Where’s Waldo? (and Mary…and Joe…and Pat)

Every plan has participants—and, sooner or later, will therefore have “ex” participants—and sometimes those participants go…missing. And that can be a real problem for retirement plan fiduciaries.

While most are likely aware of the fiduciary obligation to keep accurate records, many are less aware that there is also an obligation to take “appropriate steps” to ensure that the participants and beneficiaries are paid their full benefits when due. But what are the “appropriate steps”?

Why It Matters

This is a growing concern of regulators; in fact, (now former) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for the Employee Benefits Security Administration Jeanne Klinefelter Wilson has noted that, “In fiscal year 2020 alone, EBSA’s investigators helped missing and nonresponsive participants recover benefits with a present value in excess of $1.4 billion.”

The good news is, the Labor Department has published some guidance on the subject—in fact, it’s a triple dose of guidance related to helping retirement plan fiduciaries meet their obligations under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to distribute retirement benefits to missing participants.

What You Can—and Should—Do

Plan fiduciaries will likely find most helpful the first document in the package. Titled “Missing Participants—Best Practices for Pension Plans,” the document outlines those key best practices that you will want to make sure are a part of your process in keeping up with those missing participants. Those best practices are outlined under four broad headings: 

• Maintaining accurate census information for the plan’s participant population. This includes contacting participants (current AND retired, as well as beneficiaries) on a periodic basis to confirm or update their contact information—including putting contact information change requests in plan communications—along with a reminder to advise the plan of any changes in contact information and flagging undeliverable mail/email and uncashed checks for follow-up.
   
• Implementing effective communication strategies. This includes things like using plain language and offering non-English language assistance when and where appropriate, and building steps into your onboarding, exit and enrollment processes to confirm or update contact information, confirm information needed to determine when benefits are due and to correctly calculate the amount of benefits owed, and to advise employees of the importance of ensuring that the plan has accurate contact information at all times.
   
• Documenting procedures and actions. Every good plan fiduciary knows and appreciates the importance of documentation—both as a record of actions taken and as a roadmap for future consideration. As with other plan procedures, when it comes to keeping up with missing participants, this not only means writing it down and keeping it current, but you will also want to be sure that your recordkeeping provider does their part—in maintaining plan records and participant communications and documenting those practices as well.
   
• Conducting missing participant searches. Despite your best efforts to maintain contact, participants often move and/or change names without communicating that information or even leaving a forwarding address.[i] This is where the rubber hits the road for most plan fiduciaries.  The beneficiary information can provide some solid leads, and the reality today is that if you can track down your grade school sweetheart on Facebook, there is a pretty good chance you can leverage social media to do some of the heavy lifting—and even broad-based search engines like Google can be a valuable resource, as well as paid services that can use credit searches and such. 

But the place you should probably start—and one cited in the Labor Department guidance—is the National Registry of Unclaimed Retirement Benefits. It is a free public service designed to help employers or plan fiduciaries and former employees locate each other so the former employees can claim their overlooked or abandoned retirement money.

What better way to not only find “Waldo,” but to ensure that your ex-participants are reunited with the benefits they have earned—to fulfill your responsibilities as a plan fiduciary—and to avoid potential issues with federal agencies down the road.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD 

---

[i] And, of course, there are some other good tips here: https://www.penchecks.com/what-to-do-with-missing-participants-and-required-minimum-distributions/        

Guidance 'Counseling'

 When the Labor Department issued last month what it called “new guidance” that it further described as “the first time the department’s Employee Benefits Security Administration has issued cybersecurity guidance”—well, I, for one, was expecting… guidance. 

However, rather than an advisory opinion, information letter or even a field assistance bulletin, it turned out instead to be three documents outlining what were termed “best practices for maintaining cybersecurity.”

The issue of cybersecurity has, of course, loomed large in recent months, reportedly emerging as a focus in Labor Department audits and as a point of contention[i] in participant lawsuits. In fact, even the preamble to the final e-delivery regulations stated a year ago that “…the Department expects that many plan administrators, or their service or investment providers, already have secure systems in place to protect covered individuals’ personal information.” 

Now, in fairness, the Labor Department press release did state that it was guidance on those best practices—not that there wasn’t guidance on cybersecurity to be found in those documents. 

Consider that in the component labelled “Cybersecurity Program Best Practices,” none other than the Labor Department itself says, in no uncertain terms, “Plans’ service providers should…” and then proceeds to enumerate 12 precise and distinct elements. The first of these is no less than to “have a formal, well documented cybersecurity program,” followed immediately by “conduct prudent annual risk assessments.” 

Doubtless there are some who would prefer to have a more detailed expectation as to the particulars of those practices, some specific sense as to exactly what constitutes a “cybersecurity program,” the criteria for “strong access control procedures” and what is required in order to “appropriately respond” to past cybersecurity incidents. 

Make no mistake: Plan fiduciaries that aren’t attentive to the issue, much less the best practice guidance and its detailed outlines as to what would constitute “best” practices—well, perhaps the high-level admonitions leave too wide open the determination as to how those mesh with ERISA’s fiduciary standard. That said, and even if the Labor Department has yet to turn a sharp eye upon such things, the plaintiffs’ bar soon surely will.

The elements outlined, while broad, seem to offer at least a basic structure and specifics sufficient to validate an existing program, or—should one not yet be in place—begin its construction. And so, even if there are some specific criteria not yet detailed, plan fiduciaries can know, it seems to me—regardless of this particular guidance—for a certainty that the standards of considering, hiring and monitoring the processes and practices of those who provide support to their plan and its participants require—as they always have—a standard of care and loyalty that has been described as “the highest known to the law.” 

And surely that includes pursuing best practices in protecting both the information and account balances to which they are entrusted. 

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i] Other recent cases have involved participant accounts at Abbott Laboratories (Split Decisions in 401(k) Theft Suit for Plan Sponsor, RK), Estee Lauder (Recordkeeper, Plan Sponsor Charged in 401(k) Account Theft), MandMarblestone Group (Court Backs TPA Counterclaim on Plan Sponsor in 401(k) Cyber Theft Case) and Boeing (Man Charged with Retirement Account Thefts).

"Expected" Values

Over the past several years, a growing amount of attention has been focused on the decumulations of defined contribution plan balances in retirement. Much of that focus has, of course, been driven by concerns that those individuals won’t have enough resources accumulated to fund those retirements. More recently, there has been a sense that one way to help provide a different perspective on these retirement savings would be to provide participants with an estimate of what their current or projected savings would produce in terms of a retirement income stream.

In May 2013, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) focusing on lifetime income illustrations. Under that proposal, a participant’s pension benefit statement (including his or her 401(k) statement) would show his or her current account balance and an estimated lifetime income stream of payments based on that balance.

As noted in a recent EBRI Notes article[i], there appears to be little empirical evidence on the likely impact of such a lifetime income illustration on defined contribution participant behavior. In an attempt to provide some additional evidence with respect to potential defined contribution participant reaction to lifetime income illustrations similar to those proposed by EBSA, EBRI included a series of questions in the 2014 Retirement Confidence Survey that would provide monthly income illustrations similar in many respects to those provided by the EBSA’s online Lifetime Income Calculator.

Of course, any such projection is necessarily required to make a number of critical assumptions—including future contribution activity, future rates of return, future asset allocation, and future annuity purchase prices. Moreover, the estimates we provided were different in several aspects, notably:

• Rather than using normal retirement age for the calculation, we asked their expected retirement age.
• Since the age of the spouse was not known for married respondents, only the single life annuity income illustration was used.
• Given that the information was being provided to the respondent during a phone interview, only the projected monthly income (based on the projected account balance given the respondents’ reporting of their current balances) was provided.

What we found was that fewer than 1 in 10 (8 percent) of the defined contribution participants said the monthly amount was much less than expected, though another 1 in 5 (19 percent) said it was somewhat less than expected[ii].

However, more than half (58 percent) thought that the illustrated monthly income was in line with their expectations.

Considering those results, it is perhaps not surprising that the vast majority (81 percent) of the respondents indicated that they would continue to contribute what they do now after hearing the projected monthly income amount, while 17 percent replied that hearing this information would lead them to increase the amount they are contributing. Similarly, the vast majority (89 percent) did not believe this information would impact their expected retirement age.

They may not have been much surprised by the results, but the vast majority of respondents said the retirement income projection was useful; more than 1 in 3 (36 percent) respondents thought that it was very useful to hear an estimate of the monthly retirement income they might expect from their plan, and another 49 percent thought it was somewhat useful. Moreover, the utility of the projection appeared to transcend the results; 90 percent of those whose illustrated values were lower than expected found the estimates somewhat or very useful, and nearly as many (86 percent) of those whose values were equal to what they expected also found the estimates somewhat or very useful. Even among those who felt the values were higher than expected, 79 percent found the estimates somewhat or very useful.

I’ve heard from several in the industry since the results were released who were surprised – that the survey respondents weren’t surprised. It is, of course, possible (as the article explains) that these respondents’ current participation in employment-based plans has already provided them the education and information necessary for an appreciation both of the projected total and the monthly income estimate, and thus a greater alignment of those projections with their expectations. It could also be that, having given some thought to the subject of savings and retirement over the course of the interview, they had more realistic expectations.

Of course, whether those expectations about living on those amounts in retirement will turn out to be realistic remains to be seen.

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

[i] The EBRI March 2014 Notes article, “How Would Defined Contribution Participants React to Lifetime Income Illustrations? Evidence from the 2014 Retirement Confidence Survey,” is available online here.

[ii] There were some interesting differences by income level; combining the “much less” and “somewhat less” categories, we found that 42 percent of those in the lowest quartile for illustrated monthly income indicated that the value was less than expected, versus only 9 percent of the highest quartile.

Decision “Points”

I have watched with increasing interest the growing furor over the Department of Labor’s proposed new fiduciary definition. My first impressions of the proposal were positive: generally speaking, IMHO, the more people who work with ERISA plans that conduct themselves as ERISA fiduciaries, the better. The notion that broadening that standard would serve to “run off” those not as committed to this business bothered me not at all.

However, and as is often the case with new regulations, areas of concern began to pop up. Those involved with the valuation of privately held stock in Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) were initially most strident, though the work they do has a tremendous impact on thousands of employer and employee accounts. More recently, and of more interest to many advisers, the Department of Labor’s temerity in bringing IRA accounts under the ERISA fiduciary umbrella has drawn fire from “more than three thousand advisers,” according to the Financial Services Institute (FSI), which has led that charge. Indeed, having despaired of getting the ear of the Department of Labor, FSI says those letters have been directed to the White House itself. On Friday, The Wall Street Journal dedicated space on its editorial page to the issue (the author was opposed to the proposal).


Meanwhile, at a hearing at the House Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions last month, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle pressed Phyllis Borzi, Assistant Secretary of Labor and head of the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), to rethink the proposal, citing concerns that it cuts too broadly and that it could extract a financial toll as yet undetermined by the regulator (see Borzi Makes Case for Fiduciary Definition Change). And yet, by all accounts, at this point DoL remains unwilling to budge.

One ought not be too surprised, I suppose, at those lobbying so fiercely to preserve the status quo. For good or ill, this industry has grown up around the so-called five-part test for an ERISA fiduciary. Entire business practices and means of conducting business have been constructed with an eye toward avoiding becoming ensnared in ERISA’s web. Moreover, the compensation strictures imposed by ERISA would be problematic, at best, for many of those who currently serve the IRA market—even if a growing percentage of those assets have grown under ERISA’s auspices. Still, there’s an irony in the vehemence with which they protest the potential loss of valued counsel by investors—even as they refuse to embrace a standard that would require them to put the interests of those investors ahead of their own.

Proponents (and here I’m not just talking about the DoL) are nearly as unseemly in their rigid adherence to imposing change, ostensibly to protect investors who have had their retirement savings plundered by advisers operating outside ERISA’s strictures. For proof, they trot out, among other things, a dated study that claims to have discovered, based on a very limited sampling, that pension consultants might have a conflict of interest that could affect the advice they provide to plan sponsors. Or, one is tempted to add, they might not (see “IMHO: ‘Might’ Makes Right”). In Congressional testimony, Secretary Borzi cited research that purports to demonstrate a negative impact from potential conflicts of interest by the adviser, only to acknowledge “that none of this research evidence necessarily demonstrates abuse.”

Worse, while they acknowledge that the proposal in its current form might be poorly crafted to deal with certain specific issues, they seem to expect the industry to “trust” them to fix those problems after the regulation is issued via interpretative guidance, the issuance of prohibitive transaction exemptions, or the like.

Without doubt, ERISA’s fiduciary definition was crafted at a very different time, and the industry has undergone much change in the interim. One can understand the reluctance to embrace change that might transform a casual comment about a fund into a fiduciary obligation, and the hesitancy to extend ERISA’s reach to the individual IRA market. On the other hand, particularly when one considers how much of those funds originated under ERISA’s shield, the irony of withdrawing those protections at retirement—and at a point when those balances might be large enough to attract the attention of the unscrupulous—is, to my eyes anyway, striking.

The retirement industry (in large part) says it wants more time, thought, and analysis devoted to this proposal—and the Labor Department claims it continues to do just that.

It is hard to escape, however, a sense that the proposal’s opponents really just want it to go away—while for proponents, the decision has already been made.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

Underlying Assumptions

Last week the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued two reports focused on 401(k) plans: one on target-date funds, the other on potential conflicts of interest. As seems to be its custom in such reports, the GAO communicates its conclusion in the titles: “Key Information on Target Date Funds as Default Investments Should Be Provided to Plan Sponsors and Participants” and “Improved Regulation Could Better Protect Participants from Conflicts of Interest”—and, IMHO, there’s little controversy in those statements.

The reports themselves offer a great informational primer on target-date fund designs and issues (you’d be surprised how many plan sponsors still don’t quite grasp the concept of “glide path”) as well as the fee structures and revenue-sharing components that underlie the 401(k) retirement savings system. Both reports acknowledge that efforts are already under way to remedy the shortfalls the reports identified in both, while at the same time promoting solutions to those shortfalls that may not be cost/impact-justified.

As you peruse the target-date fund report (see “GAO Urges More Help with TDFs for Plan Sponsors”), you’re struck once again by the wide variety of answers to the question, “What is an appropriate asset allocation for participants at retirement age?” much less the assumptions that underpin it. One might well expect to find different assumptions regarding the markets, investment classes, and how the latter will respond to the former over the course of decades—and, in fact, these assumptions lie at the core of the target-date fund glide path and design. One might well expect (though many apparently didn’t) that those differences of opinion would translate into very real differences in asset allocation, even at retirement age.


There are, however, assumptions imbedded in these TDF approaches that, IMHO, are not nearly as well-communicated and/or understood by plan sponsors; assumptions that are predicated on certain participant behaviors that, in the words of the GAO report, “may not match what many participants actually do.” There is the assumption about what participants will do at the target date—either transfer those assets to another vehicle or retain their investment in the TDF.

This, of course, is the essence of the “to versus through” debate that has, since the 2008 financial crisis, drawn increasing scrutiny, if only because, IMHO, most plan sponsors (and plan participants) assumed that their target-date fund investment was designed to take them TO that date, not beyond it. Of course, that assumption bears within it another assumption: that the participant has managed to achieve a certain level of savings accumulation. Many haven’t, of course, and this knowledge underlies the assumption of those who employ the “through” approach to TDF designs, assuming that a longer equity exposure will serve to shore up that shortfall. Which, by the way, is another assumption imbedded in the “through” designs—that the participant will leave the money invested in that TDF (if not the plan itself) past their projected date of retirement.

Moreover, even the “to” TDF camp tends to assume that participants will buy an annuity at retirement, though they frequently don’t.

The GAO report noted that each of the eight TDF managers it contacted “considered contribution rates in establishing its asset allocation strategy,” noting that “some explicitly noted that these assumptions did not match the general pattern of contribution rates.” It will surprise few to learn that their assumptions were generally higher, but that they “hoped that rates will increase as workers adjust to DC plans serving as the sole employer-based retirement account,” according to the GAO report.

And, of course, since a growing number of participants were defaulted into TDFs to begin with, nobody has any real idea if they will behave the way participants have historically or not.

That said, the GAO has recommended that the Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) (1) amend the QDIA regulations such that fiduciaries are required to document whether factors beyond age or retirement date are relevant, (2) provide guidance to plan fiduciaries on the limitations of benchmarks on those funds, and (3) expand participant TDF disclosures to provide information regarding the assumptions concerning participant contribution and withdrawal intentions. EBSA was at least open to the first two (though not commenting directly, since they are currently in the process of recrafting those regulations), though it resisted the last as being a “very complicated and subjective undertaking which could affect a plan sponsor’s decision to offer any target date fund option(s),” according to EBSA’s response to the GAO report.

But, IMHO, if that gives a plan sponsor pause in offering a particular option—well, perhaps it should.


—Nevin E, Adams, JD

See also “IMHO: When You Assume…”

The GAO target-date fund report is at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11118.pdf

Paper “Trail”

Last week, the Department of Labor reissued its proposed regulation on participant fee disclosure.
Those familiar with the last proposal (put out by the prior Administration—see “EBSA Finishes Regulatory Package with Participant Disclosure Proposal”) will doubtless find this one to be a modest improvement (see “EBSA Releases Final 401(k) Fee Disclosure Rule”). Aside from the passage of time, this version incorporates additional input from the retirement plan community, financial services regulators, and even participant focus groups—most of it good, and all of it interesting.1

The rule itself is worth a read for, IMHO, it offers valuable insights not only into the suggestions made, but into the Labor Department’s reaction and response to those comments. As always, the devil lies in the final details, but one senses a strong interest in balancing the desire to give participants more information to make better decisions with the practical realities attendant in providing transparency and consistency of disclosure in an industry whose fee structure has become increasingly obtuse and intertwined.

That said, and while this is a marked improvement from the current state of affairs, IMHO, this regulation will still leave us a long way from producing what I think will actually show participants what they are paying for these retirement accounts.


Sure, they’ll get more frequent information on their investments, and sure, there will be more (and probably better) comparative information about those investments, both fees and performance. Yes, they will see fees expressed both as a percentage and as a dollar amount per $1,000 invested, and yes, they will get more information on account restrictions, annuity provisions, and revenue-sharing than many have probably ever received previously. And yet, for all this extra data that will be produced, provided, and distributed, I can’t quite shake the image of a participant’s eyes glazing over as they desperately try to make sense of what they have been given.

Of course, it’s possible that many won’t bother reading it at all, though a large part of the financial justification for these regulations is how much time the disclosures’ availability will spare participants searching for information about these investments. In fact, to my eye, perhaps one of the most significant revisions from the prior regulations was a reset in the estimation of just how many participants are expected to benefit from these reams of paper. The prior proposed regulation estimated that 29% of participants in these programs would realize some kind of time-savings, but the Labor Department, responding to a suggestion from a commentator, has upped that—to an eye-popping 70%-76%!2

Now, that determination isn’t, IMHO, essential to the importance of this effort. Personally, the 29% figure is much more in line with my experience, mostly because what I see, time and again, is that the more paper we sling at participants, the less attention they pay. And, make no mistake, with this new proposal, we will be slinging a lot more paper at participants, and more frequently. Despite the effort to alleviate the complexity of basis points and revenue-sharing, it’s hard to shake the sense that this well-intentioned effort will simply overwhelm participants, while at the same time placing a large and growing burden on the backs of those who must provide, administer, and explain it.

It’s clear to me that the information is needed, and as I read the proposal, it’s clear to me that the regulators have made a good-faith effort to strike a balance in providing it.

That said, I doubt very much that it will make much difference in participant behavior, nor am I optimistic that it will actually enlighten many, certainly not the three of four cited in the Labor Department’s projections. This is not a shortcoming of the DoL’s attempt here—frankly, in view of the tangled web that has become 401(k) retirement fee calculations, I think they are to be lauded for their vigorous and balanced efforts.

However, what participants really want and, IMHO, what they need to really understand what is going on here is to have that single figure on the statement—even if produced only once a year—that tells them what their retirement plan costs.

This new regulation may hasten that day’s arrival. But until it comes, I fear we may be doing little more than papering over the real problems.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

1 There is another interesting inclusion in this proposal—one that has to do with disclosures, but perhaps not participant fee disclosures, per se. With this proposal, which merges the 404(c) disclosure regulations with those of non-404(c) plans, the Labor Department added a provision to the 404(c) regulation, stating plainly what those of us in the industry have long understood; that, even where ERISA 404(c) protection applies, it does not shield fiduciaries from the duty to prudently select and monitor investments. However, this statement was only referenced in the preamble to those regulations rather than in the body—and thus, some courts had seen fit to disregard its implication in a series of revenue-sharing suit dismissals (see “IMHO: Second Opinions"). That, of course, is fodder for another day.

2 The recommendation was based on a finding from the Employee Benefit Research Institute’s (EBRI) 2007 Retirement Confidence Survey, which indicated that 73% (plus or minus 3%) of workers saving for retirement used written materials received at work as a source of information when making retirement savings and investment decisions.

The regulation is online HERE

A fact sheet summary is online HERE

A model of the information chart is online HERE

Not-So-Quiet Period

Remember when it used to be quiet in July?

Not so this past week, with the announcement of two major retirement industry acquisitions, a significant update on fee disclosure regulations, and a ruling in a revenue-sharing case that could have far-reaching implications.

On the two industry acquisitions, LPL’s absorption of National Retirement Partners (NRP) will surely be of most interest to the adviser community (see LPL Acquiring National Retirement Partners). LPL, which had only recently launched an IPO (and is thus literally in a “quiet period”), has struggled for some time with its retirement plan focus, while NRP has had its own share of issues in the wake of the recent financial crisis. LPL’s backing should certainly prove to be restorative for NRP’s positioning, and it’s hard to imagine that a newly constituted retirement-focused unit at LPL under Bill Chetney’s leadership won’t provide a clarity of focus for LPL’s efforts in this space.

Plan sponsors may feel a greater immediate impact from Aon’s acquisition of Hewitt (see Hewitt to Merge with Aon), the rationale is that the former’s middle-market product set (especially its insurance lines) will find room to grow in Hewitt’s predominantly large-client base, while Hewitt’s large-plan expertise will be able to find new applications in Aon’s target markets. Those notions inevitably look logical on paper; time will tell if the firms’ cultures and client approaches will assimilate. That said, the new partners are projecting a LOT of cost savings alongside a $5 billion merger—and in a people-intensive business.

As for the final release of the 408(b)(2) fee disclosure regulations, the wait appears to have been worth it (see DoL Issues New Fee Disclosure Rules). I am admittedly not yet all the way through a careful reading of the interim final package, but the removal of a written-contract requirement surely meets the common sense test, while retaining the impact of written disclosures. Similarly, the approach on disclosure—a reliance on full disclosure rather than the, to my eye, more limited conflict-of-interest focus of the prior regulations, should provide plan fiduciaries with more information, even if it does bring with it a potentially greater effort in sifting for those conflicts. Finally—and this is the provision almost certainly likely to draw the most industry focus—the DoL has opted to require that “certain providers of multiple services” disclose separately recordkeeping costs.

This was one of the more controversial provisions in the earlier proposals, and the Labor Department at that time tried to craft a “Solomonic” yet practical solution for those bundled providers who continue to claim that they are simply unable to break those costs out of their integrated delivery models, by basically requiring that unbundled providers disclose those costs, while those who couldn’t (or said they couldn’t) needn’t.

I am encouraged that this new proposal does not make that differentiation. In response to my question on the issue last week, Assistant Secretary of Labor Phyllis Borzi noted that they had heard from a number of sources during the course of the process and comment periods that many plan sponsors still are under the impression that recordkeeping is “free,” and they felt it was necessary to help disavow them of that notion. Back in the day when recordkeeping was routinely priced as a discrete service, it generally was found to constitute about 20% of the total costs for a DC plan; so, IMHO, it’s certainly large enough to warrant a separate disclosure. Ms. Borzi noted that those who may (still) find it difficult to comply with the measure have a year to do so. Personally, I would argue that they should have seen it coming before now.

As for that revenue-sharing case, well, we’ll take a look at it next week—unless, of course, we have another not-so-quiet week.

Compliance “Deportment”

Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that it was sending a questionnaire out to about a thousand 401(k) plan sponsors. The IRS said it developed the questionnaire because of the “critical role 401(k) plans play in our private retirement system” (see “IRS Provides 401(k) Questionnaire Details”).

Make no mistake: It’s going to take some effort to respond to the questionnaire—and respond you must. Described as a “compliance check,” the IRS notes that “failure to complete the Questionnaire will result in further enforcement action.” So, what does the IRS want to know?

Well, there’s a lot of information to be gathered about the plan from plan years going back to 2006: the number of employees, participants, their deferral levels, eligibility standards, service and age requirements, the existence and administration of loans and hardship withdrawals, the results of nondiscrimination tests, the determination of top-heavy status, the level(s) of match, and any changes to those levels.

The more interesting part of the questionnaire, IMHO, is the other questions the IRS asks; things like, Have recent financial conditions led to an uptick in hardships and loans? Does the plan allow for Roth contributions (and how many participants have opted for that feature)? Can participants use a debit card to take a loan? And, for plans that embraced automatic enrollment, did they do so retroactively or prospectively? And I’m curious not only about what plan sponsors have to say about the impact of factors like age, compensation, matching levels, and plan communications on participation levels—but what the IRS might do with that information.

There are, however, some areas that seem a bit like a baited trap: questions about if notices are provided timely, if excess deferral contributions were returned within the legal timeframes, even if the respondent as a SIMPLE plan exceeded the contribution limits.

And, make no mistake, this is a prelude to something deeper. In unveiling the project, the IRS noted that its Employee Plans Examinations previously conducted a baseline study of 79 market segments, and “the findings indicated that 401(k) plans are by far the most non-compliant plan type in the retirement plan universe,” going on to note that “since these plans make up over 60% of the retirement plan universe, it is important to the future of the private retirement system that these plans maintain the highest level of compliance possible.”

What will the IRS do with the information? It says that it will “ultimately result in a report published by the IRS describing the responses and identifying those areas where additional education, guidance, and outreach is needed”—and, perhaps somewhat more ominously, help the IRS focus its enforcement efforts “to address and/or avoid non-compliance related to these plans.”

All in all, I wish the IRS questionnaire wasn’t quite so long, complicated, and—for lack of a better word—intimidating. For plan sponsors, I’m sure it’s going to wind up being one more thing that has to be done when they already don’t have enough hours in the day—and one that could serve to plant a big red flag on their plan, to boot.

Here’s hoping that some good comes out of it—that the IRS does indeed discover some areas in which they can help plan sponsors do a better job of keeping these important programs in compliance—and that, perhaps, it will find that the programs are in better shape than they seem to think they are.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD

More information is at http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/0,,id=223440,00.html

A version of the online questionnaire is online HERE

"Access" Points

On Friday, the Department of Labor, as part of the White House’s Middle Class Task Force, formally unveiled a couple of initiatives.

The “new” one—and the one likely to capture the attention of the retirement plan community over the next several weeks—deals with investment advice for participants (see “DoL Proposes New Advice Rule”).

At a high level, the DoL has taken a major step back from the position it took in the final regulations on the subject put together—by the DoL—in 2008 before being halted, and then withdrawn last November by the new Administration (see “IMHO: Executive Order”). They also, IMHO, seem to have taken a step back from the admonitions of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) to draft regulations that would craft an exemption to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules that have long barred the ability to be compensated for advice on a basis that might vary according to the recommendations of the adviser1.

Withdrawal “Symptoms”

Now, many (including, apparently, some that signed that legislation) have always had an issue (to put it mildly) with this particular provision of the PPA, which they fear opens the door to “conflicted” advice (see “IMHO: Irreconcilable Differences”). Of course, proponents of the PPA’s interpretation have argued that part of the DoL’s charge was to build compliance and disclosure structures that would prevent that result. However, that apparently wasn’t possible—at least for the current DoL, which, after halting the publication of the rules and putting it back out for comment, decided last fall to withdraw its proposal “in response to concerns raised in public comment letters questioning the adequacy of the final class exemption's conditions to mitigate the potential for investment adviser self-dealing2.”

Let me be clear: I’m not faulting the DoL for essentially adopting the position that the solution that they had crafted under the leadership of one Administration was not workable under another. Greed is a corrupting force, and even the most able, honest, and forthright adviser could, on any given day, be tempted to offer advice that better fits his or her own needs than that of a participant (we also know that there are plenty of advisers out there who are neither able, honest, nor forthright). Let’s face it—the folks most in need of investment advice are most assuredly also the least likely to read (or to understand) the disclosures that are supposed to put them on notice that the advice they are about to receive could be tainted (note that, even with those opportunities muted by the new regulations, the proposed disclosure form runs FIVE pages). In large part, IMHO, requiring that compensation for investment advice be “level”—as the newly proposed regulations do—is no more than a return to the status quo.

That, of course, is also its limitation. After all, while the new regulations were touted as a means of “increasing access” to “high quality investment advice,” I think it’s fair to say that the practical result is an emphasis on “high quality” (read “not from a source whose compensation varies according to the advice provided”) rather than “access,” because I’m hard-pressed to see how the new regulations will do much to engender a real expansion of advice offerings3.

Shifting Gears

Mitigating the impact of this shift in position—and, make no mistake, it is a shift—is the reality that there are many more fee-based advisers serving this space today than there were even as recently as 2006. Perhaps some of these were motivated by the ability to offer participant advice, but I see little connection between that movement and these particular regulations. Another reality is that a growing number of participants are simply being defaulted into investment options without the “intervention” of the participant, much less an advised participant.

Additionally, the proposed regulations contain new restrictions on the design and deployment of the computer model (the selection must be made by a plan fiduciary unaffiliated with the adviser), and some intriguing questions about the applicability of specific investment theories4, as well as a determination that it is not only the adviser, but the adviser’s firm whose compensation impact must be considered. However well-intentioned, these new elements will almost certainly impede, rather than accelerate, the availability of these tools.

While the DoL made an effort to estimate the impact advice can have5, we have no such estimates on the impact of potentially conflicted counsel. Presumably, those conflicts could put participants in the clutches of a “Madoff wanna be,” but, frankly, I’m hard-pressed to understand the difference between the recommendations potentially incentivized by the personal interest of an adviser versus those of a plumber, real estate agent, used car salesman, or lawyer (though perhaps a rigid adherence to ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules provides the requisite justification).

No one—certainly not this writer—is in favor of promoting advice that isn’t good for participants. Ultimately, keeping the door closed on potentially conflicted advice may be the safest and most prudent course, though one might be inclined to think that the structures already in place (the selection of an adviser is a fiduciary duty, after all, and providing investment advice for a fee is a fiduciary act) would keep the worst at bay—and that new proposals could be crafted to weed out the rest. Or one might be inclined to insulate the participant from even potentially “good” advice, because that advice might also serve the adviser’s personal interest.

Regardless, the Labor Department has laid out a new course on how participant advice can be offered, and how advisers can be compensated for that service. They have asked for input on that new direction6—and I sincerely hope they get it.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD


1 “A final rule and related class exemption published in January 2009 were withdrawn in November 2010 in response to concerns raised in public comment letters questioning the adequacy of the final class exemption's conditions to mitigate the potential for investment adviser self-dealing.”

2 Not to be cynical about it, but those concerns were expressed by just 28 individuals/institutions (which the DoL has published at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/cmt-investmentadvicefinalrule.html). More accurately, there weren’t (even) 28 expressions of concern about the regulations themselves. Many, as you might suspect, were simply pointing out areas of needed clarification; several were just pointing out the need for final regulations, noting that the lack of certainty about the rules had created a legislative limbo in which nobody was doing anything, or at least anything different, regarding the provision of investment advice. That said, apparently somewhere in that relatively modest number of comments lay arguments compelling enough to persuade the Labor Department that there was no way to thread that particular needle.

3 The DoL would presumably take issue with my conclusion, since the regulations repeat the assumption associated with the prior—but very different—version that this approach would “extend investment advice to 21 million previously unadvised participants and beneficiaries.”

4 This may well be the “battleground” of commentators over the next several weeks. The DoL solicits comments “on the conditions applicable to investment advice arrangements that use computer models.” This is a far-ranging section of the proposed regulations, ranging everywhere from “what investment theories are generally accepted” and should this regulation not only specify them, but “require their application.” I suspect at some level that some may draw comfort from this apparent effort to bind in not only what process is appropriate for these models, but what inputs. One can’t help but wonder, however, if those findings might at some point be extrapolated (implicitly or explicitly) to other applications.

5 There are some interesting acknowledgements in the proposed regulation: that there is no requirement to “offer, provide, or otherwise make available any investment advice to a participant or beneficiary”; that in scoping the impact of the regulations, the DoL assumed that, on average, participants and beneficiaries who are advised make investment errors at one-half the rate of those who are not.

6 Written comments on the new investment advice proposal should be addressed to the Office of Regulations and Interpretation, Employee Benefits Security Administration, Room N-5665, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20210, Attn: 2010 Investment Advice Proposed Rule. The public also may submit comments electronically by e-mail: e-ORI@dol.gov or through the federal e-rulemaking portal at http://www.regulations.gov.

Under New Management

Sitting in the audience at the ASPPA/DoL Speaks conference last week, I was reminded just how disruptive it can be to have a new boss.

The conference, which, IMHO, remains unique in both the quantity and quality of access to Labor Department exports, featured many panelists it has been my pleasure to meet and get to know over the past several years. However we practitioners may struggle from time to time with the regulations and interpretations these folks put together, you don’t have to spend much time with any of them to appreciate just how smart, hard-working, and dedicated they are.

Still, I can only imagine what it must have been like to have pressed (as they were surely pressed) to wrap up as much of the pending backlog of regulations in 2008. How it must have felt to see that last package—including the final regulations on investment advice—get all the way to the regulatory finish line, only to have it halted dead in its tracks (see White House Executive Order Snares Fee Disclosure, Advice Regs). And then, over a period of weeks/months, have that work rejiggered, perhaps significantly, “simply” because an election, based on factors that had nothing to do with these issues, brought in new leadership (see EBSA Sets Out Carrot, Stick Agenda).

Starting Over?

Let’s face it, even in the private sector, managers and CEOs fall out of favor all the time and new ones are brought in, along with their new ideas (and sometimes their old friends). Advisers have seen plenty of that over these past 12 tumultuous months.

But for our industry, a few things seem obvious among those “new” priorities: a continued, and probably more insistent, emphasis on transparency in fees and revenue sharing; the rebuilding of walls between advice and compensation flows that could vary based on that counsel; and greater clarity in the targeting and positioning of target-date funds. But, frankly, while we may now achieve those aims in different ways, IMHO, it is at least arguable that we were already on those paths, or would have been shortly.

Looking Ahead

That said, there is a palpable sense that the new leadership will be less employer-friendly than its predecessors, though that need not mean unfriendly. They may be less willing to accept the rationalizations of those who protest that it is too hard, or too expensive, to provide meaningful information to plan fiduciaries; and, though it’s early yet, they seem more inclined to shield, rather than simply inform, participants. Time will tell.

Change, of course, is not only inevitable, it is frequently for the good. It is nearly always, however, “disruptive” as we shift and resift priorities and focus, certainly in the short-term. However, IMHO, if there’s a more disruptive force than change in our lives, it’s uncertainty.

And, for better or worse, I’m betting that this new Administration won’t leave us guessing for long.

—Nevin E. Adams, JD