‘Standing,’ Still

Our industry has long fretted over how 401(k) participants will respond to volatile markets. And perhaps not surprisingly, these days the headlines are, generally speaking, full of “stay the course” assurances.   

That said, as recently as a month ago the headlines—even OUR headlines read things like “Light 401(k) Trades in July Even as Wall Street Posts Strong Month, Hot July Brought Cool 401(k) Traders, July Brings Much-Needed Calm to 401k Trading Activity, 401(k) Trading Light in July Despite Market Gains.” As though this is a surprising result.

In fact, as long as I can remember, our industry (or at least its headline writers) has long been somewhat amazed that participants have been as “resilient” in the face of volatile markets as they have—consistently—been over time. We’ve rationalized that ostensibly rational behavior in different ways, at different times. In 1987 (before there was daily trading in 401(k)s) it was said that the markets had come back before participants (via those once-a-quarter transfer windows) had a chance to respond. In 2001-2002, we told ourselves that our brilliant education programs (not to mention the ubiquitous “stay the course” messages) had an impact. In 2007-2008, we comforted ourselves with the notion that there was nowhere (else) to go (granted, that wasn’t really comforting).

Today—though it’s not really mentioned—I’d like to believe that it has something to do with the shift to professional asset allocation products[i]; target-date funds and managed accounts. After all, haven’t we told participants that the purpose of these platforms was to leave the business of investing to the professionals?

But whatever rationale we may want to apply, the reality has always been that there’s not much trading activity in 401(k) accounts, even during periods of extreme volatility and concern. This is routinely borne out by annual reports from Vanguard and Fidelity, and more frequently tracked (on a monthly basis) by Alight[ii]. Inevitably the commentary commends those who “stay the course,” because those who do transfer monies tend to “lock in” their losses, selling low and buying high. Those who do transfer serve as cautionary tales—perhaps even reassuring the participants who, once again, failed to do anything.      

The reality is that participants, generally speaking, aren’t really qualified to make these kind of investment decisions, particularly during periods of extreme volatility. Let’s face it, even the best self-directed investors typically have a day job that doesn’t allow the time or inclination to keep up with the markets, or the trends that underlie them (not to mention that some of those great investing ideas at 10:00 AM fade by the time that fund trading actually occurs at the market close). The advent of daily valuation allowed us to make quick, if not always wise, decisions—but, thankfully, most don’t. 

The bottom line is that while the counsel provided participants during times like these is generally “stay the course”—that counsel is valid only if the course you’re on was correct in the first place. 

  - Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] Indeed, Vanguard notes that in 2021, only 3% of all pure target-date fund investors made an exchange, a rate nearly five times lower than all other investors.

[ii] The Alight 401(k) index recorded 7.5 times normal trading on Feb. 22 as Russian troops massed near the Ukraine border, 2.9 times normal trading the next day, and 6 times normal trading on Feb. 24 when the invasion began.  But “normal” is “when the net daily movement of participants’ balances, as a percent of total 401(k) balances within the Alight Solutions 401(k) Index™, equals between 0.3 times and 1.5 times the average daily net activity of the preceding 12 months.” Vanguard’s assessment of 2021 activity is that only 8% of participants traded, and just 4.3% did in 2022 (through June 30) while Fidelity says just 5% did (and 85% of those only did so once). Principal reported 2.44% traded, according to a MarketWatch report.   

Does Financial Wellness (Still) Need an ROI?

The ROI for financial wellness has always been elusive—but a new survey suggests that it might not matter.

Asked “Why are you creating or expanding your financial wellbeing program?”, respondents to Alight’s 17th edition of Hot Topics in Retirement & Financial Wellbeing said that not only was financial wellness their top priority, more than half (56%) said that the importance of financial wellbeing has increased at their organization over the last two years, and none said the focused has decreased. 

But—asked why they were creating or expanding their financial wellbeing program, the respondents largely ignored the traditional ROI metrics. The most common answer was nothing more concrete than to “enhance the overall employee experience (85%), and right behind that was the simple proposition that “we believe it is the right thing to do (84%). Even HR’s traditional favorite—“increase employee engagement”—at 72%—was well behind those arguably subjective gauges. 

“Engagement” isn’t exactly a new measure—but even that requires equating employee utilization with a return of value to the organization’s bottom line. It’s not that it doesn’t have value, but it’s darned hard to quantify. Indeed, some experts argue that we shouldn’t even try.

Goals Posts

Well down the list for these plan sponsors were common goals such as improved retirement statistics (e.g., improved adequacy, decreased leakage, higher participation rate), cited by fewer than half (49%), or the traditional “to increase attractiveness and/or differentiate ourselves as an employer,” which was identified by just 47%. The goals that many early advocates of financial wellness had touted—to “decrease employee time spent addressing financial issues (either on the job or through absenteeism)” was mentioned by just 43%, and as for “decreased medical costs”—a mere 14% indicated that was a rationale. Nor was it a matter of responding to worker interest—just 38% cited employees asking for these types of benefits as a factor.

Don’t get me wrong—it’s not as though there haven’t been attempts made to quantify the return on the time and monetary investment in these programs, certainly by the firms that promote these services—but getting to those results generally involves adopting not just the methodologies, but the calculus employed in assigning value to those results. 

Measure ‘Meants’

Despite the well-intentioned efforts of many, financial wellness remains one of those concepts that is still, largely anyway, (just) a concept—one with varied definitions, inconsistent applications, and disparate providers—and thus one that is notoriously frustrating to assign a dollar value[i] to—other than the cost of such programs, which when, done properly, we’re assured, costs money.

In fact, asked how they intended to measure the results of their financial wellbeing program, far and away the most common response—cited by 85%—was employee usage of benefits. As metrics go, it’s certainly an important one—because if the program isn’t being used, there can be no real impact. That said, the kinds of impact that have been more commonly associated with a quantifiable ROI—improvements in retirement statistics (55%), medical costs (e.g., health care, disability, workers compensation) (12%) and reductions in absenteeism (5%)—followed distantly. Even employee engagement—as noted earlier, a notoriously difficult aspect to quantify—was cited by only about half (52%) of plan sponsors—and 6% admitted that they did not intend to measure the results of their program.

Now, these survey results are drawn from a relatively small group of relatively large plan sponsors: 116 of them, albeit with a median employee base of 19,300 (average of 47,000). On the other hand, the patterns at evidence among larger employers have long been seen as a something of a precursor for what will eventually take hold “downmarket.” 

What remains to be seen is whether the apparent diminution of focus on traditional ROI measures among these plan sponsors suggests that those contributions to the bottom line were always illusory—or perhaps that they weren’t a necessary affirmation of the pursuit of financial wellness after all. 

- Nevin E. Adams, JD

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[i] That said, a couple of years back (see Building a Bottom Line for Financial Wellness), I was able to cobble together a formula of sorts, that looked something like “Projected reduction in turnover times current turnover rate times the estimated cost of replacing a worker times the number of employees.” That said, while it’s a calculation with discernable variables, those are still fraught with “fill in the blank” assumptions. 

‘Likely’ Stories

It is customary when sharing (or reading) the portents of a survey to focus on the actions that respondents say they have, or will undertake. But what about the things they say they will not do?

Human beings gravitate toward “norms,” of course. Plan sponsors, certainly those conscious of the personal liability that accompanies those responsibilities, can hardly be blamed for seeking the behavioral norms of their profession, drawing comfort from the collective movement of the “pack,” particularly with new and/or controversial ideas.

Large ‘Charge’

This past weekend I was reviewing Alight Solution’s 2019 Hot Topics in Retirement and Financial Wellbeing report. But, while the positive trendlines on things like financial wellness were interesting, what struck me in reviewing this particular survey were the (relatively) strong percentage weighing in on things they said they were notlikely to do, including:

• evaluate phased retirement alternatives (66% not likely to do)
• offer qualifying longevity annuity contract (QLAC) – 86%
• facilitate purchasing annuities outside the plan as options for plan distributions – 85%
• reduce the number of loans available – 86%
• allow terminated participants to continue loan repayments to reduce frequency of loan defaults – 67%
• offer student loan repayment assistance – 48%
• measure employee perceptions and/or suggestions for benefit improvements – 30%

Not to mention the more than half (53%) who said they were not likely to address lifetime income, a similar 51% were not likely to show projected health care costs in retirement projections, not to mention the 39% who were not likely to discourage cashouts, or the quarter (25%) who were not likely to do anything about minimizing leakage.

Additionally, 25% (up from 21%) had no plans to implement initiative to address the retirement savings gap, 27% (up from 25%) were not at all likely to project the expected retirement income adequacy of the population, and 29% were not at all likely to “offer services, tools, or education campaigns on debt management.”

‘Not’ Likely

While the survey cited an impressive two-thirds of surveyed employers responding they are very likely to take steps in 2019 to create or focus on the financial wellbeing of their workers in ways that go beyond retirement savings – and even though this percentage grew from 30% in 2014 to 65% in 2019 – fully one in eight of these very large employers said they were not likely to create a broad financial wellbeing strategy. And there was the 1 in 10 who said they were not likely to recognize retirement readiness.

It has, of course, long been accepted wisdom that trends among larger employers are instructive in anticipating movements down market – and, in fact, on many things it has been (a notable exception: automatic enrollment, which, a decade after the Pension Protection Act’s implementation, among smaller programs significantly lags adoption by larger plans). Mind you, this survey is based on the perspectives of not just large employers – but very large employers – that employ, on average, 44,500 workers – and 17,000 even at the median (although 2% of the respondents had less than 1,000 workers). Consequently, those trendlines might be meaningful for the plans with which you work (particularly larger employers) – then again, they may not.

More than that, one should, of course, be careful in reading too much into trendlines from one period to the next – it’s rare that the survey respondents in one period are identical to those in another, and thus the difference – be it positive or negative – but particularly when the jumps are large – might be nothing more than what one group of employers say they will do versus a completely different group at a different point in time.

Caution is also warranted in reading too much into statements regarding planned, or intended, actions. While they’re doubtless an accurate assessment of planned undertakings at the time, we’re all very aware of how often those good intentions get derailed by any number of unanticipated events.

That said, I’d argue that in contemplating future trends, there’s merit in spending as much time looking at what plan sponsors say they aren’t likely to do, as we do the possibilities.

- Nevin E. Adams, JD