“Upside” Potential

I once spent a very uncomfortable period of time stuck in one of those carnival rides that, for brief periods of time, spins riders in a circle as the cab you are in also twirls. As uncomfortable as the ride was, the “stuck” part came while my cab was high in the air—and turned upside down. In no time at all, it was obvious that this extended “upside down” state wasn’t contemplated by those who designed the seating compartment (nor, apparently, had they considered that my compartment “mate” would find it exciting to rock our stuck cab during our brief “internment”).

One of the comments you hear from time to time is that the tax incentives for 401(k)s are “upside down,” that they go primarily to those at higher income levels, those who perhaps don’t need the encouragement to save. And from a pure financial economics perspective, those who pay taxes at higher rates might reasonably be seen as receiving a greater benefit from the deferral of those taxes.
Indeed, if those “upside-down incentives” were the only forces at work, one might reasonably expect to find that the higher the individual’s salary, the higher the overall account balance would be, as a multiple of salary. However, drawing on the actual administrative data from the massive EBRI/ICI 401(k) database, and specifically focusing on workers in their 60s (broken down by tenure and salary), those ratios hold relatively steady. In fact, those ratios are relatively flat for salaries between $30,000 and $100,000, before dropping substantially for those with salaries in excess of $100,000.

In other words, while higher-income individuals have higher account balances, those balances are in rough proportion to their incomes—and not “upside down.”

(click to enlarge)

As those who work with these programs know, what keeps these potential disparities in check is the series of limits and nondiscrimination test requirements: the boundaries established by Internal Revenue Code Secs. 402(g) and 415(c), combined with ADP and ACP nondiscrimination tests. Those plan constraints were, of course, specifically designed (and refined) over time to do just that—to maintain a certain parity between highly compensated and non-highly compensated workers in the benefits available from these programs. The data suggest they are having exactly that impact.

And that’s why focusing only on the incentives—and not also on the limits—can leave you “stuck” with only part of the answer.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

Foregone “Conclusions”

Behavioral finance drives much of the discussion around retirement plan design innovations these days, for the very simple reason that it seems to help explain what might otherwise be viewed as irrational behaviors. For example, human beings are prone to something that behaviorists call “confirmation bias,” a tendency to favor information that confirms what we already believe. While doing so generally contributes to quicker assessments of information, there are some obvious shortcomings to that approach in terms of critically evaluating new information, particularly information that contradicts what we have already chosen (rightly or wrongly) to accept as reality.

Last month EBRI published an analysis of a direct comparison of the likely benefits under specific types of 401(k) plans and defined benefit (DB) pension plans.(1) As anyone who has worked with employment-based retirement plans knows, individual participant outcomes can vary widely based on a complex combination of decisions by both those that sponsor the plans and the individual workers who are eligible to participate in them, as well as a host of external factors (notably the investment markets) that lie outside their control.

The EBRI report took pains to not only select but to explain the key assumptions in our analysis. As it turns out, the analysis highlighted a number of circumstances in which traditional pensions (where offered) could produce a higher benefit at retirement—and some in which 401(k)s were superior in that regard.

However, some of the reporting and commentary that followed its publication suggest that some either did not read with care the entire analysis, or chose to ignore the totality of the report. Here, in a Q&A format, we deal with most of the mischaracterizations(2) we’ve seen thus far:

• Did the report conclude that 401(k) benefits were better for almost every age and income cohort?

♦ No. While an analysis of just the median results for just the baseline assumptions might suggest this conclusion, the EBRI Issue Brief followed with seven different sensitivity analyses with different assumptions that produce different results. Moreover, the entire analysis was restricted to employees currently ages 25–29, because those individuals would have the opportunity for a full working career with those 401(k)s, as well as the modeled defined benefit results.

• Did the study make assumptions that are biased toward 401(k)s?

♦ Quite the contrary. The baseline used historical averages and ran many sensitivity analyses that were biased AWAY from 401(k)s to test how robust the results were.

• Why did you exclude automatic enrollment designs in 401(k) plans from the analysis?

♦ While a great many employers have adopted automatic enrollment with automatic escalation provisions in recent years, sufficient time has not yet passed since the establishment of most of these escalation features to know how long, and to what levels, participants will allow the escalation provisions to continue before they opt out.

• How does excluding those automatic enrollment plan designs from the analysis impact the results?

♦ Some have argued that automatic enrollment is actually bad for retirement savings because, in some cases, the AVERAGE rate of deferral—when computed only for those who make a contribution—initially decreases.(3) However—and as previous EBRI research has documented—the decline in average deferrals masks the reality that while some individuals initially save at lower rates (certainly in the absence of provisions to increase those initial rates automatically), many lower-income workers become savers under an automatic plan design who would not contribute anything had they been eligible for a voluntary-enrollment 401(k) plan instead.

 

The June 2013 Issue Brief(4) specifically treats these individuals as making zero contributions and does NOT simply exclude them. This is the major reason why low-income employees do not do as well as high-income employees under THIS TYPE of 401(k) plan. EBRI has done previous analysis(5) showing the difference between automatic-enrollment and voluntary-enrollment types of 401(k) plans and specifically documents how much better automatic enrollment was for the retirement savings of lower-income cohorts.

• Aren’t workers today changing jobs more frequently than they did during the heyday of defined benefit pensions?

♦ Actually, no. While it was not an explicit part of this report, a recent EBRI Notes article points out that the data on employee tenure (the amount of time an individual has been with his or her current employer) show that so-called “career jobs” NEVER existed for most workers. Indeed, over the past nearly 30 years, the median tenure of all wage and salary workers age 20 or older has held steady, at approximately five years. While the new analysis focused on the outcomes for younger workers, including the implications of their tenure trends on DB accumulations, the historical turnover trends suggest that this would have been problematic for full DB accumulations among previous generations of workers as well.

•  Were the rates-of-return scenarios “realistic” for 401(k) participants?

♦ The EBRI analysis presented baseline results under historical return assumptions that were adjusted for expenses by reducing the gross return by 78 basis points. Additionally, sensitivity analysis was also conducted in this study by reducing the returns by 200 basis points to determine the robustness of the findings.

• What about the fact that private-sector pensions are largely funded exclusively by employers, while much of that burden falls on individual workers in 401(k) plans?

♦ The report acknowledges this difference, but as the title of the Issue Brief specifically states, this is a comparative analysis of future benefits from private-sector voluntary enrollment plans vs. two stylized types of defined benefit plans—not the financial impact on the individual participants during the accumulation period, or how he/she might deploy assets not committed to retirement savings. However, as both the academic papers cited in the Issue Brief state, a comparison of ALL aspects of this difference would likely need to incorporate the assumption that more costly employer contributions to a plan (whether defined benefit or 401(k)) will be at least partially offset by lower wages over the long run, everything else equal.

• Is it reasonable to compare defined benefit and 401(k) plan benefits?

♦ Retirement income adequacy studies have been undertaken in several reports by other organizations with the implicit assumption that 401(k) plans are unable to generate the same amount of retirement income (regardless of the source of financing). One of the primary objectives of the June EBRI Issue Brief was to actually test whether these implicit assumptions were correct.

So, which is “better”—a defined benefit plan or a 401(k)?

Well, as was noted in the Issue Brief, there is no single answer because a multitude of factors affect the ultimate outcome: interest rates and investment returns; the level and length of time a worker participates in a retirement plan; an individual’s age, job tenure, and remaining length of time in the work force; and the purchase price of an annuity, among other things.

The best answer depends on an incorporation of all the relevant factors, the tools to provide a thorough analysis, and an open mind with which to consider the results.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) Jack VanDerhei, “Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans,” online here.

(2) For example, see “Claim that 401(k)s Beat Defined Benefit Plans Stirs Controversy,” online here.

(3) This is the same type of mistake made in a 2011 Wall Street Journal article. See the EBRI blog “What Do You Call a Glass That is 60−85% Full?” as well as  “More or Less?”

(4) “Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans,” online here.

(5) See Jack VanDerhei and Craig Copeland, “The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants.” Washington, DC: EBRI Issue Brief, no. 318, June 2008, online here.

Cost Conscience

In about a month my eldest will be setting up a new home in a different state. It won’t be her first time living in another state, and it won’t be her first apartment. It will, however, be her first apartment as an entrant into the full-time career workforce, and so the criteria—and budget—are quite different than our past experience(s). And while she’s done a great job of constructing a budget (including savings), I can’t help but notice that she also spends “her” money a little differently than when Dad was footing the bill.

My daughter’s spending inclinations aren’t unusual, of course. As parents we tried to give our kids a sense of the cost of things, certainly as they grew older. There were, however, plenty of times over the years we didn’t share that information, either because it wasn’t important, or, in some cases, because we didn’t want them to make a decision based solely on price.

There’s a similar logic afoot with consumer-driven health plans (CDHPs). Advocates of these programs¹ contend that providing participants with an account and subjecting their health insurance claims to high deductibles will induce enrollees who would likely be spending more of their own money (than might be the case with traditional health coverage) to make more cost- and quality-conscious health care decisions. On the other hand, CDHP skeptics caution that these individuals lack the kind of information they need to make good decisions—and, worse, might make cost-centric choices that aren’t the best health care choice, and might even prove to be less cost-efficient (and even more expensive) over the longer term.

In one of the first studies of its kind, EBRI has analyzed detailed claims data over a five-year period from a large Midwestern employer that adopted a high-deductible health plan with a health savings account (HSA) for all employees in place of its traditional health care offering. The research, published in the July EBRI Issue Brief,² found that in this case, where the HSA plan was the only type of health plan the employer offered, the HSA reduced the plan’s total health care spending by 25 percent in the first year ($527 per person in the aggregate). Moreover, the cost savings continued over the succeeding three years—albeit at a slower pace.

The study also found that each category of health spending experienced statistically significant reductions in the first year of the HSA plan, with the exception of spending on inpatient hospital stays. Spending on laboratory services and prescription drugs had the largest statistically significant declines (36 percent and 32 percent, respectively). Indeed, reductions in pharmacy spending were large and mostly sustained over the four years after the HSA was adopted. In the first year of the HSA, pharmacy-spending reductions were 40–47 percent for individuals in all but the highest quintile of spending.

There are some limitations to what can be inferred from this particular study, which focused on the experience of a single large employer, and participants with continuous coverage throughout the study period, among other things. While it did not allow for distinguishing utilization of discretionary from necessary services, the data suggest that the highest users were least affected and that moderate users were most vulnerable. If the cost savings trends don’t necessarily speak to the quality of those health care decisions, the report clearly adds to the consumer-directed-health-plan literature, and our understanding of how these programs can influence cost and utilization—information that is essential to our understanding of the value of account-based, high-deductible plans.

After all, when you don’t know the cost of something, it’s hard to appreciate the value.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ A recent EBRI report notes that employers have now been using CDHPs for over a decade. In 2012, 22 percent of smaller employers, 36 percent of larger employers, and 59 percent of jumbo employers offered some form of a CDHP, and nearly 1 in 5 workers were enrolled in one.

² “Health Care Spending after Adopting a Full-Replacement, High-Deductible Health Plan With a Health Savings Account: A Five-Year Study” is available online here.

"Game" Changers

Major League Baseball recently showcased its best and most popular in the “Midsummer Classic,” better known as the All-Star Game. Purists can (and have) taken issue with the involvement of the fan vote, the intermittence of the designated hitter rule, and the impact that this contest can eventually have on the home field advantage in the World Series. Still, even casual fans of the game can relish the opportunity to see so many great players together on the field for one special night (those who don’t care about baseball can perhaps relish the fact that for a couple of days, there won’t be any baseball games or scores with which to contend).

It has been my good fortune to have had the opportunity to spend my entire career working with employee benefits, in a widely varied range of capacities. It has also been my great pleasure over those years to meet, and in some cases, work directly with, some truly talented people—who care deeply, passionately, about helping others enjoy better lives and retirements. Most, I am happy to say, could look back on their careers and find numerous examples where they made a difference, sometimes in the betterment of a single individual’s retirement prospects, and often across a broader spectrum. Some have had—or made—the opportunity to impact and influence thousands of lives during the course of their career.

In a couple of months the Employee Benefit Research Institute will announce the recipient of the 2013 Lillywhite Award.¹ The award was launched in 1992, the year that Ray Lillywhite, for whom the award was named, retired. Lillywhite, a pioneer in the pension field for decades guided state employee pension plans, and helped found numerous professional organizations and educational programs. He retired from Alliance Capital at the age of 80 after a 55-year career in the pension and investment field. Throughout that career, Ray exemplified not only excellence, but also innovation in lifelong achievements, teaching, and learning.

2012 Lillywhite Award Winner Bill Sharpe & EBRI CEO Dallas Salisbury

I recently was looking back over the list of Lillywhite Award recipients (available online here), remembering some old friends, some newer acquaintances, and recalling the contributions of some I never had a chance to meet—individuals like Stanford University’s Bill Sharpe, CalSTRS’ Jack Ehnes, Pension & Investments’ Mike Clowes, Russell’s Don Ezra, to name a few. It brought to mind the contributions of others not yet on that list that I’ve met along the way—individuals who have had an impact, influenced the direction of employee benefits, and over the course of their careers helped make things better for others, whose “outstanding service enhances Americans’ economic security.”

Next week’s All-Star roster may well represent the best baseball has to offer at present, a roster that includes some that may one day be regarded as the best in their field, who may change the outcome of a particular contest, and who—in rare situations—can even transform the nature of the game itself.

EBRI’s Lillywhite Award acknowledges the best of the best in the investment management and employee benefits fields. I’m betting you know some of these individuals, these game changers—and perhaps someone whose contributions warrant this kind of recognition.

If so, I’d encourage you to nominate them for this prestigious award—today.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹Nominations for the 2013 EBRI Lillywhite Award are scheduled to close on July 31. The winner will be announced shortly after Labor Day, and will be presented during the Pensions&Investments West Coast Defined Contribution Conference, October 27–29 in San Francisco.

The nomination form for the 2013 Lillywhite Award is available online here.

More information about the award is available online here.

"Better" Business

It has become something of a truism in our industry that defined benefit plans are “better” than defined contribution plans. We’re told that returns are higher(1) and fees lower in the former, that employees are better served by having the investment decisions made by professionals, and that many individuals don’t save enough on their own to provide the level of retirement income that they could expect from a defined benefit pension plan. Even the recent (arguably positive) changes in defined contribution design—automatic enrollment, qualified default investment alternatives, and the expanding availability of retirement income options(2)—are often said to represent the “DB-ification” of DC plans.

However, a recent analysis by EBRI reveals that DB is not always “better,” at least not defined as providing financial resources in retirement. In fact, if historical rates of return are assumed, as well as annuity purchase prices reflecting average bond rates over the last 27 years, the median comparisons show a strong outcome advantage for voluntary-enrollment (VE) 401(k) plans over both stylized, final-average DB plan and cash balance plan designs.(3)

Admittedly, those findings are based on a number of assumptions, not the least of which include the specific benefit formulae of the DB plans, and the performance of the markets. Indeed, the analysis in the June EBRI Issue Brief takes pains not only to outline and explain those assumptions,(4) but, using EBRI’s unique Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) to produce a wide range of simulations, provides a direct comparison of the likely benefits in a number of possible scenarios, some of which produce different comparative outcomes. While the results do reflect the projected cumulative effects of job changes and things like loans, as well as the real-life 401(k) plan design parameters in several hundred different plans, they do not yet incorporate the potentially positive impact that automatic enrollment might have, particularly for lower-income individuals.


Significantly, the EBRI report does take into account another real-world factor that is frequently overlooked in the DB-to-DC comparisons: the actual job tenure experience of those in the private sector. In fact, as a recent EBRI Notes article(5) points out, the data on employee tenure (the amount of time an individual has been with his or her current employer) show that so-called “career jobs” NEVER existed for most workers. Indeed, over the past nearly 30 years, the median tenure of all wage and salary workers age 20 or older has held steady, at approximately five years. Even with today’s accelerated vesting schedules, that kind of turnover represents a kind of tenure “leakage” that can have a significant impact on pension benefits—even when they work for an employer that offers that benefit, they simply don’t work for one employer long enough to qualify for a meaningful benefit.

So, which type of retirement plan is “better”? As the EBRI analysis illustrates, there is no single right answer—but the data suggests that ignoring how often people actually change employers can be as misleading as ignoring how much they actually save.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) In the days following publication of the EBRI Issue Brief, (“Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans,” online here),  a number of individuals commented specifically on the chronicled difference in return in DB and DC plans; outside of some exceptions in the public sector, DB investment performance generally has no effect on the benefits paid.

(2) A recent EBRI analysis indicates that, even in DB plans, the rate of annuitization varies directly with the degree to which plan rules restrict the ability to choose a partial or lump-sum distribution. See “Annuity and Lump-Sum Decisions in Defined Benefit Plans: The Role of Plan Rules,” online here.

(3) While the DC plans modeled in this analysis draw from the actual design experience of several hundred VE 401(k) plans, in the interest of clarity it was decided to limit the comparisons for DB plans to only two stylized representative plan designs: a high-three-year, final-average DB plan and a cash balance plan. Median generosity parameters are used for baseline purposes but comparisons are also re-run with more generous provisions (the 75th percentile) as part of the sensitivity analysis.

(4) The report notes that a multitude of factors affect the ultimate outcome: interest rates and investment returns; the level and length of participation; an individual’s age, job tenure, and remaining length of time in the work force; and the purchase price of an annuity, among other things.

(5) The EBRI report highlights several implications of these tenure trends: the effect on DB accruals (even for workers still covered by those programs), the impact of the lump-sum distributions that often accompany job change, and the implications for social programs and workplace stability. “See Employee Tenure Trends, 1983–2012,” online here.

Rates of "Return"

Having just concluded a long driving trip, I was reminded again just how helpful the technology under the hood of today’s automobiles can be: the warning lights when you’ve still got enough gas left to find a gas station, the low tire pressure light that tells you of a slow leak before you have a flat tire, the binging that lets you know you’ve left your headlights on (again), and my personal favorite, the klaxon-like bell that alerts you that your parking brake is still engaged (since that red “brake” light on the dashboard clearly wasn’t sufficient notice).

Before such warning signs were standard features, I’ve had the decidedly unpleasant experience of running out of gas in the middle of nowhere, finding myself driving on (two) flat tires, and—many years ago—I’m pretty sure I was responsible for ruining the brakes on my Dad’s car simply because I didn’t realize that the smell of burning rubber was coming from the car I was driving.

For some time now, the Federal Reserve has held short-term interest rates near zero in an effort to support an economic recovery—and has, in fact, announced its intention to maintain that policy until such time as the recovery seems to have taken hold. However, as many retirees and workers have discovered, those historically low interest rates are crimping their retirement savings—and a new study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBR)¹ quantifies the impact of a sustained low-interest rate environment on America’s retirement readiness.

Using EBRI’s unique Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM), we found that more than a quarter of Baby Boomers and Gen Xers who would have had adequate retirement income under an assumption that historical average market returns would prevail are instead simulated to end up running short of money in retirement if today’s historically low interest rates are assumed to be a permanent condition (assuming retirement income/wealth is assumed to cover 100 percent of simulated retirement expense²).

Not that everyone is affected to the same degree. In fact, the analysis reveals that the potential impact varies by income levels: The low-yield-rate environment appears to have a limited impact on retirement income adequacy for those in the lowest preretirement income quartile, since they have relatively small levels of defined contribution and IRA assets and since they rely more heavily on Social Security income in retirement. However, the research found there is a very significant impact for the top three income quartiles.³

The research found that the impact is lessened if the current low rates are temporary, but that its impact can be magnified by years of future eligibility for participation in a defined contribution plan. For example, moving from the historical-return assumption to a zero-real-interest-rate assumption results in an 11 percentage-point decrease in simulated retirement readiness for Gen Xers who have one to nine years of future eligibility, but that gap widens to a 15 percentage-point decrease in retirement readiness for those with 10 or more years of future eligibility.

In recent days, word that the Federal Reserve sees an end to its current policies has brought some volatility to the stock market. While several sectors of the economy have benefitted from the U.S. Federal Reserve holding short-term interest rates near zero to support a recovery, there are warning signs in the EBRI analysis about longer-term consequences that policy makers should also consider—and implications for retirement readiness should historical averages return.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ The full report is published in the June 2013 EBRI Notes, “What a Sustained Low-yield Rate Environment Means for Retirement Income Adequacy: Results From the 2013 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model,®” online here.

² When 80 percent of simulated retirement expenses must be covered, only 5‒8 percent are simulated to run short of money.

³ This is in sharp contrast to a recent report by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College that claimed that the lower interest rates had only a minor impact for ALL income categories. However, as we have noted previously, CRR’s National Retirement Risk Index, on which the conclusions are based, continues to assume that all retirees annuitize all of their defined contribution and IRA balances; continues to ignore the impact of long-term care and nursing home costs or assumes that they are insured against by everyone; and also seems to rely on an outdated perspective of 401(k)-plan designs and savings trends, essentially ignoring the impact of automatic enrollment, auto-escalation of contributions, and the diversification impact of qualified default investment alternatives. Additionally, given the way their model assumes assets accumulate during the preretirement period, the change in interest rates has NO impact on accumulations at retirement age. See “Rely Able?”

Balancing "Acts"

Last week we looked at how the trends in employment-based retirement plans and employment-based health plans seem to be heading in opposite directions: fewer choices for workers to make in the former, more in the latter (see Consumer “Driven,” online here.  Recent EBRI research suggests a potential divergence in other areas as well.

According to the EBRI/MGA Consumer Engagement in Health Care Survey, 26–40 percent of respondents reported some type of access-to-health-care issue for either themselves or family members last year. “Access” in this case refers not to availability, per se, but is broadly defined as not filling prescriptions due to cost, skipping doses to make medication last longer, or delaying or avoiding getting health care due to cost.

Not surprisingly, access is more of a problem among those with lower incomes, who appear to be forgoing spending on health care. In fact, regardless of health plan type, individuals in households with less than $50,000 in annual income were more likely than those in households with $50,000 or more in annual income to report access issues. In sum, a number of individuals, notably lower-income workers, were restricting their spending on healthcare.¹

Another recent EBRI analysis  found that lower-income workers were withdrawing money from their individual retirement accounts in much greater numbers, earlier, and at much larger percentages, than other workers. In fact, the report noted that nearly half (48 percent) of the bottom-income quartile of those between the ages of 61 and 70 had made such an IRA withdrawal, and that their average annual percentage of account balance withdrawn (17.4 percent) was higher than the rest of the income distribution. In sum, a number of individuals, again, notably lower-income workers, were withdrawing more from their retirement savings accounts than those in higher income groups.

One of the great hopes behind a growing emphasis on consumer-directed health plans is that individuals would make different, perhaps more efficient decisions about their health care. Of course, one of the looming concerns is that individuals would make ill-informed decisions influenced by short-term personal economic (rather than health) factors. Similarly, there have been concerns expressed that, left to their own devices, individuals will withdraw too much money too soon from their retirement accounts—that their decisions too will be motivated by short-term needs, rather than by a full appreciation for the longer-term consequences of those actions.

As previous EBRI research has documented, the availability of health insurance may not only affect retirement decisions, but the costs of health care and long-term care can have a very real impact on retirement income adequacy.² The trends highlighted in the EBRI analyses suggest that some—notably lower-income individuals—could be spending less on healthcare than they might, and perhaps drawing more from their retirement accounts than they should.

What’s not yet clear—and what future research may shed light on—is whether these actions are borne of necessity, are simply random and potentially ill-considered, or are the result of conscious (and perhaps conscientious) choice.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ Some additional evidence of the trend was highlighted by EBRI research recently published in Health Affairs, specifically that consumer-directed health plans (CDHPs) were shown to reduce the long-term use of outpatient physician visits and prescription drugs. Link is online here.

² See Views on Health Coverage and Retirement: Findings from the 2012 Health Confidence Survey, and ‘Savings Needed for Health Expenses for People Eligible for Medicare: Some Rare Good News.” 
See also “Lessons From the Evolution of 401(k) Retirement Plans for Increased Consumerism in Health Care: An Application of Behavioral Research,” online here.

Consumer "Driven?"

Over the last several years, the trend in employment-based retirement plans has been to put in place structures to make more decisions for workers through the expansion of automatic enrollment plan designs.(1) At the same time, the trend in employment-based health plans has been to look for ways to better manage costs, while providing workers more choice, and flexibility in those choices, by looking to so-called consumer-driven health plans, or CDHPs.(2)

In the case of the former, the shift has been to help workers make better decisions, to boost savings by not only increasing plan participation, but to direct contributions to more diversified investment options than many seem to choose on their own accord. In the case of healthcare plan designs, the expansion of choice is similarly rooted in a desire to help workers make “better” decisions, albeit with a slightly different emphasis.

The addition of CDHP designs (and in many cases it is an addition, rather than a replacement for, traditional health plan designs) has arguably been motivated in no small part by a desire to constrain the costs of employment-based health care programs by giving workers some “skin in the game” beyond whatever premiums may be associated with the benefit. A recent EBRI report notes that, by 2012, 31 percent of employers offered some version of a CDHP (either a health reimbursement arrangement or health savings account-eligible plan), with about 25 million people (about 14.6 percent of the privately insured market) covered by these type plans.

The concept is relatively straightforward: CDHPs combine high deductibles with tax-preferred savings or spending accounts (that can be funded by employer and/or employee contributions, or both) that workers and their families can use to pay their out-of-pocket health care expenses. The theory is that individuals may spend money from their own account(s) more judiciously. However, there have been concerns that individuals may prove to be too frugal, choosing to defer needed and perhaps even necessary healthcare just to avoid spending money.

Additionally, while the theory that consumerism would lead to less (and perhaps better) spending appeared sound, and while prior research in this area has generally found low-to-moderate reductions in measures such as services used, conclusions have also been limited by the potential for selection bias, in that workers were often given a choice between CDHPs and more traditional options—and it was possible that individuals of a particular profile might be more inclined to opt for the CDHP.

A recent EBRI study, published in the June issue of Health Affairs,(3) was able to examine healthcare services utilization trends by using data from two large employers—one that adopted a CDHP in 2007 and another with no CDHP. That research(4) found that after four years under an HSA plan, there were 0.26 fewer physician office visits per enrollee per year and 0.85 fewer prescriptions filled, although there were 0.018 more emergency department visits, and the likelihood of receiving recommended cancer screenings was lower under the HSA plan after one year and, even after recovering somewhat in later years, still lower than the baseline at the study’s conclusion. While small numbers, these figures are considered statistically significant.

Ultimately, the longer-term impact of CDHPs on health status, outcomes, and spending remains to be established. On the other hand, and as the research paper notes, if CDHPs succeed in getting workers to make decisions that are more cost-sensitive, employers may well want to ensure not only that the plan designs work to incentivize the right choices, but that their work force is educated on the expanded choices that lie ahead.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) See “The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants,” online here.

(2) CDHPs combine high deductibles with tax-preferred savings or spending accounts that workers and their families can use to pay their out-of-pocket health care expenses. These accounts allow people to accumulate funds on a tax-preferred basis—the funds may include contributions from the employer, the employee, or both, depending on the plan’s structure. Employees can choose between using the funds for their health care cost sharing or saving the money for the future. Employers began offering CDHPs in 2001 when a handful started offering health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). They then started offering health savings account (HSA)-eligible plans after the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 included a provision to allow individuals with certain high-deductible health plans to contribute to an HSA. See also “What Do We Really Know About Consumer-Driven Health Plans?”  and “Characteristics of the CDHP Population, 2005–2010.”

(3) See “Consumer-Directed Health Plans Reduce The Long-Term Use Of Outpatient Physician Visits And Prescription Drugs,” online here.

(4) This work was conducted through the EBRI Center for Research on Health Benefits Innovation (EBRI CRHBI). The following organizations provided the funding for EBRI CRHBI: American Express, BlueCross BlueShield Association, Boeing, CVS Caremark, General Mills, Healthways, IBM, John Deere & Co., JP Morgan Chase, Mercer, and Pfizer.

“Drawing” Board?

While drawing boards have been used by engineers and architects for more than two centuries, the phrase “back to the drawing board” is of much more recent origin, coined by the Peter Arno in a cartoon first published in the March 1, 1941 issue of New Yorker magazine.(1) The cartoon features a crashed plane in the background, a parachute in the distance, several military officials and rescue workers rushing to help/investigate—and one remarkably nonchalant individual, walking in the opposite direction with a rolled up document tucked under his arm as he comments, “Well, back to the old drawing board.”

For all the much-deserved focus on retirement savings accumulations, a growing amount of attention is now directed to how those already in (and fast-approaching) retirement are actually investing and drawing down those savings.

A recent EBRI analysis(2) found that at age 61, only 22.2 percent of households with an individual retirement account (IRA) took a withdrawal from that account. That pace slowly increases to 40.5 percent by age 69 before jumping to 54.1 percent at age 70, and by the age of 79, almost 85 percent of households with an IRA took a distribution.

IRAs are, of course, a vital component of U.S. retirement savings, holding more than 25 percent of all retirement assets in the nation, according a recent EBRI report. A substantial and growing portion of these IRA assets originated in other employment-based tax-qualified retirement plans, such as defined benefit (pension) and 401(k) plans.

The EBRI analysis also found that the percentage of households with an IRA making a withdrawal from that account not only increased with age, but also spiked around ages 70 and 71, a trend that appears to be a direct result of the required minimum distribution (RMD) rules in the Internal Revenue Code.(3) Those rules require that traditional IRA account holders begin to take at least a specific amount from their IRA no later than April 1 of the year following the year in which they reach age 70-½, or else suffer a fairly harsh tax penalty.

In fact, at age 71, 71.1 percent of households owning an IRA that took a withdrawal reported that they took only the RMD amount, increasing to 77.4 percent at age 75, 83.2 percent at age 80, and 91.1 percent by age 86.

However, the EBRI report noted that IRA-owning households not yet subject to the RMD—those headed by individuals between the ages of 61 and 70—made larger withdrawals than older households, both in absolute dollar amounts as well as a percentage of IRA account balance. Indeed, the bottom-income quartile of this age group had a very high percentage (48 percent) of households that made an IRA withdrawal—and their average annual percentage of account balance withdrawn (17.4 percent) was higher than the rest of the income distribution. Moreover, those younger households that made IRA withdrawals spent most of it.

While a significant percentage of those in the sample are drawing out only what the law mandates, the data indicate that more of those in the lower-income groups not only draw money out sooner, but also draw out a higher percentage of their savings—perhaps too early to sustain them throughout retirement.(4)

Planning and preparation matters—not only for retirement savings, but in retirement withdrawals. Because for those whose retirement resources run short too soon, it’s generally also too late to go “back to the drawing board.”

Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) You can see the original cartoon online here.

(2) The data for this study come from the University of Michigan’s Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging. See “IRA Withdrawals: How Much, When, and Other Saving Behavior,” online here.

(3) As noted in a previous post (see “Means Tested”), there are advantages to a drawdown strategy based on the schedule provided by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for required minimum distributions, or RMDs. See also Withdrawal “Symptoms.”

(4) The EBRI Retirement Readiness Ratings™ indicate that approximately 44 percent of the Baby Boomer and Gen-Xer households are simulated to be at-risk of running short of money in retirement, assuming they retire at age 65 and retain any net housing equity in retirement until other financial resources are depleted. Those individuals may well become part of the significant percentage of retirees who eventually must depend on Social Security for all of their retirement income. See “All or Nothing? An Expanded Perspective on Retirement Readiness.”

“Half” Baked?

I’ve never been much good in the kitchen.  I’ve neither the patience/discipline to follow most recipes, nor the innate sense for the right balance of ingredients that those with culinary talent seem to have.  That said, I learned the hard way years ago that if you mix the right items in the wrong order, or the wrong amounts of the right items, leave something to bake too long – or not long enough – the results can be disastrous.

A recent report by the Pew Charitable Trusts posed the question, “Are Americans Prepared for Their Golden Years?”  Perhaps not surprisingly, the report indicated that many are not.  What was surprising, however,  was the assertion that Gen-Xers (those born between 1966 and 1975), in the Pew analysis, looked to be in even worse shape than either early or late Boomers.

Previous EBRI research has found that approximately 44 percent of simulated lifepaths for Baby Boomer and Gen-Xer households are projected to run short of money in retirement, assuming they retire at age 65 and retain any net housing equity in retirement until other financial resources are depleted.  However, that includes a wide range of personal circumstances, from individuals projected to run short by as little as a dollar to those projected to fall short by tens of thousands of dollars.  Looking specifically at Gen X, many of which have decades of saving accumulations still ahead of them, nearly one-half (49.1 percent) of the simulated lifepaths of that demographic are projected to have retirement resources that are at least 20 percent more than is simulated to be needed, while approximately one-third (31.4 percent) are projected to have between 80 percent and120 percent of the financial resources necessary to cover retirement expenses and uninsured health care costs (see Retirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model).

However, in reviewing the Pew report and its associated methodology, several key differences in approach emerge.  On the one hand, the Pew report assumes that workers will receive credit for a full career in the accrual of Social Security benefits, and it also imputes a full-career accrual of defined benefit pension benefits – though many individuals don’t wait till full retirement age to collect on the former (accepting lower benefits), and many don’t accumulate enough service to be entitled to the latter (see “The Good Old Days”, “Employee Tenure Trends, 1983–2012“).  This assumption likely exaggerates the retirement readiness of older workers, who are more likely to have some defined benefit accrual.

On the other hand, the Pew report appears to assume no further contributions, either by employer or employee, to the defined contribution balances as of 2010.  That’s right, no further contributions beyond the self-reported participant balances of 2010, and no earnings projection on those assumed non-existent contributions, either.  This assumption likely serves to understate the future retirement readiness of younger workers, who have years, and in many cases decades, of savings ahead of them.

Based on the combination of those assumptions and the well-documented trend away from defined benefit plans and toward a greater reliance on defined contribution designs, it’s little wonder that the Pew report concludes that Gen Xers will be worse off than Boomers.

In sum, whether you’re baking a cake or evaluating research conclusions, if it seems a bit “off,” it’s generally a good idea to carefully review the recipe – and double check the ingredients.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

The Pew Charitable Trusts report, “Retirement Security Across Generations” is available online here.

“Like” Minded?

Several weeks back, my wife and I sat down with a financial planner to review and update our financial plans. Doing so brought with it a bit of personal trepidation since, being “in the business” I not only had a working knowledge of what needed to be done, I also had a pretty good sense of what hadn’t been done, and what hadn’t been done the way it should have been done in some time. As I surrendered copies of the statements from my three separate 401(k) accounts, rollover IRA, traditional IRA, and SEP-IRA, I found myself wondering (again) why I hadn’t gotten around to consolidating some of those accounts.

More and more Americans are finding themselves with multiple savings accounts, not only because of the relatively consistent pattern of job change in the American economy (see “Tenure, Tracked”), but because those job changes frequently result in rollovers to individual retirement accounts. On the other hand, in recent years, it has gotten easier to simply leave your 401(k) with a prior employer’s plan, and, with the convenience of online access and/or call center support, and the allure of inertia, many have surely opted to forestall, if not postpone the decision.

Those decisions have, of course, made it harder to assess the true accumulations in these plans. Indeed, today’s “average” 401(k) calculation suffers not only from being an average of widely varied tenure and age components, it increasingly represents the average of those balances with only a current employer plan.

But if you’re an individual worried about keeping up with all those accounts―or a regulator or policymaker concerned about the growing complexity of that task for those individuals―you might well wonder how those accounts are being managed? Are the investment allocations in those IRAs different from that of the 401(k)s?

New EBRI research (see “Retirement Plan Participation and Asset Allocation, 2010”) reveals that, in addition to demographic factors related to family heads, asset allocation within a family head’s retirement plan does seem to be affected by his or her ownership of other types of retirement plans.

According to the research, which was based on estimates from the Federal Reserve’s 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances,¹ those who own an IRA are more likely to be invested all in stocks if they also own a 401(k)-type of plan, and those who own a defined benefit (DB) plan and a 401(k)-type plan are also less likely to allocate the investments of that defined contribution plan to all interest-earning assets. Moreover, those family heads who are invested more heavily in stocks in their 401(k)-type plan and also own an IRA have a high probability of also being heavily invested in stocks in their IRA.

The bottom line? Participants in these plans generally invest them in similar manners, although some participants did have significantly different allocations across the two plan types. What we don’t know is if those similarities―and differences―are the result of conscious choice based on an awareness of these various plans, a consequence of investments in target-date or balanced funds, or mere coincidence.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ It is worth noting that, while these results provide important information on behavior within retirement savings plans, it is self-reported data from a survey of a small sample of respondents, and does not include the type of detail on asset allocation within 401(k) plans that is provided by the EBRI/ICI Participant-Directed Retirement Plan Data Collection Project or on IRAs that is provided by the EBRI IRA Database. However, these results do provide some evidence of how participants who own both types of retirement plans allocate their assets among both types of plans, and this can be evaluated with future results from the combined IRA and 401(k) database that EBRI is currently completing.

More or Less?

Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal’s Anne Tergesen wrote a story titled “Mixed bag for auto-enrollment.” Citing data presented at last week’s EBRI policy forum,¹ the article claimed “employees who are automatically enrolled in their workplace savings plans save less than those who sign up on their own initiative.”

She then proceeded to cite Aon Hewitt data presented at the policy forum that illustrated how workers at various salary levels at plans that offered automatic enrollment saved at a lower rate, on average, than workers at the same salary levels at plans that didn’t offer automatic enrollment. The article then went on to note that “The data confirms an analysis EBRI performed for The Wall Street Journal in 2011.”

Well, not exactly.

In a response to an article titled “401(k) Law Suppresses Saving for Retirement” that Tergesen wrote in 2011, EBRI Research Director Jack VanDerhei challenged the premise behind the headline of that article, explaining that it “…suggests that it is actually reducing savings for some people. What it failed to mention is that it’s increasing savings for many more—especially the lowest-income 401(k) participants.”

Not only that, he took issue with the conclusion, explaining that “The Wall Street Journal article reported only the most pessimistic set of assumptions and did not cite any of the other 15 combinations of assumptions reported in the study.”

The other statistic attributed to EBRI in the original WSJ article dealt with the percentage of automatic enrollment-eligible workers who would be expected to have larger tenure-specific worker contribution rates had they been voluntary enrollment-eligible instead. The simulation results EBRI provided showed that approximately 60 percent of the AE-eligible workers would immediately be better off in an AE plan than in a VE plan, and that over time (as automatic escalation provisions took effect for some of the workers) that number would increase to 85 percent (see chart below).

Are there those who once might have filled out an enrollment form and opted for a higher rate of deferral (say to the full level of match) that now take the “easy” way and allow themselves to be automatically enrolled at the lower rate adopted for most automatic enrollment plans? Absolutely. However, as the EBRI data show—and, for anyone paying attention, have shown for years now—the folks most likely to be disadvantaged by that lack of action are higher-income workers.

In fairness, while that 2011 article was titled “401(k) Law Suppresses Saving for Retirement,” the more recent coverage not only characterized automatic enrollment as a “mixed bag,” but acknowledged the “very positive effect on participation rates” as a result of automatic enrollment.

Indeed, the simple math of automatic enrollment is that you get more people participating, albeit at lower rates (until design features like automatic contribution acceleration kick in). Said another way, participation rates go up, and AVERAGE deferral rates dip—at least initially.

That might, in fact, mean that some individuals do, in fact, save less by default² than if they had taken the time to actually complete that enrollment form, or if they fail to take advantage of the option to increase that initial default.

But that ignores the reality (borne out by the data) that many workers will be saving more—because that initial savings choice was automatic.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ Materials from EBRI’s 72nd Policy Forum, including a link to a recording of the event (courtesy of the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans) are online here.

² EBRI has recently considered how much difference setting a higher default contribution rate can make in improving retirement readiness. See “Increasing Default Deferral Rates in Automatic Enrollment 401(k) Plans: The Impact on Retirement Savings Success in Plans With Automatic Escalation,” online here.

(Un) Realistic Expectations

This past weekend I joined the throngs of humanity that went to the theaters to see Iron Man 3. I grew up reading Marvel Comics, and, for the very most part, seeing those characters brought to life on the big screen has been a real treat.

I had been curious about the new Iron Man movie for some time, but wasn’t sure if it could live up to expectations based on the prior films. It’s hard to escape the endless promotions for these summer blockbusters, but I made a conscious effort to do so, and even avoided reading the reviews of the film until after I had had a chance to see it for myself. That decision involved some financial “risk” as anyone who has taken a family to the theater recently can attest.

There have, however, been disappointments along the way―sometimes the acting was bad, sometimes the storyline was (unintentionally) laughable, and sometimes the movie fell short of what I had anticipated simply because my expectations were set so high.

Over the years, the Retirement Confidence Survey¹ has helped uncover a number of interesting and intriguing perspectives about retirement, real and imagined―and no small number of what would appear to be unrealistic expectations about retirement: expectations around how long individuals think they will be able to work, for example, or that they will be able to work for pay after retirement. Additionally, there have been indications that more individuals expect to receive a pension than would be suggested by the data regarding how many American workers are actually covered by such programs.

The RCS has found that men and women have similar expectations for the age at which they plan to retire, and that, despite the fact that women tend to live longer and face higher health care expenses in retirement due to their greater longevity, women were statistically as likely as men to think they will need to accumulate less than $250,000 for retirement. More recently, an EBRI analysis indicated that married couple respondents to the RCS were citing retirement savings targets that were better suited for single individuals.²

Much of the focus around the release of the Retirement Confidence Survey was, as one might expect, on retirement confidence―an individual’s sense of their confidence in having enough money to live comfortably throughout retirement. And, despite some of the optimistic assumptions cited above, that confidence was mired at historic lows for the RCS, which has tracked those sentiments for nearly a quarter-century.

Avoiding the incessant summer blockbuster pre-release promotions and commercials takes some effort. In hindsight, going to see the movie with no real expectations beyond that set by prior films was a good decision, certainly from the standpoint of my enjoyment of the newest version.

Admittedly, planning for that financially comfortable retirement can appear a daunting task, one readily shunted aside in favor of more current, and what seem to be more pressing tasks. Despite the ready availability of free planning tools, such as the Ballpark E$timate,³ the RCS indicates that many have never made even a single attempt―have not even guessed―at how much they might need for retirement. Yet EBRI analysis indicates that those who have taken the time to do so set better targets than those who haven’t.

Ultimately, not having established a set of expectations can make for a pleasant surprise at the cinema―but it’s likely to result in a surprise of a completely different sort in retirement.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ The 2013 Retirement Confidence Survey is available online here.

² See “A Little Help: The Impact of On-line Calculators and Financial Advisors on Setting Adequate Retirement-Savings Targets: Evidence from the 2013 Retirement Confidence Survey,” online here.

³ The BallparkE$timate® is available online here. Organizations interested in building/reinforcing a workplace savings campaign can find a variety of free resources there, courtesy of the American Savings Education Council (ASEC). Choose to Save® is sponsored by the nonprofit, nonpartisan Employee Benefit Research Institute Education and Research Fund (EBRI-ERF) and one of its programs, the American Savings Education Council (ASEC). The website and materials development have been underwritten through generous grants and additional support from EBRI Members and ASEC Partner institutions.

Decision "Points"

There’s a saying that “the best laid plans of mice and men often go astray,” and one need look no further than the experience of a morning commute to see the principle in action.

While we all head to different places from different places, most head out for work at what for each of us is likely a consistent, regular time. That timing may be driven by external or internal factors: a mass transit schedule, by our desire to avoid traffic congestion, the constraints of fellow passengers, or simply by a need to arrive at our place of work at a specific time. But for most of us, on most days, the regularity of that schedule provides a certain dependable start to our days.

It doesn’t take much to disrupt that start, unfortunately—as anyone who has ever awakened to an unexpected snowfall, encountered the impact of a traffic accident on a major thoroughfare, or slept through a snooze alarm can attest. Sometimes we can make up the time loss imposed on our commute, sometimes we simply have to deal with the consequences of being late, and sometimes we make other adjustments in response—a different route, for example, or, if time permits, a different medium of transportation. Sometimes those alternative approaches help matters, and sometimes they don’t.

As policy makers, regulators, providers, plan sponsors and individual participants, we make decisions every day that impact not only others, but others’ choices, as well as our own. Sometimes those decisions are not only imposed by external forces, but influenced by factors over which we have little or no control.

On May 9, the Employee Benefit Research Institute will sponsor its 72nd Policy Forum. Titled “Decisions, Decisions: Choices That Affect Retirement Income Adequacy,” the sessions will be looking at factors that matter—both at the macro and micro levels. Specifically, a series of expert panels will consider what a sustained low-interest rate environment means for retirement savings and retirement income, the effect(s) of the match timing, amount, and sources on meeting plan objectives, and helping plans and participants optimize their distribution choices—rollover, drawdown, and annuity options (the agenda is online here).

Every day we make decisions—or have decisions imposed on us. These decisions, in turn, have consequences: some foreseeable, some not, others for which the true impact can only be viewed in the fullness of time. Ultimately, as with a disrupted commute, the better information we have about the nature, size, and duration of the problem, and the alternatives available, the better our choices are likely to be.

That’s what we hope to provide at EBRI’s policy forum next week: insights on key decisions and alternatives, the perspectives of experts, the sharing of research findings, the exchange of ideas.

Even the “best-laid” plans may indeed go astray. All the more reason to have a timely, working appreciation of the alternative(s).

Nevin E. Adams, JD

Information on registering for EBRI’s 72nd Policy Forum is available here.  The agenda is online here.

For those unable to attend in person, the EBRI policy forum will be webcast live by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans (IFEBP), online here.

“Gamble” Gambit

This past week PBS’ Frontline ran a segment on retirement titled “The Retirement Gamble.”

During that broadcast several individual cases were profiled—a single mother who lost her job (and a lot of money that she had apparently overinvested in company stock); a middle-aged couple whose husband had lost his job (and a big chunk of their 401(k) investment in the 2008 financial crisis); a couple of teachers who had seen their retirement plan investments do quite well (before the 2008 financial crisis); a 32-year-old teacher who had lost money in the markets and found herself in an annuity investment that she apparently didn’t understand, but was continuing to save; and a 67-year-old semi-retiree who had managed to set aside enough to sustain a middle-class lifestyle. The current income and/or working status of each was presented, along with their current retirement savings balance.

Much of the promotional materials around the program focused on fees, and doctoral candidate Robert Hiltonsmith featured prominently in the special. Hiltonsmith, as some may recall, was the author of a Demos report on 401(k) fees released about a year ago—one that claimed that “nearly a third” of the investment returns of a medium-income two-earner family was being taken by fees (Demos report online here), according to its model—which, it should be noted, assumed that each fund had trading costs equal to the explicit expense ratio of the fund.

A fair amount of the program was devoted to the trade-offs between active and passive/index investment strategies, and the lower fees generally associated with the latter. Participant savers might not always choose them, but PLANSPONSOR’s 2012 Defined Contribution Survey found that nearly 8 in 10 (77.4 percent) of the nearly 7,000 plans surveyed already include index fund(s) on their menu, and that nearly 9 in 10 of the largest plans do. Similarly, the Plan Sponsor Council of America’s 55th Annual Survey lists “indexed domestic equity funds” as one of the fund types most commonly offered to participants (82.8 percent of plans).

“Balance” Perspectives

Hiltonsmith, 31, “had no savings to lose” in the 2008 financial crisis, according to the Frontline report, but after entering the workforce he began saving in his workplace 401(k). However, “even in a relatively good market, he began to sense that something was wrong,” the voiceover notes. Hiltonsmith explained: “I have a 401(k), I save in it, it doesn’t seem to go up… I kept checking the statement and I’d be like, why does this thing never go up?”

For some time now, EBRI has tracked the actual experience in 401(k) accounts of consistent participants, by age and tenure. Looking at the experience of workers age 25–34, with one to four years of tenure, and considering the period Jan. 1, 2011, to Jan. 1, 2013, the average account balance of consistent participants (those who continued to participate in their workplace 401(k) plan during that time period) experienced a nearly 84 percent increase (see graphic, online here). Granted, at that stage in their career, most of that gain is likely attributable to new contributions, not market returns—but it is an increase in that savings balance, and one that Hiltonsmith,(1) as a consistent participant-saver should have seen as well.

Pension Penchant

The framing of the retirement “gamble” was that “it used to be much easier,” in 1972 when, the Frontline report states, “…42 percent of employees had a pension…” But one point the Frontline report ignores (as do many general media reports on this topic) is that there’s a huge difference between working at an employer that offers a pension plan (the apparent source of the Frontline statistic), and actually collecting a pension based on that employment. Consider that only a quarter of those age 65 or older actually had pension income in 1975, the year after ERISA was signed into law (see “The Good Old Days,” online here). Perhaps more telling is that that pension income, vital as it surely has been for some, represented less than 15 percent of all the income received by those 65 and older in 1975.

In explaining the shift to 401(k) plans, the Frontline report notes that, “over the last decade, the rules of the game changed…” and went on to note that people started living longer, there were changes in accounting rules, global competition, and market volatility that affected the availability of defined benefit pension plans. While all those factors certainly did (and still do) come into play, another critical factor—one unmentioned in the report, and one that hasn’t undergone significant change in recent years—is that most Americans in the private sector weren’t working long enough with a single employer to accumulate the service levels required to earn a full pension.

For years,(2) EBRI has reported that median job tenure of the total workforce—how long a worker typically stays at a job—has hovered around four years since the early 1950s, and five years since the early 1980s. Under standard pension accrual formulas, those kind of tenure numbers mean that, even among the minority of private-sector workers who “have” a pension, many would likely receive a negligible amount because they didn’t stay on the job long enough to earn a meaningful benefit from that defined benefit pension.(3) Consequently, one could argue that American private-sector workers have been “gambling” with their pension every time they made a job change.

The Gamble?

It is, of course, difficult to evaluate the individual circumstances portrayed in the Frontline program from a distance, and via the limited prism afforded by the interviews. Nonetheless, even those in difficult financial straits were still drawing on their 401(k): the single mother had apparently managed to hang on to her underwater mortgage by tapping into her 401(k) savings, as had the couple who incurred a surrender charge by prematurely withdrawing funds from what appeared to be some kind of annuity investment. While this “leakage” was described as a problem, it does underline the critical role a 401(k) plan can play in the provision of emergency savings and financial security during every “life-stage.” Moreover, while the report focused on the circumstances of several individuals who had saved in a workplace retirement plan, one can’t help but wonder about the circumstances of those who don’t have that option.

The dictionary defines a gamble is a “bet on an uncertain outcome.” While the characterization might seem crude, retirement planning—with its attendant uncertainties regarding retirement date, longevity risk, inflation risk, investment risk, recession risk, health care expenses, and long-term care needs(4)—could be positioned in that context.

However, the data would also seem to support the conclusion that this retirement “gamble” isn’t new—and that it may be one for which, because of the employment-based retirement plan system, tomorrow’s retirees have some additional cards to play.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

You can watch the Frontline program (along with some additional materials, and expanded transcripts of some of the program interviews) online here.

(1) The Frontline investigation also seemed to represent something of a voyage of discovery for correspondent Martin Smith, who apparently has dipped into his 401(k) several times over the years. In a moment of subtle irony, he notes that he runs a small company with a handful of employees, but was too busy to look at the “fine print” of his own company’s retirement plan, going on to express confusion as to how these funds got into his plan in the first place. Of course, as the business owner, he was likely either the plan sponsor, or hired/designated the person(s) who made that decision.

(2) EBRI provided all of the data referenced here—and much more—to the Frontline producers. In fact, Dallas Salisbury was interviewed on tape for nearly two hours, so we know they had the full picture on tape. That may be what makes the Frontline program the most disappointing, knowing that the program could have presented a balanced picture of “The Retirement Gamble” and the diversity of plans, fees, and outcomes, yet its producers chose not to do so. EBRI’s most recent report on job tenure trends was published in the December 2012 EBRI Notes, online here.

(3) As EBRI has repeatedly noted, the idea of holding a full-career job and retiring with the proverbial “gold watch” is a myth for most people. That’s especially true since so few workers even qualify for a traditional pension anymore (see EBRI’s most recent data on pension trends, online here).

(4) EBRI’s Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) finds that for Early Baby Boomers (individuals born between 1948 and 1954), Late Baby Boomers (born between 1955 and 1964) and Generation Xers (born between 1965 and 1974), roughly 44 percent of the simulated lifepaths were projected to lack adequate retirement income for basic retirement expenses plus uninsured health care costs (see the May 2012 EBRI Notes, “Retirement Income Adequacy for Boomers and Gen Xers: Evidence from the 2012 EBRI Retirement Security Projection Model”).

"Charge" Accounts

I was a late convert to the convenience of NetFlix, and while I appreciated the convenience of delivery, when they expanded the offering to include online movie viewing “at no additional charge,” I didn’t really “get” it. Aside from the fact that, at that time, my DVD player wasn’t wireless compatible, the selection (certainly in those early days) was unremarkable at best. In fact, I remember telling a friend once that the online movies were free, and worth every penny.

The quality and breadth of selection improved over time, until of course, there came that fateful decision to charge a fee for that online movie access separate and apart from the home DVD delivery. All of a sudden, a service that had been a nice-to-have “at no additional charge” had to be viewed through a whole new prism―it was now a benefit with a cost.

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), group health plans that offer dependent coverage are required to extend coverage to workers’ children until they reach age 26, regardless of student status, marital status or financial support by the employees. It has been estimated that 3.1 million young adults have acquired health coverage as a result of the adult-dependent mandate (ADM) provision, and overall, 31 percent of employers enrolled adult-dependent children as a result of the mandate, according to a recent EBRI report (online here).

However, under PPACA, employers are not allowed to directly charge higher premiums for the cost of this “adult-dependent” coverage. An EBRI analysis of the experience of a single large employer during the period Jan. 1, 2010, through Dec. 31, 2011, found that nearly 700 adult children enrolled in the employer plan in 2011 as a result of the adult dependent mandate―and this group used about $2 million in health care services in 2011 (about 0.2 percent of the over $1 billion in total spending on health care services by that employer that year).

The EBRI report also looked at the claims behaviors of the ADM group compared with a group of dependent children ages 19–25 that were covered prior to Jan. 1, 2011, some 13,000 young adults. Both groups had health coverage for the entire 2011 calendar year through the employer examined in this study. Average spending in the ADM cohort was higher: 15 percent higher than the comparison group, in fact. While the period of review was short, and the experiences associated with that of a single large employer, the ADM group used more inpatient services than the comparison group, and, in what is perhaps the most interesting finding of the analysis, were more likely to incur claims related to mental health, substance abuse, and pregnancy.

So, while this adult-dependent coverage is currently offered “at no additional charge” (certainly for those already carrying family coverage), there are almost certainly additional costs―costs that employers and workers will (and indeed already have begun) to share through claims payments, cost sharing, and worker premiums.

Of course, as a result of this expanded coverage, there also are individuals who might otherwise not have the benefit of the coverage, either because they wouldn’t have access, or would find it to be prohibitively expensive―and this coverage might well be less expensive than the alternative consequences. Little wonder that the debate continues as to whether the provisions of PPACA will serve to increase or decrease long-term health care spending trends.

It will be interesting to see how the health care spending trends of this younger demographic change over time, and how employers respond. It also underlines the importance of ongoing research on these spending and usage patterns as implementation of the PPACA proceeds, even as it serves to remind us that there can be a difference between no additional charge, and no additional cost.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

Ripple Effects

One of my favorite short stories is Ray Bradbury’s “A Sound of Thunder.” The story takes place in the future when, having figured out time travel, mankind has found a way to commercialize it by selling safaris back in time to hunt dinosaurs. Not just random dinosaurs, mind you—cognizant of the potential implications that a change in the past can ripple through and affect future events, the safari organizers take care to target only those that are destined to die in short order of natural causes. Further, participants are cautioned to stay on a special artificial path designed to preclude interaction with the local flora and fauna. Until, of course, one of the hunters panics and stumbles off the path—and the group finds that, upon returning to their own time, subtle (and not so subtle) changes have occurred. Apparently because in leaving the path, the hunter stepped on a butterfly—whose untimely demise, magnified by the passage of time produced changes much larger than one might have expected from its modest beginnings.

The recently released White House budget proposal for 2014 included a plan to raise $9 billion over 10 years by imposing a retirement savings cap for tax-preferred accounts. While initial reports focused on the aggregate dollar limit of $3 million included in the text, it soon became clear that that figure was merely a frame of reference for the real limit: the annual annuity equivalent of that sum, $205,000 per year in 2013 for an individual age 62.¹

Of course, there are a number of variables that influence annuity purchase prices. As an EBRI analysis this week outlines, while $3 million might provide that annual annuity today, if interest/discount rates were to move higher, that limit could be even lower. As the EBRI analysis explains, if you look only as far back as late 2006, based on a time series of annuity purchase prices for males age 65, the actuarial equivalent of the $205,000 threshold could be as low as $2.2 million—and a higher interest rate environment could result in an even lower cap threshold.

At the same time, the passage of time, which normally works to the advantage of younger savers by allowing savings to accumulate, tends to increase the probability that younger workers will reach the inflation-adjusted limits by the time they reach age 65, relative to older workers. The Employee Benefit Research Institute’s Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) allows us to estimate what the potential future impact could be. Utilizing a specific set of assumptions,² EBRI finds that 1.2 percent of those ages 26–35 in the sample would be affected by the adjusted $3 million cap by the time they reach age 65, while 4.2 percent of that group would be affected by the cap of $2.2 million derived from the discount rates in 2006 cited above.

While the EBRI analysis offers a sense of how variables such as time, market returns, and discount rates can have, there are other potential “ripples” we aren’t yet able to consider, such as the potential response of individual savers—and of employers that make decisions about sponsoring these retirement savings programs—to such a change in tax policy.

Like the hunters in Bradbury’s tale, the initial focus is understandably on the here-and-now, how today’s decisions affect things today. However, decisions whose impact can be magnified by the passage of time are generally better informed when they also take into account the full impact³ they might have in the future.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ With the publication of the final budget proposal, we also learned that the calculation of the threshold also includes defined benefit accruals. While our current analysis did not contemplate the inclusion of defined benefit accruals, it seems likely that the number of individuals affected will change. The White House budget proposal is online here.

² The specific assumptions involved taking age adjustments into account in asset allocation, real returns of 6 percent on equity investments, and 3 percent on nonequity investments, 1 percent real wage growth, and no job turnover. This particular analysis was focused on participants in the EBRI/ICI 401(k) database with account balances at the end of 2011 and contributions in that year. The assumptions used in modeling a variety of scenarios is outlined online here.

³ As with all budget proposals, most of the instant analysis focuses on the numbers. The objective in this preliminary analysis was simply to answer the immediate question: How many individuals might be affected by imposing such a cap on retirement savings accounts? Of necessity, it does not yet consider the administrative complexities of implementation and monitoring such a cap, nor does it take into account the potential response of individual savers and their employers to such a change in tax policy—all of which could create additional “ripples” of impact. The latter consideration is of particular importance in considering the implications of tax policy changes to the current voluntary retirement savings system.