20 Years Later, Did the PPA Really Change Everything?

Twenty years ago, I authored[i] a cover story about the then-newly enacted Pension Protection Act of 2006 with an ambitious headline: “The Pension Protection Act: This Changes Everything.” 

Twenty years later, it seems like a reasonable time to ask:

Did It?

The short answer, I think, is yes — though probably not quite in the ways we expected in 2006.

The PPA was a sweeping piece of bipartisan legislation, addressing among other things defined benefit funding, pension accounting, and cash balance plans — it was titled the PENSION Protection Act, after all.  And it was, for the benefits promised by those plans, an important defensive measure.[ii]  

However, to my eyes then — and now — the most lasting influence of the PPA was on the defined contribution side, where it helped change not just plan design, but the industry's thinking about participant behavior.

To Appreciate 2006, Go Back to 1986

Twenty years earlier, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had significantly tightened contribution and nondiscrimination rules for defined contribution plans — some may remember things like a $7,000 cap on pre-tax savings, among other limits designed to “pay for” tax reductions elsewhere. Some will surely also remember that the 401(k) of the 1980s and 1990s was largely a participant-directed proposition. Employees were expected to enroll themselves (on paper), decide how much to contribute, pick investments, and — in theory, anyway — periodically revisit those decisions.

ad space

The industry's response was largely to give participants more information and more choices. Unfortunately, participants didn't always make good choices — or make any choices at all. 

By 2006, the industry was increasingly recognizing that asking people to take responsibility for their retirement savings decisions didn't necessarily mean they would do so effectively. Procrastination, inertia, inadequate savings rates, overly conservative investments, and poorly diversified portfolios were not simply educational problems. They were behavioral ones.

The PPA Changed the Question

Of course, the PPA didn't invent automatic enrollment, target-date funds, or professional investment management. What it did[iii] was provide a framework that made it much easier — and arguably “safer” — for employers and fiduciaries to embrace them.

Let me start by reminding us of an unappreciated aspect of the PPA. It made permanent significant retirement enhancements we now take for granted. In 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) had restored some of what the 1986 act took away — but it not only raised contribution and compensation limits, it created age-50 catch-up contributions, expanded portability, created the Saver's Credit, and authorized Roth contributions in 401(k) and 403(b) plans. But those provisions were scheduled to “sunset” after 2010. The PPA made those retirement provisions permanent.

But it didn’t stop there. Automatic enrollment received important protections in the PPA — and more importantly, a safe harbor design template. Automatic escalation became a practical plan design feature. And Qualified Default Investment Alternatives (QDIAs) gave fiduciaries a framework for defaulting participants into diversified investment strategies, rather than the stable value or money market “vaults” that had long been chosen to preserve, rather than grow accounts.

The bigger change was philosophical. The PPA gave us a plan design template architected to leverage participant behavior towards better outcomes. Not so much an “if you build it, they will come” presumption, as a “let us do it for you” acknowledgement.

And the Numbers Moved

Twenty years later, the evidence of that shift is hard to miss.

ad space

Automatic enrollment is now commonplace — and nearly ubiquitous among large employer plans, while participation rates have reached historically high levels. Automatic escalation has helped push those default savings rates higher, with industry data now regularly showing average participant savings rates around 12% when employee and employer contributions are combined.

Target-date funds provide perhaps the clearest illustration of the change. In 2006, they were still a developing concept. Today, they are a central part of the defined contribution investment landscape and the default investment for millions of participants. Participants, it’s worth noting, who would otherwise have been left to their own devises in choosing — and maintaining — those portfolios. 

The Advisor's Job Changed, Too

“Ironically, at the same time,” I wrote then, “the PPA dramatically opens the door for a new generation of financial advisers to help participants make the very same decisions that the auto-solutions would seem to render obsolete.”

That’s right — this was an evolution that changed the role of the retirement plan advisor. In the wake of the PPA, while investment selection remained important, advisors (and TPAs) today increasingly work with sponsors on plan design, automatic features (and levels), QDIA selection, participant engagement, retirement readiness, fiduciary governance, fee benchmarking, financial wellness, managed accounts, and retirement income. 

Now, the PPA didn't do all of that by itself. Technology, markets, demographics, regulation, litigation and subsequent legislation — including the SECURE Acts — have all contributed.

But to my eyes, the PPA was an important inflection point. It was, in many ways, a reset in the perspective of what retirement plans could — and perhaps should — be.

ad space

So, Did It Change Everything? 

Not quite.

It didn't solve all of America's retirement savings issues. Coverage gaps remain. Too many participants still save too little. Turning retirement savings into reliable retirement income remains a challenge. 

But 20 years ago, the conversation was more likely to focus on whether a plan offered a broad investment menu and provided participants with enough information to make good decisions — assuming they would — and could. 

Today, we ask not only whether workers are participating, but at what level, whether the default investment is appropriate, whether the plan's design encourages better behavior, and increasingly, whether accumulated savings will actually translate into sustainable retirement income.

That's a very different conversation.

Looking Back—and Ahead

Ok, so the PPA didn't change everything. But it helped change something fundamental: the assumption that retirement security should depend primarily on participants making a long series of good decisions…on their own.

In that sense, the PPA didn't merely change retirement plans in 2006. It established a direction — and provided a foundation — that plan design has followed for the last 20 years — and that SECURE 2.0 is still following today.

ad space

Turns out, it really DID change everything.

Happy birthday, PPA!

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

---

[i] My name was on the PLANSPONSOR story, though there were several other key contributors — and one important editor, who, though not named in the piece, contributed much of the vision (none other than Charlie Ruffel).

[ii] That said, at the time I also wrote “What the PPA effectively does is hammer the nail into the defined benefit coffin by revoking the financial wiggle room that encouraged corporations to accept the pension bargain in the first place.” 

[iii] It’s worth noting that a significant part of the PPA was removing the sunset provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, which maintained higher deferral limits, retained the catch-up contribution provisions for older workers, and kept in place the Saver’s Credit and Roth 401(k).

‘Mad Money’s’ Mixed Bag

  Last week a reader brought to my attention an episode of Jim Cramer’s “Mad Money” — an episode wherein he referred to the 401(k) as a “mixed” bag. 

In it, he acknowledged the benefits of tax deferral, the benefit of compounding on returns, and — where it’s found, anyway — the “free” money of an employer match. In that, he was at least more honest about such things than many[i] who make their living offering investment advice (generally accompanied by a subscription fee to their services — which, to be fair, Mr. Cramer has and mentions in this show). 

In point of fact, Mr. Cramer would clearly prefer an IRA option — if the contribution limits were equal to the 401(k) — though they’re not even close (not to worry — he says he’s going to continue to fight to remedy that situation). Indeed, Mr. Cramer counsels that once you’ve gotten the full match in your 401(k), you should just put everything else into an IRA (though he doesn’t get into the “nuances” of contributing to both in the same year). 

But Mr. Cramer is also concerned about the “hidden” fees in a 401(k) — so much so that he counsels folks to “always” roll out of that 401(k) when they change employers. And little wonder — since he appears to think that your typical 401(k) is charging administrative fees in excess of 200 basis points — more than 2%, in other words. I’ve no doubt those can be found but would caution Mr. Cramer that those are not the “norm.”

That said, he told viewers they should be “skeptical” of a 401(k) plan that doesn’t let you buy individual stocks via a self-directed IRA — one that he maintains gives you “control” of your money. As he’s a stock picker (of sorts), it’s not surprising that he has an affinity for individual stocks[ii] rather than mutual funds (though he admitted that those who don’t have the time for the former might be well-served by investing in a low-cost index fund).

Indeed, as do most folks touting mass media investment advice, Mr. Cramer prefers the ability to go beyond the investment menu “constraints” of a 401(k) menu — and surely for individuals like him who have the time and expertise (or think they do) to make and track individual investments, that resonates.

Programs like “Mad Money” are ostensibly positioned for more experienced/engaged investors — though that did NOT seem to be composition of the callers to this particular episode. Just as well, because he wasn’t providing much more than high-level generic wisdom on basic tax deferral, compounding benefits,[iii] and a heavy dose of equities in your portfolio until you get to your 50s. 

The reality for most individuals, of course, is that without a workplace retirement plan, they don’t save for retirement, much less invest. The match may be “free” money for the individual, but it surely has a cost — one borne by their employer in support of their eventual retirement. The mutual funds Cramer rejects are — increasingly — a portfolio not only selected, but managed by professionals, either in a target-date fund or managed account. For most, it’s not “mad” money, after all — it’s about thoughtfully building a secure, reliable financial foundation.   

Those with “mad” money to spare might not need that kind of help — but plenty of “regular” people do.

• Nevin E. Adams, JD

 

---

[i] See Is the 401(k) Really a 'Horrible' Retirement Plan?, When You Assume, The 'Plot' Thickens

[ii] He did make an interesting argument for investing in stocks as a way to curb spending. Specifically, he noted that you’d have to sell your favorite stock in order to raise the cash to spend — and that you wouldn’t want to sell that favorite stock — so you wouldn’t spend the money.

[iii] One assumes that he’s more specific in his “investment club,” which came up several times during this program.

Do Roth and 401(k) Pre-Tax Holders Really Spend Differently?

An interesting—and somewhat counterintuitive—report came out last week, one that cast doubt on the “common wisdom” regarding Roth versus traditional pre-tax savings.

The assumption underlying the research[i] was that those who had not yet paid taxes on their savings (the traditional pre-tax savings) would be hesitant to tap into those savings and trigger taxes, certainly more so that individuals that had already paid those taxes. Instead, the research suggested that the opposite occurred; that individuals who had saved on a pre-tax basis actually withdrew more/sooner—but with a twist. 

This they hailed as good news. They noted that the research suggests investing in a CT (current-taxed, or Roth) plan could help ease concerns about outliving funds—because they spend at a lower rate (though they saw this as a negative for those who saved on a deferred tax (DT) basis).  They even managed to find a silver lining in the “cloud” of faster spending by the pre-tax crowd because those individuals appeared to be trying to adjust for the effect of taxes (with the caveat “despite our findings that they do not appear to adjust sufficiently, if at all”). And they saw as a positive this report’s contribution to the “accounting literature exploring the effectiveness and consequences of incentivizing behaviors through tax policy, by highlighting how past decisions motivated by taxes (e.g., retirement plan type) may continue to affect one’s quality of life long into the future.”

A few words of caution would seem to be in order, however. This wasn’t based on the patterns of actual people spending their actual money in the real world. Rather, and to their credit, they constructed a laboratory environment of sorts; they selected a group of volunteers, gave them certain criteria—basically a role they would “play” in the experiment—and set out a spending scenario. They then had them read about various spending choices—and, well—recorded how the individuals chose.

As for their conclusions, when you probe into the results more carefully, what you see is that even though those who had pre-tax accounts ostensibly feel the “pain” of taxes due on their retirement withdrawals—and that appeared to restrict their spending—it seemed to be offset by another reality. That, for reasons not understood/explained, those same individuals appeared to relish the expected benefits of consumption more than Roth holders. Said another way, their “reservations”— the cognizance of taxes—didn’t seem to constrain their spending because they were (more) enamored of the benefits of spending. Indeed, the researchers commented that those with “equivalent nominal balances” actually spent at the same rate.

I’ll just comment that it’s an interesting premise—and that the test environment created struck me as detailed and complex to map out, establish and execute. That said, I would be hesitant to draw any substantive conclusions on actual human behavior from this analysis. To me, all it seemed to “prove” is that people selected for an experiment tend to spend to the perceived “limits” of their hypothetical account, regardless of taxation. It didn’t strike me that Roth holders spent less (as many headlines covering the report suggested), but rather that pre-tax holders spent the same, even though they were going to have to deal with a tax bill at some point (hypothetically, of course).

And that, to me, isn’t a positive thing for Roths so much as it is a cautionary note for pre-tax savers—who may have forgotten that tax deferral is just that.

 - Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i] How Does Tax Timing Affect Spending in Retirement?  

Withdrawal Symptoms?

 There’s nothing like a global pandemic to fuel interest in, if not the need for, emergency savings. Indeed, there are a half dozen provisions[i] in the new SECURE 2.0 designed to make it easier for workers to tap into their retirement savings—two aimed specifically at emergency savings.

Though the financial impact of the pandemic (not to mention a series of natural disasters) has arguably been uneven, a report from Vanguard[ii] highlighted the longer-term impacts of the economic slowdown and inflation’s growing bite of the household budget. It's also widely acknowledged that concerns about the inability to fund an unexpected financial emergency is a source of stress for workers, undermining financial wellness.   

All that said, well before COVID-19, there have been concerns about Americans’ lack of emergency savings[iii] and, perhaps more broadly, that they were using their retirement savings accounts as that resource. Behavioral finance-types have counseled that a mental, if not physical, segregation of money by purpose is helpful, and at least one of the new SECURE 2.0 provisions seems designed to make that structure a reality by creating an emergency savings “sidecar” alongside regular retirement savings accounts. 

The first of these is found in Section 115 and, beginning in 2024 it says a participant may generally make a withdrawal of up to $1,000 per year from their retirement account for certain emergencies. The withdrawal may be taxable (unless drawn from Roth) and MAY be repaid within three years, but it will not be subject to the 10% penalty for early withdrawals. Only one withdrawal is permitted per the three-year repayment period—if the first withdrawal has not been repaid.

The other emergency savings provision (Section 127)—and the one that seems to be garnering most of the media attention is the (confusingly labeled) “Pension Linked Emergency Savings Accounts.” Beginning in 2024, it will ALLOW (not require) employers to create an Emergency Savings Account (ESA) as part of a defined contribution plan (401(k) or 403(b)). Only non-highly compensated employees may contribute to the account, though employers MAY auto-enroll such individuals in an EAS up to 3% of their compensation, and the EAS value cannot exceed $2,500[iv] (indexed for inflation). All employee contributions to this emergency savings account MUST be made on an after-tax basis—and each month participants may take withdrawals from the account (just to further complicate administration, the first four withdrawals for a year cannot be subject to distribution fees). 

Oh—and speaking of complications, those employee contributions must be treated as elective deferrals for purposes of any matching contributions. The matching contributions are treated by a plan no differently than matching contributions made on account of elective deferrals.   

Now this provision likely makes the behavioral science-types happy—it provides a separate mental (and notational) accounting—and one that doesn’t force the individual to choose between saving for retirement or saving for that “rainy day” emergency, at least in terms of foregoing a company match. 

But, aside from the obvious administrative complexities of this option (certainly for the plan sponsor/recordkeeper), it’s by no means clear that this kind of set up won’t create a kind of “Christmas club” account, with individuals withdrawing these contributions for just about any reason every year (just) long enough to get the match—and then the next year they could do it all over again. And again. The Treasury is authorized to issue regulations to prevent abuse, but there’s no telling if or when (or  what) those rules would be.  

It might be good mental “accounting”—but I’m not sure that it will be good for retirement. 

- Nevin E. Adams, JD 

---

[i] While I’m focusing on only two of those provisions here, the others are Section 314 (allows for up to $10,000 of withdrawals from plans and IRAs in cases of domestic abuse, effective 2024), Section 326 (exempts from the 10% excise tax withdrawals from plans and IRAs in cases of terminal illness, effective now), Section 331 (allows for withdrawals from plans and IRAs of up to $22,000 in federally declared disasters, effective retroactively to Jan. 26, 2021), and Section 334 (allows for up to $2,500 a year of withdrawals from workplace plans to pay for long-term care, effective three years after enactment (so generally not until 2026)).

[ii] In fact, that report, published last October, and amidst growing concerns about the above factors and volatile investment markets, noted that the share of workers taking cash from their employer retirement plans through new loans, non-hardship withdrawals, and hardship withdrawals were on the rise in 2022.  Called out for special note was the rise in hardship withdrawals, which Vanguard said had reached an all-time high—though that was only 0.5% of workers tracked by Vanguard (5 million participants in 1,700 employer-sponsored retirement plans administered by the firm).

[iii] The most widely repeated likely being the Federal Reserve survey asking Americans if/how they’d handle a $400 emergency (approximately 1 in 9 said they couldn’t, and while that’s a minority, the headlines have tended to highlight the impact)—but see https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2021/what-a-400-dollar-emergency-expense-tells-us-about-the-economy.

[iv] Though there’s been some question as to whether $2,500 is “enough” (there’s language in the bill calling for a study to see if it needs to be higher).

‘Might’ Makes… Wrong?

 Sometimes the motivations of those attacking the 401(k) are pretty obvious.

The most recent was an article by a Maurie Backman at the Motley Fool titled, “Why a 401(k) isn’t the wonderful savings tool you think it is.” I tried to ignore it when it first (to my eyes) appeared on Forbes (which seems to have a pretty low threshold for contributions these days), and I was no more inclined to read it when it showed up a couple of days later on Fox News. But then folks started sharing it on both LinkedIn and Twitter—some ostensibly to hold it up for ridicule,[i] others as an affirmation—and, with some reluctance, I finally clicked on the article. 

Oddly, considering the title (and, in fairness, editors have been known to tweak headlines such that they bear little resemblance to the article they are attached to), the article spent almost as much space outlining the virtues of the 401(k)—specifically that they are “easier to sign up for” than an IRA, and that they have (much) higher annual contribution limits, even for catch-up contributions.

So, what’s their beef(s)? Backman makes three points:

1. That investment choices in a 401(k) can be limited (specifically that you generally can’t buy individual stocks).
2. That fees in a 401(k) can be high (the issue here seems to be the inclusion of actively managed funds alongside index offerings—and an assertion that “401(k)s plan come with administrative fees that generally are not negotiable. The administrative fees you'll pay with an IRA are typically much lower”—an assertion that doesn’t align with my experience, but is offered without data).
3. That a Roth option isn’t guaranteed (this factual assertion despite the fact that the most recent data from the Plan Sponsor Council of America that more than two-thirds of 401(k)s do currently provide the option).

To sum up: According to the article that claims the 401(k) isn’t a wonderful savings tool, the suboptimal aspects of a 401(k) are: (1) the options might not include individual stocks; (2) the fees can be high; and (3) you aren’t guaranteed to have the ability to save for retirement on a Roth basis—even though, by the author’s own admission, 401(k)s have much higher contribution limits and are easier to access, and thus are much more likely to be used (recall that data indicates individuals are 12-15 times more likely to save in a 401(k) than in an IRA on their own). Oh—and there’s only a passing reference to the employer match, which arguably also isn’t “guaranteed,” but is certainly more likely to be found in a 401(k) than in a stand-alone IRA.  

Perhaps it should come as no surprise that an article penned by the Motley Fool—a platform that purports to help individuals make stock picks—thinks that you’d be better off utilizing a retirement savings plan[ii] that would more readily accommodate their services. 

Yes, sometimes the motivations of those attacking the 401(k) are pretty obvious. The motivations of those choosing to publish such silliness? Not so much.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i] Memo to those who did—clicking on the article is the whole point; sharing it only exacerbates the problem.  

[ii] To add to the irony, the article sums up its advice thusly: “What you should do in that case is contribute just enough money to your 401(k) to snag your full employer match, if one is offered, but then put the rest of your savings into an IRA. Doing so could help you invest more appropriately, avoid high fees, and enjoy the perks of a Roth saving option.” 

'Tacts' Treatment?

Roth 401(k)s are more prevalent—and popular—than ever. But is that good—or bad—for retirement?

A recent op-ed[i] in The Wall Street Journal explored the potential implications—“What ‘Rothifying’ 401(k)s Would Mean for Retirees”— (subscription required), though the focus is on tax policy as well.

You’ll remember that so-called “Rothification”—essentially the elimination of the pre-tax treatment currently accorded 401(k) contributions—was quite the controversial issue back in 2017 when the Republican-controlled House of Representatives was looking for ways to raise revenue to help pay for tax cuts.[ii] And while it’s not been an active focus of late, it seems likely to resurface as the nation’s budget deficit widens, and the field of 2020 presidential aspirants seem determined to find ways to spend more or, in the case of the incumbent, collect less in taxes.

‘Out’ Comes 

As for the WSJ treatment, I’ll spare you the short read (longer if you actually check out the 36-page paper it was based upon), and summarize it thusly: later retirements (not by choice, but of necessity), less retirement income, and more wealth inequality. Though, at least in the short run, more tax revenue for Uncle Sam.[iii]

Now most of this comes from a key assumption; as the WSJ piece puts it, “Over their lifetimes, workers would accumulate one-third less in their 401(k)s under a Roth system. This is because, with no tax advantage from contributing to a 401(k), workers would save less and those lower contributions would earn less over the years.”

Said another way, without the tax break, the authors conclude that workers won’t save as much, and saving less means that they’ll have less invested, and that  means that they’ll have less retirement income. They also argue that, with Rothified savings, workers would tap into Social Security later—a year later, on average, they claim. They note that with their retirement savings already taxed, wealthier individuals would be inclined to defer taking Social Security (increasing their benefit), widening income inequality.[iv]

‘Less’ on Plan?

The concern about mandatory Rothification was always that workers would, in fact, save less—and this is a concern that employers have expressed, though this was in the context of the ability to save on a pre-tax basis being taken away. That, in turn, seems to be predicated on the notion that workers have a specific dollar amount in mind that they can afford to save, and that if some of that certain dollar amount goes to taxes, there is a dollar-for-dollar offset. Doubtless that’s true for some, particularly among lower-income workers. However, when I have seen savings data, what seems to be the norm is that individuals save a specific percentage of pay, one generally driven either by what’s necessary to earn the employer match, or perhaps that rate at which default contributions are set. In other words, people choose to save 3% of pay, not $50/paycheck.

Now, if that  perception is accurate (feel free to disagree in the comments below if you see things differently), then it seems to me that most individuals might actually save the same amount, regardless of whether it’s pre- or post-tax. And if they were to same at the same rate (and admittedly that’s a big “if”), their retirement outcome might actually be more  secure—because withdrawals (and taxation) wouldn’t be forced on them by RMD calculations, because they wouldn’t have to worry about those contributions—and the earnings that have accumulated on those contributions—being taxed, and, significantly, because the reduction in taxable income wouldn’t undermine (through “means testing”) Social Security benefits.

But key to the analysis is how participants would respond, and the study cited in the WSJ isn’t the only academic consideration on the subject; one in 2015 found no change in savings rates with a voluntary addition of a Roth feature, and in 2017, the non-partisan Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI) found that it might help—or hurt—retirement security—and this is key—depending on the response of participants.

It appears that more participants are being presented with that option. Nearly 70% of plans now provide a Roth 401(k) option, according to the most recent survey by the Plan Sponsor Council of America. Perhaps more significantly, that survey, reporting 2018 plan activity, finds that nearly a quarter of participants (23%) elected to contribute to a Roth when given the opportunity, up from 19.5% in 2017 and 18.1% in 2016—an increase of nearly 30% in just three years.

Academic studies notwithstanding, it’s worth remembering that retirement security isn’t just a matter of how much you have saved at  retirement; it’s how much you have available to spend throughout retirement.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

---

[i]The authors of the WSJ article, Olivia S. Mitchell and Raimond Maurer, previously authored a research paper upon which the WSJ piece was based (albeit with a slightly different title, “How Would 401(k) ‘Rothification’ Alter Saving, Retirement Security, and Inequality?”). 

[ii]They weren’t, however, the first to propose such a shift. President Obama did so in 2015.

[iii]However, the authors state that the taxes collected on withdrawals of that money exceed the amount of additional income taxes that would be collected during people’s working lives under Rothification.

[iv]As a side note, the authors in the WSJ article note that not only would this be bad for Social Security funding, but they also conclude that the taxes collected on withdrawals would exceed the amount of additional income taxes that would be collected during people’s working lives under Rothification—ostensibly because of their previous assumption that it would be a larger accumulation of money to be taxed. 

5 Key Industry Trends You May Have Missed

The Plan Sponsor Council of America recently released its 60th Annual Survey of Profit-Sharing and 401(k) Plans, documenting increases in participation, deferral rates, target-date funds, automatic enrollment and advisor hiring, among other key trends.

Here are five key trends highlighted in the survey that you may have missed.

Automatic enrollment is still (mostly) a large plan thing.

One of the most celebrated plan design features of the 401(k) era is automatic enrollment. Nearly as old as the 401(k) itself, once upon a time (when it wasn’t as popular) it was called a “negative election.” Regardless of the name, the concept has been extraordinarily effective at not only getting, but keeping, workers saving via their workplace retirement plans. However, adoption of the design, after a surge in the wake of the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, now seems to have plateaued.

A decade ago, only about a third (35.6%) of respondents to the PSCA survey offered automatic enrollment. Now more than half (60%) do – and that increases to 70% among plans with more than 5,000 participants. However, only a third of plans with fewer than 50 workers do.

For some potential explanations – see Why Doesn’t Every Plan Have Automatic Enrollment?

Auto-escalation is escalating.

An incredible three-quarters of plans with automatic enrollment auto-escalate the deferral rate over time, compared with less than half (49.7%) a decade ago, according to the PSCA survey.

However, only one-third do so for all participants.

As for the rest, one in eight do so for under-contributing participants, and a third do so only if the participant elects to do so.

Plans are curing a fault with the default.

While you see surveys suggesting that a greater variety of default contribution rates is emerging, the most common rate today – as it was prior to the PPA – is 3%. There is some interesting history on how that 3% rate originally came to be, but the reality today is that it has been chosen because it is seen as a rate that is small enough that participants won’t be willing to go in and opt out – and, after the PPA, we have some law to sanction that as a target.

Sure enough, the PSCA survey found that the most common default deferral rate remains 3% (36.4%). However, more than half of plans now have a default deferral rate higher than 3%. Indeed, the second most common default (22.2%) is now 6%.

Roths remain on the rise.

Nearly two-thirds of plan sponsors now provide a Roth 401(k) option. In fact, in just a decade, the percentage of plans offering such an option has more than doubled; from about 30% in 2007 to 63.1% now.

Pre-tax treatment has, of course, been the norm in 401(k) plans since their introduction in the early 1980s. On the other hand, the Roth 401(k) wasn’t introduced until the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, and even in that legislation wasn’t slated to become effective until 2006 (and at that time was still slated to sunset in 2010). Significantly, participant take-up, which just a few years ago hovered in the single digits, is now in the 15-20% range (18.1% according to the PSCA survey, somewhat higher among smaller plans).

While industry surveys during the tax reform debate (including a flash poll from PSCA) indicated a fair degree of employer concern about the potential impact of so-called “Rothification” on participation, that doesn't seem to be slowing the opportunity for individuals to take advantage of tax diversification.

It’s (still) what goes in, not what comes out that ‘matters.’

It’s said that what’s measured matters – and yet, despite all the buzz around financial wellness, and a growing emphasis on outcomes, the latter still has a way to go in terms of being an established plan success benchmark.

Consider that in this year’s PSCA survey, a whopping 89.6% of plans cite participation rate as a benchmark to determine plan success – and even more (93.2%) of the largest plans rely on that gauge. Deferral rates were a distant second (72.6%), and average account balances ranked third (55%).

What about outcomes? Only a quarter of plans used that as a benchmark, though a third of the largest plans (33.8%) did.
Industry surveys, particularly those with a broad range of plan types and providers, and with the perspective of decades such as the PSCA survey provide an invaluable sense not only of where we are, but where we have been.

However, their real value lies in helping us see where we need to be.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

More information about the Plan Sponsor Council of America’s 60th Annual Survey of Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plans is available at www.psca.org.

NOTE: There will be a special workshop exploring the survey results and the implications for advisors at the NAPA 401(k) SUMMIT, April 15-17, 2018 in Nashville, Tennessee. If you haven’t registered, there’s still time (but the hotel blocks are filling) at http://napasummit.org.

Tax Reform – ‘Tricks’ or Treat?

A few weeks back, my wife and I went to see the updated version of It. Now, I’ve been a fan of King’s work ever since a friend shared a copy of Salem’s Lot with me, though his work doesn’t always translate as well to the big screen. “It” is a malevolent entity that emerges about once every 27 years to feed, during which period it takes on various shapes designed to lure its prey – generally children, and then it returns to a hibernation of sorts. “It”’s most notorious incarnation is, of course, Pennywise the Dancing Clown (the lovely visage below).

Ironically, tax reform too seems to be a once-in-a-generational thing. It’s been 30 years since the Tax Reform of 1986 cut tax rates1 – and cut into retirement plan saving and formation with the creation of the 402(g) limit (and its tepid COLA pace), not to mention the cost and timing issues associated with multiple iterations of the nondiscrimination testing that often produced problematic refunds for the highly compensated group. There’s little question that those changes (and others) did what they were designed to do – generate additional tax revenue by limiting the deferral of taxes. But what did those constraints do for retirement security?

Much of that damage wasn’t repaired until – well, 2001 with the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) – which, somewhat ironically, introduced the concept of the Roth 401(k).

Rothification Response

While tax reform has wrought its damage on retirement savings before, this time around a new way to raise revenue has emerged – “Rothification,” loosely defined as the limiting or elimination of the current pre-tax contribution limits.

We don’t really know what workers would do confronted with that kind of change (the surveys that are available – though not completely on point suggest that the response might be modest) – though we do know that if current participants continued to save at the same rate, retirement readiness would likely improve. There are also signs that it would be seen as a big enough change that some, perhaps many, plan sponsors would want to rethink, if not reconsider, their current automatic enrollment assumptions.

We may not know with certainty those outcomes, but there are lots of reasons to be nervous, if not downright fearful of change to retirement plans, particularly one that seems likely to give plan sponsors – and plan participants – a reason to rethink their current savings rates. Granted, surveys show that most plans already offer a Roth option, and more recent surveys indicate that most plan sponsors would continue to offer a plan even if the current pre-tax option for 401(k)s was reduced and/or eliminated (and how sad would it be if a plan sponsor decided to walk away from offering a plan just because the pre-tax savings option was clipped).

We also know that more than half of current 401(k) contributors would be affected by a $2,400 pre-tax contribution limit, based on data from the non-partisan Employee Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), using their Retirement Security Projection Model® (based on information from millions of administrative records from 401(k) recordkeepers), and that the impact reaches down to some very moderate income levels.

That said, we don’t yet know – and this is significant – if the tax reform proposals that emerge this month will include some version of Rothification, nor at what level the Rothification restriction might be imposed (as it turns out, Rothification was NOT included in this first round!).

‘Pass’ Tense?

Consider the recent “unintended” consequence of a proposed tax break for pass-through entities (i.e., partnerships, S corps, and small business limited liability corporations). More than 320,000 of these entities sponsor a retirement plan (with the average size being 75 employees) – unfortunately, many of these businesses may reconsider adopting or maintaining a qualified retirement plan because of significant financial disincentives woven into the fabric of the tax reform proposal, which would establish a 25% maximum pass-through rate on that business income, versus the 35% top rate on ordinary income (as well as the favorable tax rate on capital gains income at 20%) that would be assessed when the money is withdrawn at retirement. In other words, the small business owner’s plan contributions and accumulated earnings will be taxed at 35% instead of the 25% pass-through rate and the 20% capital gains rate on accumulated earnings.

There are some things about tax reform proposals that we do know. One, that lawmakers – and sometimes regulators – often seem to operate on the assumption that employers will, and indeed must, offer a workplace retirement plan no matter what changes or cost burdens are imposed on plan administration. With an eye toward narrowing the benefit gap between higher-paid and non-highly compensated workers, limits are imposed that often outweigh the modest financial incentives offered to businesses, particularly small businesses, to sponsor these programs. This, despite the striking coverage gap among those who work for these small businesses, and the potentially burdensome administrative requirements and additional costs that the owner must absorb, alongside a pervasive sense that their workers aren’t really interested in the benefit (or, perhaps more accurately, would prefer cold, hard cash).

The debates about modifying retirement plan tax preferences – or the notion that these preferences are “upside down,” and thus may be dispensed with – are bandied about as though those changes would have no impact at all on the calculus of those making the decisions to offer and support these programs with matching contributions. In other words, while some attempt is made to quantify the response of workers to changes in their incentives, most studies simply assume that employers will “suck it up.”

Well, this week the GOP is slated to unveil its proposal for tax reform in the House of Representatives, and shortly thereafter we should see a separate GOP proposal emerge in the Senate. Those will have to be reconciled, and these days that’s no slam dunk.

It remains to be see what tax reform – with all its laudable objectives – might mean for retirement plans this time around. But here’s hoping that, if tax reform turns out to be “Pennywise,” it won’t be “pound” foolish.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

Footnote

1. And the time before that was 1954… with the creation of the Internal Revenue Code.