ERISA Litigation: How Low Will 'They" Go?

The ERISA litigation field in recent years has seen copycat filings, plagiarism in pleadings, factual flaws, and misleading assertions—but to my eyes, we’ve just hit a new low.

I’m speaking of what appears to be a new strategy, at least in this area of the law. Specifically, a California law firm by the name of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein is in the midst of what appears to be a pre-trial “shakedown.”

More specifically—brought to my attention by Daniel Aronowitz (writing for The Fid Guru Blog)—Leiff Cabraser is currently engaged in a letter writing campaign to plan sponsors, alerting them to a series of assertions about ERISA litigation, allegations about the fees paid by participants in their plans (relative to a standard that has been repeatedly criticized in that context at trial)—all alongside the fact that they’ve allegedly found an as-yet-unnamed plaintiff-participant in the plan in question that is said to be willing to represent a class action alleging the plan’s fiduciary breach. 

Oh—and the purpose of this campaign? Why, according to the letter, Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein is “open to discussing our client’s ERISA claims in hopes of reaching an early resolution…before a great deal of time and expense is incurred by any party in litigating this matter.” 

And if the threat of litigation was not sufficient to garner their attention, the letter closes, “This may be the last time that the parties have total control over the outcome of this matter without leaving it up to the Court. A settlement now, before the parties have incurred significant litigation expenses, will benefit both parties.”

Perhaps, but I’m guessing one party in particular.

Sadly, there’s nothing illegal in this approach—even though it smacks of extortion. As for the recipients of these letters, they may well know that the fees their plans/participants are actually paying are much different than the letter suggests, but they may NOT know of the shortcomings in the way the 401(k) Averages Book data is presented (though already noted by more than one court) and applied to their plans (Mr. Aronowitz does an artful job of explaining that, however, and it’s worth a look!). However, they probably ARE aware of the headlines that appear with distressing regularity tracking this type of litigation and may well have a sense of the multi-million-dollar settlements—whose pace and frequency seem to be quickening with each passing month. 

Looking at the arguments presented in most of these actions, it’s hard to dismiss the feeling that most are, in fact, (just) playing for that quick settlement; half of their filings (and most are pretty short) are simply a cut and paste regarding ERISA’s obligations alongside an inference (and sometimes more than an inference) that the plan fiduciaries in question (and those who appointed them) have fallen short of those obligations. They cite plans that are supposedly comparable (at least in size and participant count), extract numbers from government filings that don’t capture the full picture of costs (or services), lay those down next to data from sources known to have shortcomings for those purposes, toss in some “best practice” commentary from a trade publication or two, and rely on the forbearance of the judiciary to open the door to the more intrusive (and costly) process of discovery, deposition, and at some point, trial. 

That’s been the way of this type of litigation for awhile now, where it is simply easier—and, sadly, cheaper—for plan fiduciaries (and their insurers) to just settle and move on, though that process inevitably serves to fund the plaintiffs’ bar’s next “foray.”

Consequently, it’s been refreshing of late to see some federal district courts require more to establish a “plausible” argument to get past that point—to call for not only an accounting of fees, but of the services rendered for those fees. That surely complicates matters for the plaintiffs’ bar—but then, why should they be able to drag firms through the arduous process of discovery and depositions with no more than regurgitated copy, sweeping generalizations, and a table or two cobbled from unrelated sources? 

But now it seems that this law firm at least doesn’t even want to go through that exercise—and why should they if they can simply unleash a correspondence campaign that stands to bring in a payoff from who knows how many plans without even the bother of a court filing or appearance?

I know it’s easy to sit here and carry on as to why plan fiduciaries need to stand up to this kind of practice—to applaud the actions of federal judges who can see what’s going on here, and hope they continue to demand more than mere allegations and flawed assumptions. Unfortunately, this most recent undertaking is perhaps an obvious progression of a sad, regrettable trend.

But I can promise you that if this “works”—it won’t be the last.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

The Contingency 'Plan'

So, how much should the plaintiffs’ attorneys who wrangled a $12 million settlement receive for their time, effort and trouble?

Well, if you’ve been keeping up with such things, you’ll do some quick math and arrive at a figure of $4 million since, after all, these class action suits[i]—undertaken on a contingent fee basis—generally produce a pay day of somewhere between 25% and 30% of the settlement amount.[ii]

In this case, that’s the settlement amount requested by the law firm of Schlichter Bogard & Denton for their work in a suit involving Oracle Corp. and its 401(k) plan (over 6,300 hours—5,631.10 hours of attorney time & 696.5 hours of non-attorney time—according to the filing (Troudt v. Oracle Corp., D. Colo., No. 1:16-cv-00175, motion for attorneys’ fees 5/8/20). That’s aside from the requested reimbursement of what those same attorneys characterize as “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses of $410,501.60,[iii] and $25,000 for each of the named class representatives.”

The filing states that that fee “would not even provide the lodestar[iv] amount that the attorneys who handled this case would have generated on an hourly rate charge, and would provide no compensation or multiplier to Class Counsel for the substantial risk of nonpayment they undertook.” Specifically, those 6,327.60 hours add up to a combined lodestar of $4,316,867.00—only 92% of the hourly rate of the Schlichter lawyers and staff in working on this case.

Par for the course in such motions, the plaintiffs take pains to justify settlement in lieu of a full adjudication of the issues by pointing out the uncertainty of the result. Here they not only note that “even if Plaintiffs prevailed at trial the aggressive defense presented the possibility that Class Members would have to wait over a decade to receive any compensation pending multiple appeals,” explaining that both Tussey v. ABB, Inc. and Tibble v. Edison took more than a dozen years and involved multiple appeals.

The filing cites the “fact-intensive nature of the remaining imprudent investment claims,” the “adverse findings” in the case of Sacerdote v. New York Univ. “…on similar imprudent investment claims, including the court’s rejection of Plaintiffs’ expert, who was the same expert here.”

The petition makes two other obvious but seldom acknowledged points. First, that the named plaintiffs “…would not have been unable to pursue this litigation other than on a contingency fee basis and no competent plaintiffs’ lawyer or law firm would take on such risky representation for less than one-third of any monetary recovery.”

Second—and perhaps just as importantly—they acknowledge that “as a plaintiffs’ law firm that works solely on a contingency basis, the decision to pursue this class action and commit significant resources and potentially thousands of attorney hours to obtain a successful recovery impacts Class Counsel’s ability to handle other actions.”

And that, it seems fair to say, was always the contingency “plan.”

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i]This settlement, as have several in this genre, notably those brought by the Schlichter law firm, are more than just monetary, of course. This one in particular imposes limitations on the recordkeeper (current and over the next three years) in terms of soliciting plan participants for non-retirement plan related services.

[ii]Indeed, according to the filing, when you take into account the benefit of the tax deferral on the settlement amount once its restored to the 401(k), the requested fee is 28% of the settlement’s full value.

[iii]According to the filing, the “vast majority of these fees were incurred for necessary experts and to conduct critical depositions.”

[iv]Basically, the lodestar method involves multiplying the number of hours reasonably devoted to the case by a reasonable hourly rate—the latter may, of course, vary based on the geographical area, the nature of the services provided, and the experience of the attorneys. And, of course, what’s deemed “reasonable.”

ERISA Litigation – The Year in Review

There were a lot of ERISA litigation settlements in 2019 – but how are those trending?

An analysis by Bloomberg Law finds that class settlements in employee benefit disputes hit $449 million in 2019 – a figure that they noted was up significantly from 2018’s $291 million, but well short of the $559 million in settlements recorded in 2017.

That said, “only” about half of the 2019 “tab” – some $193 million – came from excessive fee suits, according to the report. The average of such settlements? $12 million.

In March, the parties in Tussey v. ABB, one of the oldest (2005) excessive fee suits, came to terms for $55 million. Other settlements announced included:

• Northrop Grumman ($16.5 million); 
• a 2017 stable value suit settlement finally approved; 
• the settlement terms of two fiduciary breach suits involving Safeway’s 401(k) plan, its investment structure, plan consultant, and selection of target-date funds have been submitted for court approval; 
• another suit involving the $2.3 billion 401(k) and 403(b) plans of the Allina Health System (which was for $2.425 million); and 
• a $1.2 million settlement with the $96.5 million 401(k) plan of Gucci America Inc. This settlement pales in comparison to the normal multi-billion dollar plans that normally draw the attention of the plaintiffs’ bar, but even here the plaintiff cited the plan’s “substantial assets” and said that the plan fiduciaries “…have significant bargaining power and the ability to demand low-cost administrative and investment management services within the marketplace for administration of 401(k) plans and the investment of 401(k) assets.” 

‘Excessive’ Forces

Another grouping came with the so-called excessive fee suits involving university 403(b) plans. The year saw five of those settled, the largest – and in many ways the most bizarre (allegations of a quid pro quo between the University and recordkeeper Fidelity, whose CEO Abigail Johnson sits on the university’s Board of Trustees) – was with MIT, which settled with plaintiffs represented by Schlichter Bogard & Denton for $18.1 million – and, what seems to be emerging as a trend in these cases, a series of non-monetary commitments for RFPs, changes in revenue-sharing practices, and even training for plan fiduciaries.

The largest settlements prior to MIT were with Vanderbilt University, which in April 2019 announced a $14,500,000 cash settlement, as well as a long list of process/procedural changes that were also to be monitored over a three-year period, and Johns Hopkins, which settled for $14,000,000, also alongside a number of plan design/procedural changes. In March, Brown University settled for $3.5 million, as well as “other, structural relief” – and a $10.65 million settlement, also alongside a series of changes in plan administration was approved in February.

However, on that “score,” it’s worth noting that St. Louis-based Washington University, New York University and Northwestern University have thus far prevailed in making their cases in court. The University of Pennsylvania, which in 2017 won at the district court level, in 2019 had that decision partially overturned by an appellate court. The plan fiduciaries’ motion for an en banc review of that decision was rebuffed earlier this year, but just ahead of the holidays, they petitioned the nation’s highest court to weigh in on the threshold for getting to trial.

‘Self’ Serving?

Financial services companies that included their own funds in their 401(k)s also found themselves a target of litigation in 2019, among those striking deals were SEI ($6.8 million), MFS ($6.875 million), Eaton Vance ($3.45 million), Franklin Templeton ($4.3 million, announced in 2018) – though the terms in the latter, particularly as regards the attorney fees – were not without controversy.
In November, the parties in a suit involving Invesco announced a settlement, but those terms haven’t yet been announced.

As it turns out, those settlement numbers are lower than those seen in 2018, according to Bloomberg. However, it’s also worth noting that we began the year with a big victory by the American Century plan fiduciaries where many of the allegations that have been widely made in these excessive fee cases were refuted by testimony and documentation that revealed the kind of thoughtful, ongoing, due diligence process that plan fiduciaries are often counseled to undertake.

But if you’re wondering where the “big” money was in ERISA litigation in 2019 – there was $100 million by Dignity Health to end a church plan lawsuit (though that settlement hasn’t yet been approved, pending a resolution on the issue of attorneys’ fees), and SSM Health Care Corp. and St. Anthony Medical Center Inc. settled church plan lawsuits for $60 million and $4 million, respectively, according to the report. These (and a number of 2018 settlements) came in the wake of a 2017 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding these programs at religiously affiliated hospitals that treat their pension plans as ERISA-exempt “church plans.” The lawsuits alleged that the hospitals abused ERISA’s religious exemption to significantly underfund their pensions.

What Next?

It seems likely that proprietary fund suits will continue to emerge (as a couple did in Q4), and while the American Century case would seem to provide a solid roadmap for defense, settlement – and settlement on the scheduled date of trial – seems to be becoming the order of the day. While the university suits seem likely to continue, that could change if the Supreme Court takes up, and decides in favor of the University of Pennsylvania defendants. As for whether excessive fee litigation will (finally) move down market – there’s evidence (the Gucci case noted above) that such things remain possible, though the contingent fee nature of compensation for the plaintiffs’ bar may serve to hold such things in check for a while longer. And yet, there are smaller law firms just now entering the “fray”… 

Advisors? Well, they’ve mostly avoided being drawn into the crosshairs of ERISA litigation – but not always.

If we’ve learned nothing else from this year of litigation, it’s what we’ve always known: a prudent process (eventually) prevails.

But sometimes it’s (apparently) cheaper to just settle.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD