A Penchant for Pensions?

  I’m not sure how old I was when I first saw “Night of the Living Dead”—but I have long been intrigued by stories of a zombie apocalypse—where mindless beings inexplicably rise from the dead, with no memory of their past, just a relentless (and apparently insatiable) hunger for…well, “us.”

That is perhaps an unfortunate comparison to last week’s hearing by the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee, one ostensibly held to focus on how we were going to stave off the retirement “crisis” by…bringing “back”[i] defined benefit plans.[ii]

There were two fundamental premises underlying the hearing; first that there is, in fact, a retirement crisis, and second, that the restoration of defined benefit plan designs would remedy that situation.  

There remains in many circles (including last week’s hearing) a pervasive sense that the defined contribution system is inferior to the defined benefit approach—a sense that seems driven not by what the latter actually produced in terms of benefits, but in terms of what it promised. Even now, it seems that you have to remind folks that the “less than half” covered by a workplace retirement plan was true even in the “good old days” before the 401(k), at least within the private sector. And when it comes to defined benefit plans, it was significantly less than half.

And while you can (eventually) wrest an acknowledgement from those familiar with the data, almost no one EVER talks about how few of even those covered by those DB plans put in the time required to vest in their full pension (particularly prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which accelerated vesting schedules). Those who demonize the 401(k) are never asked to speak to the “coverage gap” that was actually wider when defined benefit structures were “in vogue,” nor called for an accounting of the shortfall between the actual benefits delivered versus the “promise.” And yet, those 401(k) critics in last week’s hearing—with a straight face—held forth on how much better things would be…if only defined benefit plans would come back.

Don’t get me wrong—defined benefit plans continue to serve a valued societal purpose (not the least of which the income they provide my 93-year-old mother, though given the state’s finances, she remains concerned how long they will last), though they tend to work “better” in the public sector and among unionized workforces, where one’s profession and job tenure tend to be less volatile. That said, it’s not like there was some kind of cataclysmic event that wiped them out overnight in the private sector. Rather, their demise was one of a hundred painful “cuts”—all well-intentioned, of course. 

There were (and are) premiums to provide insurance backing for plans that “fail,” disclosures to try and avoid (unexpected) failures, demands for a full accounting of the potential financial obligations those plans represented for the organizations that sponsor them, and finally a demand that those financials be moved from footnotes to the corporate balance sheet itself. At any number of points along that continuum, one could well understand and appreciate why employers would choose to step away from that burden—and they did. 

Moreover, with few exceptions they were able to do so without opposition from employees—who typically didn’t (and largely still don’t) appreciate the cost or benefit of a promise that won’t come to fruition until years, if not decades, beyond the date they expect to be employed by the firm making that promise. And that ignores a criticism highlighted by several in the hearing—that these programs aren’t always well-managed or funded to provide those promised benefits.         

Yes, a fully funded, fully vested benefit that you’ve paid nothing for is certainly a good thing. Little wonder that a recent survey (by one of those firms represented at the hearing) suggested a massive public clamoring for the alleged panacea of these programs. And considering the plethora of headlines proclaiming the dire straits of today’s retirees, who can be faulted for clinging to a benevolent notion of a simpler time when someone else worried about such things?

All that said, there was little in the way of actual data at the hearing to suggest that a return of DB (certainly at the expense of the 401(k)) would actually resolve the issues. Mostly the witnesses focused on the alleged shortcomings of the current system (albeit with some sharp differences in conclusions, and a brief debate about the different results one gets from actual data versus surveys reliant on what people think in terms of establishing whether or not there is an actual crisis), alongside some optimism that SECURE and SECURE 2.0 had laid the groundwork for potential improvement in coverage, sufficiency and decumulation options. If there was a consensus, it might have been that we need to address the projected shortfalls in Social Security benefits—and, truly, if that isn’t, then we really will be looking at a crisis.

The thing that makes cinematic zombies so terrifying is that there are so many of them—and that they keep getting up and pursuing you no matter how much damage you inflict.[iii] That, and they manage to “convert” more with a simple bite. Let’s face it—a truly serious look at the retirement “crisis” would acknowledge that under traditional vesting definitions and job turnover rates in the private sector, defined benefit designs are, at best, a dubious solution. 

A penchant has been described as an irresistible attraction, as someone having a “penchant” for taking risks. 

A more practical one would be to look at a system that is already in place and working for those with access—and talk about ways to make THAT reality a reality for all.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

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[i] In fairness, there are still defined benefit plans about, even in the private sector—though they are considerably fewer than they were a generation ago, and many are frozen or in termination status. 

[ii] The hearing was titled and you can still listen to a recording of it here, "Taking a Serious Look at the Retirement Crisis in America: What Can We Do to Expand Defined Benefit Pension Plans for Workers."

[iii] Well, except for the occasional well-placed headshot.

Shifting the 401(k) ‘Balance’?

A week or so ago, I came across an announcement that IBM was making changes to its 401(k). More specifically that, effective next year they were going to replace their matching contribution in their 401(k) with an employer contribution to a cash balance plan.[i] In the days that followed, the news was picked up in a couple of different trade publications—the implication being that this might be signs of a new shift in plan design. Heck, even Teresa Ghilarducci weighed in, championing the “evolution” to a defined benefit structure from the “flawed” 401(k). She never misses an “opportunity.”

Readers here are likely familiar with the basic concepts of a cash balance design. Technically a defined benefit plan, it’s generally referred to as a “hybrid” because it also has a number of participant-friendly aspects that it shares with a defined contribution plan, notably an account balance (though it’s a “notional” one) that is shared with participants. The benefits accumulate somewhat evenly over time, rather than being more service “back-loaded” as traditional pension plans tend to be. But just like a traditional DB plan, cash balance plans are funded by the employer on an actuarial basis, and the investments are employer-directed, ostensibly with an eye toward the benefit obligations that are accruing. Also, some cash balance plans are insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), just like traditional pensions (and yes, the employer has to pay premiums).

Of course, cash balance designs aren’t new, nor are they new at IBM, which (in)famously shifted to one from a traditional defined benefit plan back in the late 1990s. I say “infamously” because it triggered a couple of participant lawsuits from individuals who thought their benefits had been reduced in the move—an age discrimination suit they won, only to lose on appeal. That said, even in finding for IBM the appellate court acknowledged that older workers were generally correct in perceiving "that they are worse off under a cash-balance approach" because such a plan eliminated the possibility of earning larger benefits as they neared retirement. "But removing a feature that gave extra benefits to the old differs from discriminating against them," the judge wrote. 

That controversy notwithstanding, cash balance plans have, in recent years, proven to be quite popular—particularly among smaller employers because they provide more funding flexibility than a traditional DB plan, and the potential for better benefit accumulation than the non-discrimination and top-heavy test limits often allow with defined contribution plans, such as a 401(k). But what IBM has done—basically replacing its 401(k) match with a cash balance plan contribution does appear to be unique—and worth noting.

As for IBM, while external perspectives on the announcement appear to be largely positive,[ii] it remains to be seen how it will be accepted by those it is ostensibly designed to benefit. Some have already commented that the loss of a match will reduce incentives to save in the 401(k)—others that the resulting diminishment in the 401(k) balance will undermine the amounts available for loans and hardships, though that arguably isn’t the purpose for those 401(k) savings, either. On the other hand, all eligible IBM employees stand to get this employer contribution, not just those who contribute to the 401(k) (though with what is said to be a 97% participation rate, it seems that few are left out at present, though we don’t know their contribution rates). You don’t have to be a cynic (though it helps) to imagine that IBM has done the math here, and that the change is either neutral, or inures favorably to their bottom line.

People tend to forget that the contributions defined in a defined contribution plan can be (re)defined each plan year—and while reductions are rare, they are not unprecedented. That said, even in rolling this new benefit out, IBM has (according to an internal communication memo posted online) acknowledged a reduction; “IBMers will also receive a one-time salary increase to offset the difference between the IBM contributions they are currently eligible to receive in the 401(k) Plan and the new 5% RBA pay credit”—though arguably that’s trading a pre-tax benefit for one on which taxes will be due immediately.   

While it’s certainly an interesting move—by a company with a history of interesting benefit moves—and, despite the enthusiastic response of Professor Ghilarducci, it seems unlikely to catch on more broadly.  Retirement savers have not only long understood and appreciated not only the value of an employer match, and so seem unlikely to embrace “losing” that to new plan they don’t understand, however even the tradeoffs are presented. As for plan sponsors—well, inertia is a powerful force in plan design as well—and a big design change that requires sensitive (and likely) ongoing communication will almost surely give pause to even the most innovative.

That said, it should serve as a reminder that plan designs can, and should, serve multiple purposes. It will be interesting to see how this one pans out.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD  

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[i] It’s actually referred to as a Retirement Benefit Account (RBA), though the description fits a cash balance plan, and it’s described as being offered “within IBM’s Personal Pension Plan.”

[ii] Not exclusively, of course—there’s cynicism to be found with regard to IBM’s true motives here. 

The Deification of DB-ification

I recently stumbled across another of those “DC plans are becoming like DB plans” articles — you know, the so-called “DB-ification” of 401(k)s? This is all supposed to be a good thing, of course, but is it?

We are, of course, routinely told that defined benefit plans do (or did) a better job of providing adequate income in retirement than defined contribution plans — though we aren’t generally reminded that that assumes that workers have actually managed to accumulate service credits sufficient to vest in those benefits, and that those programs are properly funded.

However, this interest in emulation of DB plans by DC plans is a relatively recent focus, fueled in no small part by the success of Pension Protection Act-engendered trends, primarily auto-enrollment (after all, nobody asks people to fill out a form to be covered by their DB plan) and asset allocation fund defaults (ditto on asking participants to choose the investments in the DB plan). But while it’s said that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, it’s not like those auto-designs were actually copied from DB plans.¹

Don’t get me wrong — anything that turns employees into participants (and automatic enrollment surely does that) and helps them make better investment decisions (and, generally speaking, asset allocation solutions fulfill that need) has to be a good thing. But to suggest — as many of these reports do — that these trends are essentially helping DC programs mature into their more “responsible” DB counterparts seems a gross misinterpretation of what is going on.

If we’re really looking to bring the best of the DB approach to DC plans, we need look no further than the definition of a defined benefit. Defined benefit plans are funded — at least, they are supposed to be — with an eye toward the benefit that will be paid out. As the name suggests, the benefit is defined — and the decisions that are made about how much to contribute to the plan and how those contributions will be invested are also done with that in mind.

Defined contribution plans, on the other hand — even the “automatic,” DB-ified ones — have an entirely different focus. They are (still) mostly focused on how much participants can afford to put into them (or can be forced to put into them without them opting out), not how much you need to get out of them. Oh, sure, the PPA’s safe harbor automatic enrollment — and a growing number of DC plans — includes a provision to increase those contributions on an annual basis. But is it any replacement for the kind of true funding discipline that a defined benefit focus represents? More importantly, will it be enough to provide the same kind of retirement security that the DB system promised?

Let’s not kid ourselves — when they worked (and they didn’t always), DB designs were “better” not because they made decisions for individuals (though that helped), but because somebody else was generally doing the funding,² but more importantly doing so based on specifically targeted outcomes.

We’re not likely to shift the funding paradigm — but there’s nothing to keep us from emphasizing the focus on the ultimate benefit, the outcome that we hope to achieve — and the discipline to fund those DC accounts so that they can provide it.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD


Footnotes

1. Another DB “innovation” – the annuitization of the benefit — is certainly talked about (though not yet widely adopted) in the context of DC plans. Ironically, the trend in DB plans seems to be to replace that with the lump sum option so prevalent in DC plans.
2. Another significant DB/DC difference — and one that tends to get glossed over — is that DB plans not only don’t ask employees to sign up or make investment decisions — they — at least the ones in the private sector — generally don’t ask participants to fund them. Oh, sure, that DC plan frequently comes with a match, but the primary source of funding for most of these programs lies with the participant.

Use It or “Lose” It

At the time that EBRI was founded 35 years ago, I was about six months into a job doing pension accountings for a large Midwestern bank. At the time, I didn’t realize I’d still be working with those kinds of issues in 2013—in fairness, like most recent college graduates, I wasn’t really thinking about anything that was 35 years in the future. I had a job, a car that ran, and a reasonably nice stereo in an apartment in the Chicago suburbs that didn’t have much else.

My employer had a nice defined benefit (DB) pension, and an extraordinarily generous thrift-savings plan, but those weren’t big considerations at the time. I had to wait a year to participate in the latter (pretty much standard at the time), and as for the former—well, you know how exciting pension accruals are to 22-year-olds (even those who get paid to do pension accountings). Turns out, I worked there for nearly a decade, and walked away with a pretty nice nest egg in that thrift savings plan (that by then had become a 401(k)), and a pension accrual of…$0.00.

At the time, I didn’t think much about that.  Like many private-sector workers, I hadn’t contributed anything to that pension, and thus getting “nothing” in return didn’t feel like a loss.

By the time I left my second employer (this time after 13 years), the mandated vesting schedules had been shortened by legislation—but even then, the benefit I hope to collect one day won’t amount to much on an annual basis, and won’t be anything like the benefit that plan might have provided if only I had remained employed there – for the past 20 years. Instead, like my service with that prior employer, that DB benefit is frozen in time. That result stands in sharp contrast with the 401(k) balances I have accumulated and that continue to grow, despite having changed employers twice since then.

Of course, national tenure data suggest that my job experience was something of an anomaly.  When you consider that median job tenure in the United States  has hovered in the five-to-seven-year range going back to the early 1950s[i], there have doubtless been many private-sector workers who were, for a time, like me, participants in a traditional defined benefit pension plan, only to see little or nothing come of that participation[ii].

I often hear people say that 401(k)s were “never designed to replace pensions,” a reference to the notion that the benefit defined by most traditional pension plans stood to replace a significant amount of pre-retirement income at retirement.  Now, there’s no question that the voluntary nature of the 401(k) programs, as well as their traditional reliance on the investment direction and maintenance by participants, can undermine the relative contribution of the employer-sponsored plan “leg” to a goal of retirement income adequacy.

However, what often gets overlooked in the comparison with 401(k)s is that when you consider the realities of how most Americans work, traditional defined benefit realities frequently fell short of that standard as well. Indeed, in many cases, based on the kinds of job changes that occur all the time, and have for a generation and more, they could provide far less[iii].

In both cases, it’s not the design that’s at fault—it’s how they are used, both by those who sponsor these programs, as well as those who are covered by them.

Nevin E. Adams, JD 

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[i] See “Employee Tenure Trends, 1983–2012” available here.  

[ii] And a great number of private-sector workers never participated in a defined benefit plan.  See “Pension Plan Participation” available here.  

[iii] A recent EBRI Issue Brief provides a direct comparison of the likely benefits under specific types of defined contribution (DC) and DB retirement plans. See “Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans”.

Foregone “Conclusions”

Behavioral finance drives much of the discussion around retirement plan design innovations these days, for the very simple reason that it seems to help explain what might otherwise be viewed as irrational behaviors. For example, human beings are prone to something that behaviorists call “confirmation bias,” a tendency to favor information that confirms what we already believe. While doing so generally contributes to quicker assessments of information, there are some obvious shortcomings to that approach in terms of critically evaluating new information, particularly information that contradicts what we have already chosen (rightly or wrongly) to accept as reality.

Last month EBRI published an analysis of a direct comparison of the likely benefits under specific types of 401(k) plans and defined benefit (DB) pension plans.(1) As anyone who has worked with employment-based retirement plans knows, individual participant outcomes can vary widely based on a complex combination of decisions by both those that sponsor the plans and the individual workers who are eligible to participate in them, as well as a host of external factors (notably the investment markets) that lie outside their control.

The EBRI report took pains to not only select but to explain the key assumptions in our analysis. As it turns out, the analysis highlighted a number of circumstances in which traditional pensions (where offered) could produce a higher benefit at retirement—and some in which 401(k)s were superior in that regard.

However, some of the reporting and commentary that followed its publication suggest that some either did not read with care the entire analysis, or chose to ignore the totality of the report. Here, in a Q&A format, we deal with most of the mischaracterizations(2) we’ve seen thus far:

• Did the report conclude that 401(k) benefits were better for almost every age and income cohort?

♦ No. While an analysis of just the median results for just the baseline assumptions might suggest this conclusion, the EBRI Issue Brief followed with seven different sensitivity analyses with different assumptions that produce different results. Moreover, the entire analysis was restricted to employees currently ages 25–29, because those individuals would have the opportunity for a full working career with those 401(k)s, as well as the modeled defined benefit results.

• Did the study make assumptions that are biased toward 401(k)s?

♦ Quite the contrary. The baseline used historical averages and ran many sensitivity analyses that were biased AWAY from 401(k)s to test how robust the results were.

• Why did you exclude automatic enrollment designs in 401(k) plans from the analysis?

♦ While a great many employers have adopted automatic enrollment with automatic escalation provisions in recent years, sufficient time has not yet passed since the establishment of most of these escalation features to know how long, and to what levels, participants will allow the escalation provisions to continue before they opt out.

• How does excluding those automatic enrollment plan designs from the analysis impact the results?

♦ Some have argued that automatic enrollment is actually bad for retirement savings because, in some cases, the AVERAGE rate of deferral—when computed only for those who make a contribution—initially decreases.(3) However—and as previous EBRI research has documented—the decline in average deferrals masks the reality that while some individuals initially save at lower rates (certainly in the absence of provisions to increase those initial rates automatically), many lower-income workers become savers under an automatic plan design who would not contribute anything had they been eligible for a voluntary-enrollment 401(k) plan instead.

 

The June 2013 Issue Brief(4) specifically treats these individuals as making zero contributions and does NOT simply exclude them. This is the major reason why low-income employees do not do as well as high-income employees under THIS TYPE of 401(k) plan. EBRI has done previous analysis(5) showing the difference between automatic-enrollment and voluntary-enrollment types of 401(k) plans and specifically documents how much better automatic enrollment was for the retirement savings of lower-income cohorts.

• Aren’t workers today changing jobs more frequently than they did during the heyday of defined benefit pensions?

♦ Actually, no. While it was not an explicit part of this report, a recent EBRI Notes article points out that the data on employee tenure (the amount of time an individual has been with his or her current employer) show that so-called “career jobs” NEVER existed for most workers. Indeed, over the past nearly 30 years, the median tenure of all wage and salary workers age 20 or older has held steady, at approximately five years. While the new analysis focused on the outcomes for younger workers, including the implications of their tenure trends on DB accumulations, the historical turnover trends suggest that this would have been problematic for full DB accumulations among previous generations of workers as well.

•  Were the rates-of-return scenarios “realistic” for 401(k) participants?

♦ The EBRI analysis presented baseline results under historical return assumptions that were adjusted for expenses by reducing the gross return by 78 basis points. Additionally, sensitivity analysis was also conducted in this study by reducing the returns by 200 basis points to determine the robustness of the findings.

• What about the fact that private-sector pensions are largely funded exclusively by employers, while much of that burden falls on individual workers in 401(k) plans?

♦ The report acknowledges this difference, but as the title of the Issue Brief specifically states, this is a comparative analysis of future benefits from private-sector voluntary enrollment plans vs. two stylized types of defined benefit plans—not the financial impact on the individual participants during the accumulation period, or how he/she might deploy assets not committed to retirement savings. However, as both the academic papers cited in the Issue Brief state, a comparison of ALL aspects of this difference would likely need to incorporate the assumption that more costly employer contributions to a plan (whether defined benefit or 401(k)) will be at least partially offset by lower wages over the long run, everything else equal.

• Is it reasonable to compare defined benefit and 401(k) plan benefits?

♦ Retirement income adequacy studies have been undertaken in several reports by other organizations with the implicit assumption that 401(k) plans are unable to generate the same amount of retirement income (regardless of the source of financing). One of the primary objectives of the June EBRI Issue Brief was to actually test whether these implicit assumptions were correct.

So, which is “better”—a defined benefit plan or a 401(k)?

Well, as was noted in the Issue Brief, there is no single answer because a multitude of factors affect the ultimate outcome: interest rates and investment returns; the level and length of time a worker participates in a retirement plan; an individual’s age, job tenure, and remaining length of time in the work force; and the purchase price of an annuity, among other things.

The best answer depends on an incorporation of all the relevant factors, the tools to provide a thorough analysis, and an open mind with which to consider the results.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) Jack VanDerhei, “Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans,” online here.

(2) For example, see “Claim that 401(k)s Beat Defined Benefit Plans Stirs Controversy,” online here.

(3) This is the same type of mistake made in a 2011 Wall Street Journal article. See the EBRI blog “What Do You Call a Glass That is 60−85% Full?” as well as  “More or Less?”

(4) “Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans,” online here.

(5) See Jack VanDerhei and Craig Copeland, “The Impact of PPA on Retirement Savings for 401(k) Participants.” Washington, DC: EBRI Issue Brief, no. 318, June 2008, online here.

"Better" Business

It has become something of a truism in our industry that defined benefit plans are “better” than defined contribution plans. We’re told that returns are higher(1) and fees lower in the former, that employees are better served by having the investment decisions made by professionals, and that many individuals don’t save enough on their own to provide the level of retirement income that they could expect from a defined benefit pension plan. Even the recent (arguably positive) changes in defined contribution design—automatic enrollment, qualified default investment alternatives, and the expanding availability of retirement income options(2)—are often said to represent the “DB-ification” of DC plans.

However, a recent analysis by EBRI reveals that DB is not always “better,” at least not defined as providing financial resources in retirement. In fact, if historical rates of return are assumed, as well as annuity purchase prices reflecting average bond rates over the last 27 years, the median comparisons show a strong outcome advantage for voluntary-enrollment (VE) 401(k) plans over both stylized, final-average DB plan and cash balance plan designs.(3)

Admittedly, those findings are based on a number of assumptions, not the least of which include the specific benefit formulae of the DB plans, and the performance of the markets. Indeed, the analysis in the June EBRI Issue Brief takes pains not only to outline and explain those assumptions,(4) but, using EBRI’s unique Retirement Security Projection Model® (RSPM) to produce a wide range of simulations, provides a direct comparison of the likely benefits in a number of possible scenarios, some of which produce different comparative outcomes. While the results do reflect the projected cumulative effects of job changes and things like loans, as well as the real-life 401(k) plan design parameters in several hundred different plans, they do not yet incorporate the potentially positive impact that automatic enrollment might have, particularly for lower-income individuals.


Significantly, the EBRI report does take into account another real-world factor that is frequently overlooked in the DB-to-DC comparisons: the actual job tenure experience of those in the private sector. In fact, as a recent EBRI Notes article(5) points out, the data on employee tenure (the amount of time an individual has been with his or her current employer) show that so-called “career jobs” NEVER existed for most workers. Indeed, over the past nearly 30 years, the median tenure of all wage and salary workers age 20 or older has held steady, at approximately five years. Even with today’s accelerated vesting schedules, that kind of turnover represents a kind of tenure “leakage” that can have a significant impact on pension benefits—even when they work for an employer that offers that benefit, they simply don’t work for one employer long enough to qualify for a meaningful benefit.

So, which type of retirement plan is “better”? As the EBRI analysis illustrates, there is no single right answer—but the data suggests that ignoring how often people actually change employers can be as misleading as ignoring how much they actually save.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

(1) In the days following publication of the EBRI Issue Brief, (“Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans,” online here),  a number of individuals commented specifically on the chronicled difference in return in DB and DC plans; outside of some exceptions in the public sector, DB investment performance generally has no effect on the benefits paid.

(2) A recent EBRI analysis indicates that, even in DB plans, the rate of annuitization varies directly with the degree to which plan rules restrict the ability to choose a partial or lump-sum distribution. See “Annuity and Lump-Sum Decisions in Defined Benefit Plans: The Role of Plan Rules,” online here.

(3) While the DC plans modeled in this analysis draw from the actual design experience of several hundred VE 401(k) plans, in the interest of clarity it was decided to limit the comparisons for DB plans to only two stylized representative plan designs: a high-three-year, final-average DB plan and a cash balance plan. Median generosity parameters are used for baseline purposes but comparisons are also re-run with more generous provisions (the 75th percentile) as part of the sensitivity analysis.

(4) The report notes that a multitude of factors affect the ultimate outcome: interest rates and investment returns; the level and length of participation; an individual’s age, job tenure, and remaining length of time in the work force; and the purchase price of an annuity, among other things.

(5) The EBRI report highlights several implications of these tenure trends: the effect on DB accruals (even for workers still covered by those programs), the impact of the lump-sum distributions that often accompany job change, and the implications for social programs and workplace stability. “See Employee Tenure Trends, 1983–2012,” online here.

Tenure, Tracked

Sooner or later as a parent you’ll be told—as you doubtless you told YOUR parents—that “that’s not the way things are now!” It’s a potent retort to whatever social more is at issue because, whether it involves a choice in dress, curfew, or even resumé preparation, our perspectives are often shaped (and sometimes distorted) by our recollection of the way things were for us at comparable points in time. Or, as we must sometimes admit, “the way things used to be.”

When it comes to things like working careers, there is a widespread assumption that past generations worked for a single employer for all, or most of his/her working years, and then retired with a pension and a gold watch. In contrast, current American workers are believed to change jobs (much) more frequently. In fact, many champion the defined contribution plan design as a better “fit” for today’s workforce, which—certainly in the private sector—is seen as lacking the kind of tenure necessary to accrue sufficient benefits under a traditional pension design.¹As it turns out, the latest data on employee tenure from the January 2012 Supplement to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS) show that the overall median tenure of workers—the midpoint of wage and salary workers’ length of employment in their current jobs—was slightly higher in 2012, at 5.4 years, compared with 5.0 years in 1983.

In fact, as a recent EBRI Notes article points out, the data on employee tenure (the amount of time an individual has been with his or her current employer) show that those so-called “career jobs” NEVER existed for most workers. Indeed, over the past nearly 30 years, the median tenure of all wage and salary workers age 20 or older has held steady, at approximately five years.

Looking inside those long-term numbers, different trends emerge. For example, the median tenure for male wage and salary workers was, in fact, lower in 2012, but the median tenure for female wage and salary workers increased (from 4.2 years in 1983 to 5.4 years in 2012). This long-term increase in the median tenure of female workers more than offsets the decline in the median tenure of male workers, leaving the overall level slightly higher over the long term.

When you focus on trends among older male workers (ages 55–64), the group that experienced the largest change in their median tenure during the period covered by the report, median tenure fell from a level that would not normally be considered career-length—14.7 years in 196—to just 10.7 years in 2012.

Ultimately, when it comes to job tenure trends,² the way things look today is remarkably consistent with “the way it used to be.” However, as is often the case, a closer look at the underlying data highlights that even the things we expect to be different aren’t always different in the ways we expect.

Nevin E. Adams, JD

¹ See also “The Good Old Days,” online here.

² The EBRI report highlights several implications of these trends: the effect on defined benefit accruals (even for workers still covered by those programs), the impact of the lump-sum distributions that often accompany job change, and the implications for social programs and workplace stability. “See Employee Tenure Trends, 1983–2012,” online here.

The Good Old Days

There’s been a lot of talk lately about the need to fix the “broken”401(k) plan. Some say it disproportionately benefits higher-paid workers, some claim it can’t provide a level of retirement income sufficient to meet lower-income needs, and still others maintain it can’t provide that level of security for anyone. And, as often as not, those sentiments arise as part of a discussion where folks wistfully talk about the “good old days” when everybody had a defined benefit pension, and people didn’t have to worry about saving for retirement.

Only problem is—those “good old days” never really existed, nor were they as good as we “remember” them.

Consider that only a quarter of those age 65 or older had pension income in 1975, the year after ERISA was signed into law. The highest level ever was the early 1990s, when fewer than 4 in 10 (both public-and private-sector workers) reported pension income, according to EBRI tabulations of the 1976–2011 Current Population Survey (in 2010, 34 percent had pension income).

Perhaps more telling is that that pension income, vital as it surely has been for some, represented just 20 percent of all the income received by those 65 and older in 2010. In the “good old days” of 1975, it was less than 15 percent.

In fact, in 1979, just 28 percent of private-sector workers were covered “only” by a defined benefit (DB) plan (another 10 percent were covered by both a DB and a defined contribution plan), according to Department of Labor Form 5500 Summaries. In other words, even in the “good old days” when “everybody” supposedly had a pension, the reality is that most workers in the private sector did not.

Even among those who worked for an employer that offered a pension, most in the private sector weren’t working long enough with a single employer to accumulate the service levels you need for a full pension. Nor is this a recent phenomenon; median job tenure of the total workforce has hovered about four years since the early 1950s (in fact, as EBRI’s latest research points out, the average median job tenure has now risen, 5.2 years).[i] For private-sector workers, fewer than 1 in 5 have ever spent 25 years or more with one employer. Under pension accrual formulas, those kind of numbers mean that even among the workers who qualify for a pension, many are likely to receive a negligible amount because their job tenure is so short.

Ultimately what this suggests is that, even when defined benefit pensions were more prevalent than they are today, most Americans still had to worry about retirement income shortfalls.

Indeed, Americans today do have some additional concerns: longer lives and longer retirements to fund, as well as the attendant issues of higher health care costs and long-term care. For most workers—past and present—the more savings options they have, the better; and the easier we make it for them to save, the better. That is the power of payroll deduction, matching contributions, and employer action.

When all is said and done, we’re all still challenged to find the combination of funding—Social Security, personal savings, and employment-based retirement programs—to provide for a financially satisfying retirement.

Just like in the “good old days.”

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] EBRI Notes, December 2010, http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_12-Dec10.Tenure-CEHCS.pdf

Expectations Set

Thousands of protestors took to the streets this past week—in Wisconsin.

They were protesting legislation that would restrict the scope of collective bargaining power, while at the same time requiring public-sector workers to pay more for their pensions and health care. Last week, reportedly 40% of Madison, Wisconsin, schoolteachers called in sick (ostensibly they were in attendance at the state capital, and by appearances bringing some of the student body with them). The protestors (at least the ones on camera) drew comparisons to their actions with those taken recently by those in Egypt protesting for freedom and a democratic system of government.

But to my eyes, it looked more like Greece.

Don’t get me wrong. The Wisconsin protests were boisterous but appeared to be peaceful, and I’ve heard no reports of the kind of violence and arson that accompanied the protests in Greece a year ago (see Grecian Formula).

But in Wisconsin, as in Greece, a big issue is pensions and benefits1; more specifically, that certain promises had been made to workers by a government that said it was no longer able to meet those obligations, certainly not on the original terms.


During the Greek protests, I was hard-pressed to find anyone sympathetic to their cause. Most had read with some incredulity coverage of the sanctioned state retirement age (61, though reports said many retired as early as 53), and considering the enormous financial straits of that nation, most seemed to think the protestors needed to be reintroduced to reality. Of course, I wasn’t talking to any Greek nationals about this—just associates in this country and others who are living with (and within) a completely different set of economic and retirement expectations.

Which brings us back to Wisconsin—or New Jersey, or California, or Ohio, or perhaps even your town. Doubtless some of those protesting workers are overpaid and underworked, as in any workplace, but surely most are undertaking to do an honest day’s work for a fair amount of pay and benefits. These people are, as President Obama said recently, our friends and neighbors. Heck, in my case, they are also family members. And I can promise you that the teachers and/or police officers in my family are NOT overpaid.

On the other hand, I have plenty of friends and family in the private sector who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own, and had to figure out a way to make ends meet without the protection of tenure, or the safety net of a pension or retiree medical coverage. They weren’t overpaid before they lost that job, and they surely weren’t afterwards. Many who still have jobs have had to absorb pay and/or benefit cuts (or had those cut into by higher prices and co-pays). They have had their pensions frozen, if they ever had one at all, and not a few saw their 401(k) match suspended over the past couple of years. Many haven’t seen a “regular” cost-of-living increase capable of keeping up with the increases in the cost of living in a very long time.

They are, quite simply, living with (and within) what appear to be a completely different set of economic and retirement expectations than those now in, and descending upon, the Wisconsin capital.

And, as a result, I can’t help but wonder if they’ll be sympathetic.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

See also “IMHO: Promises Premises” at

1 Some might argue that the real issue in Wisconsin is proposed changes in collective bargaining rights rather than pensions, but at issue, among other things, is the right to collectively bargain for wages, pensions, and benefits, so….

Goal Lines

That report, published by Towers Watson (see “Towers Watson Finds DB Plans Outperformed DC Plans” at ), compared the differences in investment results between 401(k) plans and defined benefit (DB) plans—and, in a contest that you’d surely have trouble getting decent odds on in Vegas, defined benefit plans fared better.

That shouldn’t—and probably didn’t—surprise anyone, IMHO. Defined benefit plans have a lot of things going for them that 401(k)s don’t. First, most DB plans have someone in an official capacity paying attention to them. They are obligations of the employer, after all, and they have a direct—and increasingly visible—impact on the bottom line. Second, in view of the first consideration, those responsible for that bottom line impact of the DB plan generally have the good sense to engage the services of experts to help them make the right decisions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly when it comes to making investment decisions, DB plans have the benefit of time—and in many cases, a nearly indefinite time horizon—upon which to base and fund their commitments. They have, in football parlance, a solid ground game, well-honed defensive line, a quarterback who is getting solid play-making support from the sidelines, and control of the clock.

401(k) plans, on the other hand, rely on the investment prowess of an untrained, and in most cases, wholly uneducated participant-investor. A “quarterback,” if you will, who effectively strolls out on the field, drops back and—well, sometimes they just fall on the ball, sometimes they try to run with it (for a short distance, anyway) and, yes, sometimes they just—in pure “Hail Mary” fashion—hurl the ball downfield and hope for the best.

Little wonder that, in the time periods that were the focus of the Towers Watson update, DB plans did better. In fact, after fees were taken into account, Towers Watson estimated that DB plans outperformed 401(k) plans by roughly one percentage point in 2008, though both types of plans lost value.

That said, when you look at the full Towers Watson analysis, the result is more nuanced. Over the decade and change it has been conducting this analysis, Towers Watson noted that DB plans do better (on a relative basis to 401(k)s) when the markets are bearish—and yet, 401(k) results, with all their faults and shortcomings, tend to fare better (at least at a plan average) when the bulls are in charge.

In fact, the Towers Watson report draws the following conclusion:

“After stronger performances by DB plans during the 2000-2002 bear market, 401(k) plans outperformed DB plans from 2003 through 2005, as measured by plan-level medians. DB plans and DC plans realized equal returns in 2006, with 401(k) plans taking the lead again in 2007. But, over the 13-year period, which captures both bull and bear cycles, DB plans outperformed 401(k)s by an average of 23 basis points.”

Read that last sentence again. That’s right—despite all their advantages, over one of the most tumultuous market cycles in memory (1995 to 2007), DB plans did better than their 401(k) brethren—by just 23 basis points.

Now, there are issues whenever you try to come up with something like an “average”(1) result in any evaluation, much less an “average” 401(k) plan investment result. For example, that “average” 401(k) plan might have a group of participants that gravitate toward more-conservative investments counter-weighted with a group of “shoot-the-moon” gamblers, yielding an “average” return that winds up being pretty diversified at the group level(2). Moreover, some of the plans in the Towers Watson evaluation had both a DB and a DC program and, at least in theory, participants covered by both programs might—and certainly should—invest differently than those with only a DC plan to rely on.

The bottom line: The presentation of a DB “average,” regardless of the care taken in presenting the data, may be something of a stretch; but, IMHO, while there may be an arithmetic “average” for 401(k) plan returns, it sheds little light on what is really going on at the level where such decisions matter—the not-so-average individual participant.

And, as many Super Bowl losers can attest, it isn’t about how many yards you gain on the ground, how many interceptions you’ve thrown, or how many sacks—it’s the score on the board at the end of the game that counts.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

The Towers Watson study is online at http://www.towerswatson.com/research/845

(1) For another perspective on averages, see “IMHO: The Mean-ing of Average”

(2) The Towers Watson analysis noted that, over time, 401(k) plans do, in fact, have a wider distribution of returns than DB plans, and that, with the exceptions of 2002 and 2003, 401(k) plans had a wider distribution of investment returns in all years in the analysis.