The 'Terror' of 401(k) Litigation

So much of our lives have been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic—but the pace of 401(k) litigation, it seems, has, if anything, accelerated.

Now, some may find the label “terror” in the title extreme. In fact, it hadn’t really occurred to me until I read the response of defendants to a suit slapped on Genentech Inc. and the plan fiduciaries of its $7.6 billion 401(k) plan in early October. In a response to that excessive fee suit, the defendants’ attorneys referred to this suit—and others like it—as “an in terrorem attack on fiduciaries and employers seeking sweeping monetary and injunctive relief geared toward disrupting employee benefit relationships and causing protracted, expensive litigation.” 

“In terrorem,” Latin for “into/about fear,” has a legal context—a legal threat, really—one generally voiced in hope of compelling an action (or lack of action) without resorting to a lawsuit or criminal prosecution. It normally arises in regard to a provision in a will which threatens that if anyone challenges the legality of the will or any part of it, then that person will be cut off or given only a dollar, rather than what is left to them in the will. 

While that may (or may not) be an accurate characterization of that particular litigation, the motivations of the plaintiffs’ bar on these matters are surely as diverse as the plans and plan designs they challenge, if not the experience, expertise and expectations of the individual firms themselves. Indeed, having had the opportunity to discuss these matters with a few over the years, I am persuaded that some at least are indeed fighting what they honestly believe is the “good fight.”[i] They see evidence of inattentive fiduciaries manipulated (or motivated) by unscrupulous providers, sometimes over a period of years, if not decades, all to the financial detriment of participants who must work (and save) all the more to compensate for the “theft.”  

However, in the process they have sought to create presumptions of imprudence that (IMO) aren’t. They’d have us (or more precisely, a judge) believe that active management is not only inherently inferior to passive approaches, but unacceptable, that RFPs not only must be conducted, but at a minimum must be conducted on a 3-year cycle, to accept that recordkeeping fees are prudent only if assessed as a function of participant count (as though size and complexity of the plan’s investments and design shouldn’t be a consideration), that extrapolated averages of published plan fees are sufficient to set a benchmark of reasonability, that a stable value option is superior to money market, except when money market is better than stable value, that they provide too many options for participants to choose from… or too few. Indeed, as the defendants in the Genentech response note, “Fiduciaries that manage 401(k) plans are getting sued no matter what they do.”  

When the dust “settles” in these cases—sometimes over decades, but of late more rapidly—most still produce nothing but a monetary “arrangement”—the amount nearly always significantly less than the damages alleged, and the per participant recovery relatively small.[ii] The plaintiffs’ attorneys get somewhere between 25% and a third of that recovery—which is deemed reasonable[iii] since they often labor long and without compensation until a settlement or adjudication is reached, though it is often tens of millions of dollars when it happens. 

Those suits that do go to trial generally seem to turn out in favor of the plan fiduciary(ies), either because the substance behind the plaintiffs’ claims is found to be insufficient, or the actions of the plan fiduciaries are determined to clear the admittedly high bar of ERISA’s prudence. It’s easy to overlook that result because, as human beings, we are inclined to see a settlement in manners as heinous as those alleged as an admission of culpability, if not guilt, whatever the legal disclaimers. Regardless, while the proceeds that flow to the plaintiffs’ counsel surely offset the investment of time and effort getting to that point, there’s little question that some of it simply goes to funding the next suit… 

As with any apparently profitable enterprise, this current wave of 401(k) litigation has attracted new entrants—and copycats—not only in actions, but in the very language employed in their filings. Based on their record to date, it’s doubtful that they will enjoy much success under the full scrutiny of adjudication—but then, that may not be their objective.  

Ultimately it takes time, patience—and yes, money—to stand up to this threat. 

But here’s hoping that, knowing the threat exists, plan fiduciaries continue to take the time to be thoughtful, deliberate and, yes, prudent in the exercise of their critical duties, that they take the time to document that work—that they do so with the involvement and engagement of wise counsel—that they find ways to share the fruits of that diligence with those they serve—and that in so doing, they deprive the plaintiffs’ bar of any rational basis upon which to bring, much less prevail in, these pursuits.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

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[i] There’s no question that 401(k) fees have declined over the years—and while the plaintiffs’ bar would surely like—and some are, perhaps entitled—to claim credit for at least some of that, fees decline for any number of reasons, though plan fiduciaries, writ large, are more sensitive to the issue these days. Then again, the costs of this litigation are being paid by someone, and insurers have not traditionally been known to long absorb the impact of such things to their bottom line—indeed, some have already taken to asking pointed questions of employers in the course of questionnaires that would seem to have little to do directly with the insurance coverage sought. 

[ii] The named plaintiff(s) generally are accorded $10,000 to $25,000 each for their time and trouble in representing the class.

[iii] Though that never takes into account the time, effort, expense and opportunity costs for the employers that must devote time and treasure to the litigation.

College ‘Intuition’

Much remains unsettled – and, as yet, largely unadjudicated – in the large, and growing series of excessive fee litigation directed at university 403(b) plans. However, certain trends in the litigation have emerged – some very different than 401(k)s, others not. Here’s what to look (out) for.

The list of these so-called university 403(b) suits – the first were filed in August 2016 – now includes plans at Cornell University, Northwestern University, Columbia University and the University of Southern California, as well as Yale. Meanwhile, some of the earlier suits are just getting to hearings on motions to dismiss, specifically Emory University and Duke University – both of which are currently proceeding to trial – and the University of Pennsylvania, which recently prevailed in a similar case. Another – involving Princeton University’s 403(b) plans – is on hold awaiting an appeal in the University of Pennsylvania litigation.

By my reckoning, here are the grounds upon which the university 403(b) plans that have been sued thus far have in common.

They have more than one recordkeeper.

While not every university 403(b) plan against which a lawsuit has been filed employed the services of more than one recordkeeper, they all seem have done so at one point in their history.

Indeed, a couple of lawsuits filed against university plans that have consolidated to a single recordkeeper have pointed to the consolidation decision as proof that the plan fiduciaries knew that the multiple provider approach was inefficient and costly – and should have acted sooner.

They offer a “dizzying array” of funds (generally from each of the aforementioned recordkeepers).

In the 401(k) world, large fund menus have long been considered a nuisance, if not downright unproductive. We’ve even got a behavioral finance study involving jams to back up the sense that, given too many choices (whatever that may be – with jams, it’s apparently more than 6), people tend not to decide.

With university 403(b) plans – certainly the ones that have found themselves sued – the “norm” seems to be in excess of 100. And frequently they approach that number with each recordkeeping provider.

That said, at least one court presented with the issue has said “Having too many options does not hurt the Plans’ participants, but instead provides them opportunities to choose the investments that they prefer.” And a second one has just held that “plaintiffs have neither alleged that any participant experienced confusion nor stated a claim for relief.”

They offer “duplicative” investments.

One of the reasons the fund menus, at least in total, seem to be so large is that each recordkeeping provider seems to put forth their own optimal menu of choices – and if you have more than one recordkeeper – well, you apparently wind up with “duplicates” in what the plaintiffs frequently claim are “in every major asset class and investment style.”

And in numerous of these cases, the only funds offered are the proprietary offerings of those recordkeepers.

Their recordkeeper choice “tethered” them to certain fund options.

Many, though not all, of the lawsuits involve plans that had TIAA-CREF as recordkeeper, and those all cite how the choice of TIAA-CREF as recordkeeper bound (“locked” and “tethered” are other terms employed to describe the arrangement) the plan to include certain (allegedly inferior) TIAA-CREF investment options on the menu, notably the CREF Stock Account and Real Estate Fund. Other issues unique to some TIAA-CREF investments are certain transfer restrictions, and some differences in their loan account processing.

Share ‘Alike’

There are, of course, elements that these programs share with their 401(k) brethren.

They use retail class mutual funds and/or active when passive would “do.”

Yes, not only are those fund options “duplicative,” they are often retail, rather than institutional class. Or actively managed when passive varieties were available. And thus more expensive, so the argument goes.

They pay for those (multiple) recordkeepers via asset-based, rather than per participant fees.

This wasn’t always an issue in excessive fee litigation, but in recent years – well, it’s become something of a regular “feature” of this type litigation – and it’s been part and parcel of the fabric or 403(b) university plan litigation.

The argument, of course, is that recordkeeping is about keeping up with individual records, and whether that individual account balance is $100 or $100,000, the cost of keeping up with the balance is the same. However, not content to argue with the method of calculation, these days the plaintiffs nearly always take the next step – and proffer what they consider to be a reasonable per-participant fee – on their way to alleging that the fees being charged – are not.

They are big plans.

Nearly all of the 401(k) excessive fee lawsuits filed since 2006 (when the St. Louis-based law firm of Schlichter, Bogard & Denton launched the first batch) have been against plans that had close to, or in most cases in excess of, $1 billion in assets. There’s no real mystery here. Willie Sutton robbed banks for the same reason.

And if you’re a class action litigator, that also happens to be where a large number of similarly situated individuals can be found; a.k.a. plaintiffs.

Less cynically, the plaintiffs generally charge that, despite the plan’s large (“jumbo”) size, rather than “leveraging the Plans’ substantial bargaining power to benefit participants and beneficiaries, Defendant caused the Plans to pay unreasonable and excessive fees for investment and administrative services.”

Where does this leave your “average” multibillion dollar 403(b) university plan? Well, they say that forewarned is forearmed. However, the reality is that corrective actions now may not be enough to keep the plan out of “cite” – but it might be enough to keep your plan out of court.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD
 
Note: It bears acknowledging that the reason that so many of these suits allege the same things is not only that the plans have similar structures and characteristics, but that many of the suits have been filed by the same firm (Schlichter Bogard & Denton) – or by firms that have taken pages (literally in some cases) from the suits filed by that firm.

5 Things of Which Plan Fiduciaries Need to Be Aware

Whoever said ignorance was bliss surely wasn’t talking about fiduciary litigation.

While I’ve had the opportunity over the past decade and change to peruse plenty of filings and findings related to excessive fee suits, the recent amended filing in a case against New York University (NYU) included something new – a long list of statements and acknowledgements by plan fiduciaries that, according to the plaintiffs, “displayed an alarming lack of understanding of basic terms and principles in investment management and fiduciary best practices.” Indeed, one of the plan committee members was called out for their “remarkable unawareness of basic facts” relating to the plan.

Now, one must take care in accepting the assertions in litigation at face value, and it’s too early to say if they – along with a response by the defendants – will carry the day with a judge. Still, it’s hard, more than a decade after the first of the so-called excessive fee cases were filed, to believe that there remain multi-billion dollar retirement plans in operation with committees – and as here, with the involvement of an investment advisor – that don’t know – well, the things that the long-standing practices of these committees suggest are still in place.

The job of a plan fiduciary isn’t all about fees, of course, though it’s certainly been a focus of these excessive fee lawsuits. Still, it seems to me that there are some things that plan fiduciaries of any plan size should be aware, and of which responsible plan fiduciaries should have a working knowledge.

Said another way, a plan fiduciary could be in trouble if you don’t:

• Know how much your plan pays in fees. And to whom. And for what.
• Know how many (and which ones) of your plan’s investment choices are offered in retail class shares. And if institutional class shares are available, and under what circumstances/conditions.
• Know how much of your plan’s investments are in funds that belong to your recordkeeper. And why.
• Know what revenue-sharing is (and where it goes).
• Have a basis for determining that the fees paid by the plan/participants are “reasonable.”

That’s not an exhaustive list, of course though, at least with regard to fees and expenses, I think it covers the key issues, certainly the ones that have arisen in litigation. Remember that plan fiduciaries – who have personal liability for their actions – are charged with “paying only reasonable plan expenses.” And, as noted above, plan fiduciaries – and those who guide them – have had at least a decade to see the writing on the wall on these excessive fee lawsuits.

Arguably, that can’t be done without first knowing what those expenses are, and having some basis of comparison/evaluation to ascertain if they are, in fact, reasonable in view of the services provided.

Particularly if you don’t want to be caught “unawares.”

- Nevin E. Adams, JD
 
See also:

• Your Plan Might Be an Excessive Fee Litigation Target If…
• 4 Things Before You Get to That RFP…
• What You Can Get with an RFP

Your Plan Might Be an Excessive Fee Litigation Target If…

Last week another of the so-called excessive fee lawsuits was settled – not adjudicated, mind you. Here are some factors that the targets of these lawsuits seem to have in common.

Now, in fairness, most of these cases haven’t actually gone to court – and, by my count, most of the ones that actually get to court are won by the employers/plan sponsors. Even the Tibble case, which drew so much attention when it made it to the Supreme Court, eventually came out in favor of the plan sponsors (though they “lost” the Supreme Court decision).

However, a lot of litigation has been filed over the past decade, and millions of dollars spent — reminding me of an old mentor’s admonition that you can spend a lot of money in court being “right.” That so many employers have decided that it is “cheaper” to settle for millions of dollars gives you some idea of the magnitude of these challenges.

So, with that in mind – and with apologies to Jeff (“you might be a redneck…”) Foxworthy: Your plan might be an excessive fee litigation target if…

It’s a multi-billion dollar plan.

Nearly all of the excessive fee lawsuits filed since 2006 (when the St. Louis-based law firm of Schlichter, Bogard & Denton launched the first batch) have been against plans that had close to, or in most cases in excess of, $1 billion in assets. There’s no real mystery here. Willie Sutton robbed banks for the same reason: that’s where the money is. And if you’re a class action litigator, that also happens to be where a large number of similarly situated individuals can be found.

Harder to figure out is why plans of that size, and the expertise/resources that such employers can ostensibly bring to plan administration, have been so vulnerable.

Your multi-billion dollar plan has retail class mutual funds.

Granted, even at the largest employers, individuals frequently find themselves assigned the responsibility for being a plan fiduciary with little or no training or background. Still, in this day and age, it’s remarkable that so many of these targets were either so ignorant of the concept of share classes or so poor at negotiating with their providers that they included options in their multi-billion dollar plan menus funds that were, in some cases, no more competitive in price than what the individual plan participants could have acquired in their IRA.

You have proprietary funds on your menu.

As a financial services provider, there are any number of valid business reasons to include your own funds on the menu you offer to your workers. It’s a testament to your willingness to “eat your own cooking,” a statement of confidence in the skill and acumen of your investment management staff.

However, this access can be used to prop up funds with steady cash flow that aren’t deserving of that confidence, and can provide at least the temptation on the part of committee members to favor internal offerings to the exclusion of external choices. Moreover, since it can be difficult politically to “fire” an internal service provider, the plan might find itself paying “retail” prices, not only for funds, but for administrative services – an issue that has been made in several of these lawsuits.

The bottom line: However outstanding your internal options are, the current litigation environment seems to favor a “Caesar’s wife” approach – your actions need to be above (and beyond) suspicion.

You can’t remember the last time you benchmarked your plan/investments.

Let’s face it, even changing a single fund on an existing menu can be complicated, much less a full blown consideration of changing record keepers and fund menus. And plan sponsors, even plan sponsors at multi-billion dollar plans, juggle myriad responsibilities and are constantly pulled in multiple directions. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is a mantra born of practicality, if not necessity, for most. If the current process and services are working, that is often “enough.”

But if you haven’t been through some kind of competitive bidding/review process in recent memory – well, “it seems to be working” isn’t necessarily in keeping with the legal admonition to ensure that the services rendered and fees paid for those services are “reasonable” and in the best interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries.

And even if it is in the eyes of a judge, a motivated plaintiff’s bar can likely make an issue of it.

You are still paying asset-based record keeping charges, rather than a per-participant fee.

Okay, this is a new one. I don’t recall seeing this being an issue until this year – and though it has been alleged, and incorporated in a couple of the most recent settlements, to my recollection, no court has ever ruled on this.

That said, the current and apparently emerging argument is based on the notion that there is little correlation between record keeping services and the dollar value of that account. And the most recent litigation puts forth some fairly specific notions of what that reasonable per-participant charge should be. And did I mention that this has even been raised in some very recent litigation involving a $10 million plan?

You haven’t hired a qualified retirement plan advisor to help.

It’s possible that advisors have been involved in these plans, but to date I can only recall one situation where an advisor was involved/named (though not as a party to the litigation), and that more an investment consultant than an advisor, per se.

That said, when you look at the issues like share class selection, and the lack of regular review (not to mention documentation of that review) in many of these cases, you can’t help but think, “Where was the advisor?” The answer seems to be that these plans hadn’t engaged those services.

And then you can’t help but wonder what difference their involvement might have made.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Your Plan Might Be an Excessive Fee Litigation Target If…

Last week another of the so-called excessive fee lawsuits was settled – not adjudicated, mind you. Here are some factors that the targets of these lawsuits seem to have in common.

Now, in fairness, most of these cases haven’t actually gone to court – and, by my count, most of the ones that actually get to court are won by the employers/plan sponsors. Even the Tibble case, which drew so much attention when it made it to the Supreme Court, eventually came out in favor of the plan sponsors (though they “lost” the Supreme Court decision).

However, a lot of litigation has been filed over the past decade, and millions of dollars spent — reminding me of an old mentor’s admonition that you can spend a lot of money in court being “right.” That so many employers have decided that it is “cheaper” to settle for millions of dollars gives you some idea of the magnitude of these challenges.

So, with that in mind – and with apologies to Jeff (“you might be a redneck…”) Foxworthy: Your plan might be an excessive fee litigation target if…

It’s a multi-billion dollar plan.

Nearly all of the excessive fee lawsuits filed since 2006 (when the St. Louis-based law firm of Schlichter, Bogard & Denton launched the first batch) have been against plans that had close to, or in most cases in excess of, $1 billion in assets. There’s no real mystery here. Willie Sutton robbed banks for the same reason: that’s where the money is. And if you’re a class action litigator, that also happens to be where a large number of similarly situated individuals can be found.

Harder to figure out is why plans of that size, and the expertise/resources that such employers can ostensibly bring to plan administration, have been so vulnerable.

Your multi-billion dollar plan has retail class mutual funds.

Granted, even at the largest employers, individuals frequently find themselves assigned the responsibility for being a plan fiduciary with little or no training or background. Still, in this day and age, it’s remarkable that so many of these targets were either so ignorant of the concept of share classes or so poor at negotiating with their providers that they included options in their multi-billion dollar plan menus funds that were, in some cases, no more competitive in price than what the individual plan participants could have acquired in their IRA.

You have proprietary funds on your menu.

As a financial services provider, there are any number of valid business reasons to include your own funds on the menu you offer to your workers. It’s a testament to your willingness to “eat your own cooking,” a statement of confidence in the skill and acumen of your investment management staff.

However, this access can be used to prop up funds with steady cash flow that aren’t deserving of that confidence, and can provide at least the temptation on the part of committee members to favor internal offerings to the exclusion of external choices. Moreover, since it can be difficult politically to “fire” an internal service provider, the plan might find itself paying “retail” prices, not only for funds, but for administrative services – an issue that has been made in several of these lawsuits.

The bottom line: However outstanding your internal options are, the current litigation environment seems to favor a “Caesar’s wife” approach – your actions need to be above (and beyond) suspicion.

You can’t remember the last time you benchmarked your plan/investments.

Let’s face it, even changing a single fund on an existing menu can be complicated, much less a full blown consideration of changing record keepers and fund menus. And plan sponsors, even plan sponsors at multi-billion dollar plans, juggle myriad responsibilities and are constantly pulled in multiple directions. “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is a mantra born of practicality, if not necessity, for most. If the current process and services are working, that is often “enough.”

But if you haven’t been through some kind of competitive bidding/review process in recent memory – well, “it seems to be working” isn’t necessarily in keeping with the legal admonition to ensure that the services rendered and fees paid for those services are “reasonable” and in the best interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries.

And even if it is in the eyes of a judge, a motivated plaintiff’s bar can likely make an issue of it.

You are still paying asset-based record keeping charges, rather than a per-participant fee.

Okay, this is a new one. I don’t recall seeing this being an issue until this year – and though it has been alleged, and incorporated in a couple of the most recent settlements, to my recollection, no court has ever ruled on this.

That said, the current and apparently emerging argument is based on the notion that there is little correlation between record keeping services and the dollar value of that account. And the most recent litigation puts forth some fairly specific notions of what that reasonable per-participant charge should be. And did I mention that this has even been raised in some very recent litigation involving a $10 million plan?

You haven’t hired a qualified retirement plan advisor to help.

It’s possible that advisors have been involved in these plans, but to date I can only recall one situation where an advisor was involved/named (though not as a party to the litigation), and that more an investment consultant than an advisor, per se.

That said, when you look at the issues like share class selection, and the lack of regular review (not to mention documentation of that review) in many of these cases, you can’t help but think, “Where was the advisor?” The answer seems to be that these plans hadn’t engaged those services.

And then you can’t help but wonder what difference their involvement might have made.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD