fiduciary—and what that means.

The first thing to understand is who a plan fiduciary is, and to understand that the “test” isn’t what you call yourself (or, in some cases, what you avoid calling yourself), but your ability to control and influence plan assets. A fiduciary is any person or entity named in the plan document (e.g., the plan sponsor and trustee); any person or entity that has discretionary authority over the management of a retirement plan or its assets (all individuals exercising discretion in the administration of the plan, all members of a plan’s administrative committee—if it has such a committee—and those who select committee officials); and any person or entity that offers investment advice with respect to plan assets, for a fee.

Remember too, that the authority to appoint a fiduciary makes you a fiduciary—and that hiring a “co-fiduciary” does not make you an “ex” fiduciary.

If you are a fiduciary, and you feel that you lack the expertise to make those decisions, you will of course want—and, in fact, are expected—to hire someone with that professional knowledge to carry out the investment and other functions.

Finally, remember that, IMHO, you’re more likely to get sued for not doing something you should be doing than for doing something you shouldn’t be doing.


—Nevin E. Adams, JD

You can find more information on fulfilling your fiduciary responsibilities at the Employee Benefits Security Administration’s (EBSA) Web site HERE

Sunday, April 19, 2009

'Second' Opinions

ERISA’s 404(c) has long been held out by some as something of a magic talisman: Comply with its strictures, they claim, and you have an iron-clad defense against participant lawsuits —and, IMHO, the implication is a defense against ALL participant lawsuits. Of course, any number of ERISA experts will tell you that it is nearly impossible to satisfy those strictures, certainly not for every transaction (and mind you, 404(c) is transactional protection)—not that that seems to dissuade plan fiduciaries from trying, nor plan advisers from purporting to help them achieve that end. Nor are plan fiduciaries, or the participants and beneficiaries they support, ill-served by those efforts.

That said, I have long been surprised at how broadly the judiciary has been willing to extend those protections. Good news if you’re the plan sponsor getting sued, of course—but not-so-good if you’re a plan fiduciary looking for some consistency in the law.

The most recent example was Hecker v. Deere (see “Appellate Court Backs Deere Case Dismissal”), one of the litany of revenue-sharing lawsuits that have been brought (see “IMHO: Fighting Words”). This particular case has drawn the attention of the Department of Labor (DoL), and not for the first time. In fact, it was almost exactly a year ago that the DoL tried to help the appellate court do a better job applying the law than the District Court had (see “IMHO: The Letter of the Law”).

This time, the DoL said in a friend of the court filing that a “[p]anel rehearing is warranted to correct the panel’s mistakes of law and fact in misconstruing section 404(c ) of ERISA and declining to defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of her 404(c ) regulation.”

Besides the issue of deference to the Secretary of Labor, at issue in the DoL’s filing: “whether participants and beneficiaries exercise independent control,” but more specifically, did that exercise happen “in the manner described in the regulation,” because only then would the plan fiduciaries not be liable for any loss “that is the direct and necessary result” of that exercise of control.

The DoL cites language in 404(c)’s preamble that clearly puts the act of designating investment alternatives as well as the ongoing determination that those choices are “suitable and prudent” outside the shield of 404(c), and goes on to note footnote language that, IMHO, confirms the obvious—that the choice of those fund menu options is a task “over which the fiduciary, and not the participant has control”—and thus, even if the plan qualified as a 404( c) plan, those protections would not apply. Moreover, and at issue in the Deere case, the DoL notes, “[I]f on the other hand, the fiduciary maintains imprudent investment choices—such as investments with imprudently high fees (emphasis added)—then under the Secretary’s regulation, any resulting loss is not a ‘direct and necessary consequence of the participant’s exercise of control,’ and the fiduciary is not exempt from liability for that loss.”

The DoL notes that the court’s decision “appears to rest in large part on a mistaken impression that plaintiffs’ claims hinge on the fiduciaries’ failure to ‘scour the market to find and offer the cheapest possible fund,’ as well as the conclusion that the fees were necessarily prudent because the Plan’s array of investment funds were offered ‘to the general public’ at the same expense ratios that the Plans paid.” To the DoL’s point, it’s one thing to say that there is no obligation to find/obtain the cheapest fee, another altogether, IMHO, to claim that a multi-billion-dollar 401(k) plan has no fiduciary obligation to negotiate a better deal on behalf of its participants than they could do on their own account in a retail environment. To fail to do so is not necessarily a fiduciary transgression—but, IMHO, it surely is worth a proper hearing.

To its credit, the DoL didn’t just take issue with the fact that the court basically ignored its earlier counsel, nor did it focus strictly on its belief that the court just plain got it wrong, though it did say that “[t]he court also may not have fully understood the potentially far-reaching ramifications of its decision, which permits fiduciaries to evade accountability for the imprudent selection and maintenance of funds in defined contribution plans.”

The DoL also looked out to the future to see where a judicial misapplication of the law might take us and, I’m pleased to say, they cited this column (1). “These implications have not gone unnoticed,” the DoL said. “For instance, a commentator in PLANSPONSOR notes that if he were advising an employer with a 401(k) plan based on this decision he would ‘advocate giving participants LOTS of fund choices—via a brokerage window if possible,’ and would advise the employer that it ‘won’t have to worry about being prudent in the selection of the fund options for the plan because, according to [this Court’s] ruling, that [404(c)] safe harbor applies to that decision.’” The DoL then notes that “[e]ven if this Court meant to limit its holding to plans that offer a brokerage window of the type offered by the Deere plans…it is not hard to imagine that plan designers will advocate including this feature for all plans in order to immunize fiduciaries from any liability with respect to the selection of the plan’s option.”

Of course, the “counsel” I offered in that column was somewhat tongue in cheek. To me, it’s evident on the face of the matter that that would be an inappropriate result—and yet, as the DoL acknowledged by including the comment, you don’t need to reach very far from the court’s articulated rationale to arrive at that result.

In fact, the DoL has, consistently to my ears, and across administrations, said that, in the absence of 404(c)’s protection, plan fiduciaries are responsible for all plan investment decisions, even those made by well-informed, active, and engaged participants, even if that is further than many plan sponsors are willing to acknowledge.

That makes those protections all the more precious—and, with all due respect to the judges who consider these situations, all the more important that they get it right.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD


(1) IMHO: “Winning” Ways?

See also: IMHO: Letter of the Law

Saturday, September 06, 2008

Storm "Surge"

Over the past several weeks, I’ve received a dozen different inquiries from providers and advisers, all wanting to know if we’re seeing any pickup in provider changes. Now, aside from the frequency and consistency of the inquiries, they also share two interesting aspects. The first is that—to a person—the inquirers say that, while they are still enjoying a good deal of activity/interest, they have heard that things are slowing down.

What I’ve not been able to figure out, of course, is if they are just nervous that their string of good luck is getting ready to run out, or if they are feeling really confident about their business prowess and are looking for some independent affirmation of same.

Truth be told, I’ve not seen anything to suggest a noteworthy uptick in the number of provider changes—other than the uptick in volume that frequently is associated with changes at the providers themselves (see “Exit Signs”). It’s summer, after all, and if it isn’t quite the activity doldrums that it was once upon a time, the reality is that provider changes are generally committee decisions, committees are made up of people, and people—certainly those with kids—still tend to be out of the office for extended periods of time in the summer. And those absences tend to slow, if not freeze, committee actions.

Will there be more change this year than in years past? Frankly, I doubt it. “Change” may now be the mantra of the 2008 presidential election, but IMHO, for most plan sponsors, change equals work. It’s work to go through a search process, after all (even if a consultant/adviser does most of the legwork), and, some have reminded us in the current election cycle, change is not necessarily for the good. There are risks: that the changeover won’t go smoothly, that the new provider will turn out to be no better—or even that, in ways as yet unanticipated, they will be worse. Furthermore, even the most seamless of transitions imposes change—not only on plan sponsors, but on plan participants. New Web sites, new toll-free call in numbers, different statements, new procedures for handling loans and withdrawals—and the potential for a reinvigorated investment menu—all serve to “inflict” change on plan participants, as well as the plan sponsor.

That’s why, in my experience, plan sponsors approach change with caution (some might term it “prudence”). And most—though they are always interested in improving services and in reducing fees—reasonably find the tasks and uncertainties attendant with a provider change sufficiently daunting to keep them firmly planted (change can be forced on them, of course, by provider exits or by service “missteps”).

However, you can sense a sea change just over the horizon as a new series of fee disclosure initiatives takes hold, both at the plan and participant level. It will take time for those to emerge, of course—even longer for plan fiduciaries to absorb and respond. But respond they will, IMHO, and in short order, the question will go from “what am I paying” to “why am I paying what I am paying?”

It’s a change that will catch some unawares, and, with luck, it’s a change that will drive off the unprepared and uncommitted— those who think they can simply “ride out” the storm. It’s a change that is coming—whether you believe in it, or not.

— Nevin E. Adams, JD

Saturday, March 29, 2008

The Letter of the Law

An early “win” for plan sponsors (perhaps more accurately, a win for a plan sponsor) was Hecker v. Deere & Co.

That’s the case where, last June, U.S. District Judge John Shabaz tossed “with prejudice and costs” allegations that the plan had incurred excessive fees and had violated its fiduciary obligations by not disclosing revenue-sharing relationships to participants (see “Fighting Words”). It was, many experts said at the time (including this writer), a correct decision, but bad law, with Shabaz too broadly (IMHO) applying the shield of ERISA 404c to excuse an entire series of fiduciary responsibilities not encompassed by that statute.

Not surprisingly, that decision has been appealed—and this time, the Department of Labor has offered its opinion as a “friend of the court” (see “DoL: ERISA Fiduciaries Could Have Disclosure Mandate Not Specified in Law”). And perhaps not surprisingly, the DoL also seems to think that Judge Shabaz missed the boat on a number of his conclusions.


404(c) "Immunity"

First and foremost, the DoL stated that “the statutory safe harbor in section 404(c) does not immunize the Plans' fiduciaries to the extent they acted imprudently in offering investment options with excessive fees”—and also that “section 404(c) does not give fiduciaries a defense to liability for their own imprudence in the selection or monitoring of investment options available under the plan.” Further, that “[a]ll of the fiduciary provisions of ERISA remain applicable to both the initial designation of investment alternatives and investment managers and the ongoing determination that such alternatives and managers remain suitable and prudent investment alternatives for the plan.” None of those statements are particularly controversial, IMHO, though they may surprise some that have seen 404(c) as some kind of magic talisman to ward off all fiduciary evils.

In fact, in its amicus brief, the DoL noted that “[i]f, as alleged, the defendants violated their fiduciary duties by selecting investment options with excessive fees, section 404(c) provides no defense to their fiduciary misconduct,” and made no bones about where it stood on Judge Shabaz’ ruling: “The district court thus erred in holding that ERISA section 404(c) immunizes fiduciaries from liability for any resulting losses as the basis for dismissing plaintiffs' claim for excessive fees.”

However, the DoL also noted that fiduciaries are forbidden from “misleading plan participants about their plan”—and said that that duty, “in certain circumstances, require[s] fiduciaries to disclose information that participants need to know to exercise rights under the plan or protect their interests in the plan.”

And while the DoL did note that there might be an obligation to disclose information to participants beyond that outlined in the so-called “black letter of the law,” that did not equate to an absolute obligation to disclose everything, much less the particulars of revenue-sharing relationships. The DoL noted, “This is not to say, however, that the Secretary agrees with plaintiffs' more sweeping suggestions that the fiduciaries of participant-directed plans must always, or even usually, disclose revenue sharing arrangements as a matter of general fiduciary principles. Indeed, we are skeptical that, absent any misrepresentations, ERISA's duties of prudence and loyalty would have required disclosure to plan participants of revenue sharing among Fidelity affiliates.”

At this juncture, we still don’t know if the fees charged in this case (or the dozen or so that alleged similar transgressions against a variety of employers by the Schlichter, Bogard & Denton law firm) were unreasonable or not, or if the alleged breaches of fiduciary duty are founded on anything of substance.

What we do have, thanks at least in part to the DoL’s brief, is a clear restatement of what the law actually requires. And that’s a step toward better law, as well as a better decision.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

The DoL brief is here.

Saturday, February 23, 2008

All For One


Looks like James LaRue will get his day in court, after all.

Last week’s Supreme Court result (see Justices OK Individual ERISA Suits in Landmark Ruling) could perhaps have been anticipated – certainly there has been little of late to suggest an interest in depriving participants of their right to sue - but the margin of victory – 9-0 – was striking.

The case - LaRue v. DeWolff – involved a participant that claimed he had instructed his plan administrator to transfer his balances to different funds. Those instructions were either ignored, or never presented in the first place, depending on who you choose to believe – but the lack of attention to those instructions allegedly cost James LaRue $150,000. What really happened, why LaRue chose to sue when he chose to sue, and how much damage was done as a result has yet to be established – the case was dismissed by two lower courts that, relying on an earlier Supreme Court precedents, determined that ERISA did not permit individual participants to bring suit on behalf of their own interests, only on behalf of the plan as a whole.

I can’t say, however, that I was impressed with the rationale presented by Justice Stevens, who authored the court’s decision (he was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, while Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, and Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring only in the judgment, which Justice Scalia joined). Essentially, Justice Stevens admitted that the Supreme Court had previously held in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, that ERISA didn’t permit individual participant suits (1) - but that while “Russell’s emphasis on protecting the “entire plan” from fiduciary misconduct reflects the former landscape of employee benefit plans. That landscape has changed.”

Change “Parse”?

How has it changed? Well, to put it simply, because defined contribution plans have individual accounts, and – here I’ll let Justice Stevens speak for himself – “Russell’s emphasis on protecting the “entire plan” reflects the fact that the disability plan in Russell, as well as the typical pension plan at that time, promised participants a fixed benefit. Misconduct by such a plan’s administrators will not affect an individual’s entitlement to a defined benefit unless it creates or enhances the risk of default by the entire plan…. Thus, Russell’s “entire plan” references, which accurately reflect §409’s operation in the defined benefit context, are beside the point in the defined contribution context.”

Of course, defined contribution plans were not “beside the point” when the Russell case was decided, and the justices then ((in an interesting touch, Stevens also authored that opinion) addressed what ERISA allowed, not what it provided for suits brought in a non-individual account context under ERISA. Consequently, to my eye, anyway, it’s as though the Supreme Court sought to “excuse” its prior decision as not being applicable to ALL plans covered by ERISA (you’d think that could’ve been mentioned at the time), or worse – to suggest that because the “landscape” has changed, so has the law.

I suppose some will appreciate the “vitality” such flexible interpretations give the law, but it’s precisely those kind of situational determinations that unduly complicate our lives, IMHO. Defined contribution plans (and those individual accounts) have been with us more than a century, ERISA for a generation. What about the prevalence of defined contribution plans relative to defined benefit programs warrants a reinterpretation of the latter to adequately address the former – other than perhaps the fact that the justices themselves didn’t “get” individual accounts in 1985 when the Russell case was decided? Or, more cynically, that the justices messed up in their Russell decision, and wanted to rationalize what could plausibly be viewed as a repudiation of the previous decision?

A Loss is a Loss

That’s why I much prefer the rationale expressed by Justice Thomas in his concurrence – a concurrence that “is not contingent on trends in the pension plan market. Nor does it depend on the ostensible “concerns” of ERISA’s drafters.” Thomas goes on to affirm the statutory right of a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring suit (“obtain relief”), and then goes on to state what common sense dictates – losses to individual accounts in a plan are losses of the plan – and recoverable as such (2).

Whatever the rationale, the law of the land now affirms that participants can bring suits based on injuries to their individual accounts. Frankly, the court’s previous sense that an injury to a participant in a plan was not a plan injury smacked of the kind of legal hair-splitting that only lawyers (and I have a JD) and politicians relish. Now, in the wake of the LaRue decision, I can understand and appreciate the concerns expressed on behalf of employers – that this case will simply set off a wave of new and expensive litigation.

No doubt the coverage of the LaRue case will serve to discourage some who were contemplating offering a 401(k), but I doubt that it will lead to the demise of plans already in existence. Much as I hate to contemplate the prospect of more red meat for the plaintiffs’ bar, I suspect the individual participant lawsuit “shield” pierced by the LaRue decision was unappreciated by most plan sponsors. Perhaps most obviously, why else would so many have sought the protections of ERISA’s 404c, but to avoid the possibility of an individual participant suit?

Still, one need look no further than the rash of so-called stock drop cases or the revenue-sharing challenges to see the potential – and the LaRue headlines certainly convey the sense of a new way for workers to sue their employers. But I think plan sponsors – certainly the ones attentive to their fiduciary responsibilities - have long been concerned about participant lawsuits.

Of course, they’re also probably not the ones who should be worried.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD


(1) ERISA Section 409(a) provides: “Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made throughuse of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be removed for a violation of section 411 of this Act.” 88 Stat. 886, 29 U. S. C. §1109(a).

(2) “The allocation of a plan’s assets to individual accounts for bookkeeping purposes does not change the fact that all the assets in the plan remain plan assets.”